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Abstract 
This thesis is an examination of how British television news reported on the Peace 
Accords signed between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators at the Wye River 
Plantation, Maryland USA in October 1998. The research involves three elements. 
Firstly a review of the historiography of the conflict which sketches out the range of 
views on the history and origins of the dispute. Secondly a content analysis of the 
peace negotiations themselves. This examines how journalists drew on the range of 
views present in the historiography in order to contextualise coverage and provide 
explanations for the conflict. Thirdly the thesis looks at the various factors in 
production which influence the construction of news in this area, and links this to 
theoretical debates in the area. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The former Washington Post publisher Philip Graham famously described j ournalism 
as the 'first draft of history'. Recent research suggests that if anything Graham may 
actually be understating the true influence of the media. The important role played by 
television news in the formation of public knowledge means that for many members 
of the public this type of journalism represents not just the 'first draft' but the only 
draft of history. Studies have shown that approximately 80 percent of the public rely 
on television news as their source of information on world news (Committee on 
Standards in Public Life, 2004; Philo & Berry, 2004; ITC, 2003). Furthermore 
broadcast j ournalism retains a relatively high degree of public trust compared to other 
media and pubic institutions. A September 2004 survey found that that television 
news is considered significantly more trustworthy than broadsheet j ournalism and 
seven times more so than the tabloid press. Partly this may be related to inherent 
veracity of the moving image embodied in the famous cliche that the 'camera never 
lies'. Tom Bums, the historian of the BBC notes that: 
because television news and current affairs programmes convey action, 
movement, facial expression and demeanour, scenes and actors, as well as 
verbal messages, they seem more complete, more satisfactory than any 
account provided by newspapers. 'Viewability' is easily construed as 
reliability because any intervention by broadcasters is largely invisible, and 
because the dramatic intensity of film and video recording carries conviction 
and guarantees authenticity in ways in which words cannot (Bums, 1977: 206, 
cited in Glasgow Media Group, 1993: 4) 
However television is also likely to be trusted because of its claims to impartiality, 
neutrality and objectivity. News is under a statutory obligation to be balanced and 
impartial, and to refrain from editorialising in its broadcasts. As Schlesinger notes the 
notion of being non-partisan and 'above the fray' in matters of public controversy has 
been the defining ethos of the BBC: 
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Impartiality is the linchpin of the BBC's ideology: it is a notion saturated with 
political and philosophical implications. What the BBC claims, when it says it 
is 'impartial', is that it has achieved institutional detachment from the conflicts 
of British society, and that the Corporation is independent of all interests. The 
news is therefore held to represent all interests and points of view without an 
evaluative commitment to any (1978: 163). 
What appears on television news under the banner of impartiality has attracted 
academic research (e. g. Glasgow Media Group, 1993,1985,1983,1982,1976; Miller, 
1994; Schlesinger, 1978; Murdock, 1973; Morley, 1976). Much of this research has 
tended to conclude that in practice, impartiality has usually meant reporting on the 
spectrum of views present at the Palace of Westminster. This is not to say that 
oppositional or dissident voices are never heard, but that due to a variety of factors 
embedded in the news production process, they tend to be excluded. As Philo notes in 
the struggle to be heard the 'structural position of the state and its information 
managers is one of potential dominance' but it is a dominance 'contested by 
oppositional groups and through the interplay of the different organisational and 
commercial priorities of the media' (Philo 1995: 222). 
This thesis is an examination of how television news approaches its 
obligations to neutrality and impartiality when reporting on the one of the most 
controversial of all foreign news stories, the long running conflict between the Israelis 
and Palestinians. This research will examine whether broadcasters achieve balance or 
if some perspectives predominate. It will also evaluate the various factors and 
constraints which impinge upon the reporting of the dispute, and relate them to the 
theoretical debates in the area. In order to examine the range of views on the origins 
and history of the conflict, I present in chapter two a historiography of the conflict 
indicating the areas of consensus, and the points where historians diverge. In Chapter 
three I present a content analysis of television news coverage of the peace talks 
between the Israelis and Palestinians which took place in America in October 1998. 
The research looks at how much context and background is present and whether 
certain perspectives and explanations predominate in reporting. In chapter four I look 
at the constraints and pressures that journalists face in reporting on the conflict. The 
final chapter pulls all the threads together and addresses some of the theoretical 
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debates around how the various political, economic, cultural and organisational 
contexts affect the production of television news. 
However I want to start in this chapter by introducing the themes and debates 
which follow. This will involve a discussion of the uniquely controversial 
historiography of the conflict, together with a literature review of previous content 
analyses in the area, and an assessment of the theoretical arguments about the various 
factors effecting the production of news. 
The Controversial Historiogrgphy of the Conflict 
In chapter two I will examine various different perspectives on the history of 
the conflict. This is to lay out the competing narratives which journalists can draw 
upon in explaining the conflict to viewers. Although there are areas of consensus 
amongst historians there are also many areas over which there is still great 
disagreement. As the Princeton historian L. Carl Brown has noted 'Israel's crowded 
history has been matched by a massive historiography. Israelis and foreigners, friends 
and foes, participants and observers, professionals and amateurs -- all have entered the 
debate. ' (Foreign Affairs, July/August 1998). Within this debate there has been much 
heat, as well as light, with accusations of academic dishonesty being unusually 
common. Indeed some have suggested that the historians are themselves directly 
involved as 'combatants' in the conflict. Writing in the New Statesman Stephen Howe 
comments that: 
All wars, in a sense, are history wars. Their protagonists are driven by rival 
visions of the past, and people are willing to kill or die for those visions, at 
least as much as they are for ideas about the future. The unending violence 
between Israelis and Palestinians is a particularly extreme case. There, 
historians themselves are combatants, whether they are working to sustain the 
national myths that fuel the conflict, or trying to undermine them. (5 August 
2002) 
For more than thirty years after the 1948 war there existed within Israeli 
society what could be described as an official or canonical Zionist history of the 
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conflict. This narrative was accepted by the great bulk of the population and taught in 
all Israeli schools. According to the Israeli historian Avi Shlaim (2004) it fulfilled two 
objectives. Firstly, 'it instilled a sense of nationhood in Jews from various countries of 
origin' and secondly, 'it enlisted international sympathy and support for the fledgling 
State of Israel' However he also notes that 'the one cause it emphatically did not serve 
is that of mutual understanding and reconciliation between Jews and Arabs. ' The 
traditional narrative maintained that the Jewish attempt to create a homeland in their 
ancestral lands in Palestine was a benign affair, which sought to develop the backward 
and sparsely populated country and bring the benefits of modernity to the Arab 
population. Under the British Mandate Jewish attempts to foster mutual understanding 
and cooperation were met with intransigence and outright hostility from the local 
Arab population. Avi Shlaim sketches out the traditional narrative from the pivotal 
year of 1948 onwards: 
The conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine came to a head following 
the passage, on 29 November 1947, of the United Nations partition resolution 
which called for the establishment of two states, one Jewish and one Arab. 
The Jews accepted the UN plan despite the painful sacrifices it entailed but the 
Palestinians, the neighbouring Arab states, and the Arab League rejected it. 
Great Britain did everything in its power towards the end of the Palestine 
Mandate to frustrate the establishment of the Jewish state envisaged in the UN 
plan. With the expiry of the Mandate and the proclamation of the State of 
Israel, five Arab states sent their armies into Palestine with the firm intention 
of strangling the Jewish state at birth. The subsequent struggle was an unequal 
one between a Jewish David and an Arab Goliath. The infant Jewish state 
fought a desperate, heroic, and ultimately successful battle for survival against 
overwhelming odds. During the war, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians 
fled to the neighbouring Arab states, mainly in response to orders from their 
leaders and despite Jewish pleas to stay and demonstrate that peaceful co- 
existence was possible. After the war, the story continues, Israeli leaders 
sought peace with all their heart and all their might but there was no one to 
talk to on the other side. Arab intransigence alone was responsible for the 
political deadlock that was not broken until President Anwar Sadat's visit to 
Jerusalem thirty years later. (2004) 
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The Palestinian narrative of the conflict could hardly be more different. It 
regarded Jewish immigration into Palestine as a form of European colonialism and 
questioned the right of the British government to set up a Jewish homeland in an area 
where a settled population had been living for hundreds of years. They believed that 
the Jewish immigrants came to take their land and dominate them, rather than develop 
the country for the mutual benefit of both peoples. The 1948 war was as seen as 
national catastrophe in which most Palestinians were ethnically cleansed in line with 
long held plans to 'transfer' the indigenous population. After the war the Israeli state 
despite pressure from the 'LN refused to allow the return of the refugees it had 
expelled, strengthening the Palestinian view that the expulsions were premeditated. 
The 1956 and 1967 wars were seen as attempts at territorial expansion by Israel, and 
the 1982 invasion of Lebanon as well as the settlement program in the occupied 
territories were seen as attempts to crush Palestinian nationalism and prevent the 
emergence of a Palestinian state. 
It is clear that there is little common ground in the official Israeli and 
Palestinian narratives. However from the late 1970s onwards the traditional Israeli 
narrative began to come under increasing pressure from dissident academics within 
Israel. Initially it was sociologists rather than historians who began to question the 
dominant perspective. Sociologists such as Shlomo Swirski and Deborah Bernstein 
questioned the dominant functionalist paradigm in Israeli sociology which stressed the 
integration and adaptation of Israel's diverse social groups. These sociologists saw 
Israeli society riven by inequality and schisms between Ashkenazi (of European 
origin) and Mizrahim (of Middle eastern origin) Jews, between secular and orthodox 
Jews, between the Arab and Jewish citizens of the state and between the Israeli 
occupying forces and the Palestinians living under military rule. The Israeli 
sociologist Lawrence Silberstein suggests that the controversial 1982 Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon placed further strain on the traditional Israeli version of history: 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the ensuing sense of shock, 
disillusionment and demoralization led to the emergence of peace groups 
previously unknown in Israel. In the wake of that war, many Israelis came to 
feel a previously unknown scepticism concerning Israel's officially stated 
commitment to fighting only defensive and to pursuing peace on all fronts. 
The trauma of Lebanon became the equivalent of the trauma of Vietnam in the 
5 
United States in the nineteen sixties and seventies. In the meantime the effects 
of the long years of occupying territories conquered in the 1967 War and 
controlling a hostile and restless population rendered problematic the 
dominant representations of Zionism as a humane, progressive movement. 
(Silberstein, 1999: 72) 
In the aftermath of the Lebanon invasion the prime minister Menachem Begin 
gave a lecture to the IDF staff academy on wars of choice and wars of no choice in 
which he argued that the Lebanon war like the 1956 Suez War was a war of choice 
undertaken for political objectives. Shlaim suggests that with 'this admission, 
unprecedented in the history of the Zionist movement, the national consensus round 
the notion of ein breira [no choice] began to crumble, creating political space for a 
critical re-examination of the country's earlier history' (2004). The following year an 
Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling published a study entitled Zionism and 
Territory: The Socio- Territorial Dimension of Zionist Politics which challenged the 
notion that pre- 1948 Jewish settlement was undertaken to benefit both the both Jewish 
and Arab populations. Kimmerling, for the first time in the Israeli academy, utilized a 
European colonial model to analyse Jewish settlement policies, thus substantially 
narrowing the gap with the Palestinian perspective of this period. The following year 
Tom Segev, a journalist and historian published 1949: The First Israelis which 
challenged other aspects of the official history. These included the claims that the 
Palestinian refugees of 1948 had left their homes willingly, that Israel did everything 
it could to bring about peace after 1948, and that the Middle Eastern Jews who arrived 
in Israel after 1948 were integrated into the collective without economic and social 
discrimination. Silberstein suggest that Segev's book was a direct challenge to many 
aspects of how Israeli saw themselves and their relationship to the state: 
Typifying the new scholarship emerging in the 1980s and 1990s, Segev argued 
that his book 'shattered a firmly established self-image and exposed as mere 
myths a large number of long established truisms. ' These 'myths' grounded in 
Zionist discourse and produced and disseminated by the state apparatus, 
provided Israelis with the basic materials out of which they constructed their 
self understanding as a collective. Additionally they provided the state with its 
basic legitimation. Constituting the 'common sense' of Israeli culture, they 
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shaped the way in which most Israelis viewed social, cultural and political 
reality. (1999: 77). 
However it wasn't until 1988 that the issues raised by the 'new historians' 
broke into the mainstream. In that year four works were released with challenged 
fundamental aspects of the traditional history: Avi Shlaim's Collusion across the 
Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition ofPalestine; Simha 
Flapan's The Birth of1srael: Myths and Realities; Benny Morris's The Birth of the 
Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949; and Ilan Pappe's Britain and the Arab- 
Israeli Conflict, 1947-5. All of these works took issue with the traditional Israeli 
narrative of 1948 and the notion that Israel had earnestly sought peace after the war. 
Benny Morris's book in particular provoked a furious backlash amongst some Israelis. 
The most ferocious criticism came from Shabtai Teveth, a journalist and biographer 
of David Ben-Gurion, who penned an article entitled 'Charging Israel with Original 
Sin' which appeared in the conservative American-Jewish monthly Commentary 
(September 1989). In the article Teveth accused Morris of producing a 'farrago of 
distortions, omissions, tendentious readings, and outright falsifications', whose 
political purpose was to generate sympathy for the Palestinians and de-legitimate the 
Israeli state (cited in Shlaim, 2004). As Silberstein notes the debate demonstrated that 
'far more than scholarly methods and historical accuracy were at stake. Extending far 
beyond the walls of the academy, the questions raised by the young scholars had the 
effect of problematizing prevailing notions of Israeli collective identity as well as the 
trustworthiness of the authorities of the state' (1999: 84). Throughout the 1990s the 
new historians continued to question further aspects of the traditional Israeli history 
and in particular whether it was the Arab or Israeli intransigence which was to blame 
for the failure to conclude peace treaties. Shlaim suggests that this issue is: 
particularly sensitive because it entails the allocating of responsibility for the 
persistence of the conflict. At the core of the old version is the image of the 
Arab world as a monolithic and implacably hostile enemy. According to this 
version, Israel's leaders strove indefatigably towards a peaceful settlement of 
the dispute but all their efforts foundered on the rocks of Arab intransigence. 
The revisionist version holds that Israel was more inflexible than the Arab 
states and that she consequently bears a larger share of the responsibility for 
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the diplomatic stalemate that remained in place long after the ending of 
military hostilities. (2004) 
In 1999 the debate was re-ignited by the publication of two highly influential works, 
Avi Shlaim's The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World and Benny Morris's 
Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1999. Both drew 
plaudits from European and some Israelis critics but were also subject to significant 
criticism. In a Ha'aretz article Israeli novelist Ahron Meged accused Shlaim and 
Morris of leading the country towards collective suicide, whilst in a ten page review 
of the books in The New Republic Anita Shapira accused the authors of being 
'heretical elements' who 'doubted the right of Israel to exist and stressed the wrongs 
that were perpetrated against the Arabs' (29 November 1999). Shlaim claimed that 
Shapira's review was inspired by the fear that the 'old historians' were 'losing the 
battle for the hearts and minds of their compatriots' and that the article was 'redolent 
of defeat on the intellectual battlefield'. The outbreak of the second intifada in late 
2000 and the election of the hardline Sharon administration led to a move away from 
the 'new history' and a return to the traditional narrative. Six months before his 
election Ariel Sharon was asked what changes he would like to see to the Israeli 
education sysem and he replied that he 'would like them to study the history of the 
people of Israel and the land of Israel ... the children must be taught Jewish-Zionist 
values, and the 'new historians' must not be taught. ' (cited in Shlaim, 2004). When 
the Sharon administration came to power, the new education minister Limor Livnat 
ordered the re-writing of all the history books for secondary school and the removal of 
all traces of the 'new history'. 
During the 1980s and 1990s the new historians had considerably narrowed the 
gap between the Israel and Palestinian versions of the conflict. Pappe suugest that 
there is now enough common ground between the two versions to create what he 
describes as a 'bridging narrative' on the events of 1948. This he suggests is 
important in creating the conditions for a sucessftil resolution to the conflict since it 
entails the recognition by Israel of 'the centrality of the refugee problem in the 
Palestinian historical narrative, collective memory and national ethos' (1999: 59). 
Similarly another of the 'new historians' Avi Shlairn also sees a narrowing of the gap 
between the narratives as a necessary pre-condition for a resolution of the conflict: 
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In all these different ways, the new history helped to create a climate, on both 
sides of the Israeli-Arab divide, which was conducive to the continuation of 
the peace process. As Bishop Tutu pointed out in the South African context, it 
is difficult to know what to forgive unless we know what happened. In the 
Middle East, as in South Africa, it is necessary to understand the past in order 
to go forward ... Xenophobic and self-righteous national narratives only 
fuel 
and prolong this tragic conflict. A more complex and fair-minded 
understanding of the past is therefore essential for preserving at least the 
prospect of reconciliation in the future (2004). 
Both the Israeli and Palestinian positions, and justifications for their actions 
are intimately linked to their particular version of the past. Into this controversy 
journalists must select certain salient information to contextualise stories and explain 
events. I now want to review research which has looked at how j ournalists have tried 
to accomplish this. 
Previous Research on Media Coverage of the Israel-Palestine Conflict 
American Research 
One approach adopted by researchers has been to examine how reporting on the 
conflict has changed over time. Zaharna examined the portrayal of Palestinians in 
Time magazine between 1947 and 1993. He suggests that because of the close 
relationship between Israel and the United States news from Israel has been treated 
like a domestic story, and that rather than balancing Israeli and Palestinian sources 
Time has tended to quote 'extensively from American politicians and Israelis' and that 
'because American politicians tended to be supportive of Israeli views this practice 
[has] served to reinforce the Israeli perspective and negate the Palestinian message' 
(1995: 3 8-39). In the period around the creation of the Israeli state Zaharna claims 
that Jewish leaders were cited much more frequently than Arab leaders and that Time 
featured many personalised stories of Jews in Palestine. Personalised stories on 
Palestinians did not begin to appear in the magazine until the first intifada in 1988. In 
the period from 1950 until the Six Day War Zaharna found that descriptions of Arab 
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leaders corresponded closely with American foreign policy. Wl-iilst the US ally King 
Hussein of Jordan was presented positively, Nasser was portrayed as a 'prominent 
Arab villain' 0 995: 4 1). From this period until the outbreak of the first intifada 
Palestinians had a dual image of terrorist and refugee. Palestinians were portrayed as 
'dedicated, vicious political fanatics' (Time, 21 September 1970) or 'unpredictable 
terrorists' (Time, 19 March 1973) and their behaviour described as 'insensible terror' 
(Time, 27 May 1974) or 'savage and irrational' (Time, 7 January 1974). Zaharna 
suggests that President Carter's call for a Palestinian homeland in 1977 and the Camp 
David agreements, which called for expanded Palestinian autonomy, increased the 
legitimacy of their cause whilst the Sabra and Shatilla killings maintained their image 
as victims. During the first intifada the author found that Time produced more positive 
images of Palestinians, sometimes highlighting their claims to independence and self- 
determination. He suggests that this may have been partly due to attacks on foreign 
journalists by members of the IDF. In the period leading up to the Oslo accords 
Zahama found that positive images of Yasser Arafat became much more frequent. He 
suggests that Arafat's deal making with Israel led to him being recognised as a 
legitimate leader of the Palestinians nineteen years after he was officially recognised 
by the United Nations and that 'the irony was that the gap between the Palestinian 
leadership and people's media image was ultimate bridged through the PLO's ability 
not to align itself with its own people in 1974 but with Israel in 1993' (1995: 47). 
Noakes and Wilkins (2002) examined a random sample of Associated Press 
and New York Times articles for the period 1984-1998 and assessed three variables: 
how much attention the conflict received; which sources were cited; and how 
Palestinian actions were framed. Noakes and Wilkins found that both the first intifada 
and the beginning of the Oslo peace process in 1993 led to a large increase in news 
coverage. They argue that the first intifada 'as a grassroots protest against an 
oppressive government ... 
frame[d] the Palestinian cause in terms similar to those 
advanced by many movements in the US including the Civil Rights Movement' and 
that 'such frames resonate [d] with the producers of TV news and the American 
public' (2002: 659). However the authors offer no evidence in form of interviews or 
focus group studies with viewers or broadcasters to support these claims. Other 
research in this area, suggests that it can be dangerous to make assumptions about 
how the activities of Palestinians opposing the occupation will be read by audiences, 
as a crucial factor is whether viewers see the struggle as legitimate (Philo & Berry, 
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2004). Noakes and Wilkins did find that a consistent pattern in sourcing that official 
Israel spokespersons were consistently cited more than official Palestinian sources by 
a factor of two to one, although the use of official Palestinian sources increased 
markedly after the signing of the Oslo agreements. They also found that the framing 
of Palestinian resistance changed over time. Prior to the first intifada Palestinians 
were three times more likely to be portrayed as 'terrorists' rather than the 'victims' in 
the struggle, whilst during the uprising they were presented as terrorists only slightly 
more than victims. The authors claim that: 
It was also during the intifada period that the Palestinian struggle was most 
likely to be presented as just. Fewer than one out of ten news articles framed 
the Palestinian struggle as justified prior to the intifada, but more than one 
quarter (27.5 percent) of the articles did so during the intifada. The appearance 
of this frame in US news media, however declines quickly in subsequent 
periods. In contrast, Palestinians were most likely to be seen to have a right to 
self-determination or national sovereignty after the Oslo Accords (2002: 664) 
Although the researchers do not draw the conclusion, one possible explanation 
for the media choosing to portray the Palestinian demand for national self- 
determination more favourably after the Oslo Accords was that they were taking their 
cue from official American foreign policy. The signing of the accords on the White 
House lawn in 1993 may have indicted to news editors and j ourrialists that the 
Palestinian claim to self-determination was now a legitimate perspective. 
Other research has focused on how the media reported on specific events, such 
as the first Palestinian intifada. For instance, Daniel (1995) argues that images from 
the first intifada presented a challenge to the dominant representation of the conflict. 
She maintains that most news fits into standard storylines in which the 'prevailing 
conventional wisdom is not challenged and the status quo interpretation of the world 
is preserved' (1995: 64). However the 1987 uprising 'presented a serious challenge to 
the predominant conception of Israel as a tiny democracy surrounded by hostile forces 
and constantly threatened by Palestinian terrorists' (1995: 62). She suggests that the 
images of women and children facing faces tanks and an-ned with stones didn't fit 
with previous images of 'turban shrouded, almost exclusively male militants' (1995: 
67). Thus footage from the conflict 'recontextualised the Palestinian population as one 
composed not just of a few terrorist males but of families and community, a major 
base for identification' (1995: 68). Daniel suggests that the introduction of such 
complexities 'and grey areas into a situation that was previously a clear contest of 
good and evil, of victim and villain' served to open up discussion on issues such the 
occupation, and Palestinian demands for self-determination (1995: 67). She also cites 
American public opinion data to argue that public opinion of Palestinians became 
more positive during the intifada. 
Wolfsfeld in an another study of American media coverage of the first intifada 
argues that the uprising provided 'an almost textbook case of how a seemingly weaker 
challenger can shatter the authorities' domination over the political environment and 
successfully promote their frames to the news media' (1997: 127). Wolfsfeld argues 
that two frames vied for competition in the intifada, the 'law and order frame' which 
defined the uprising as composed of criminal acts and social disorder, and the 
'injustice and defiance frame' which presented the uprising as a response to a 'brutal 
military occupation'. Echoing the claims made by Daniel above, Wolfsfeld argued 
that the 'injustice and defiance frame' was more successful because the 
'confrontations in the streets and allies of the West Bank and Gaza provided more 
than just journalistic resonance, they also had a good fit with Palestinian claims 
concerning Israeli brutality' (1997: 153). Also in line with the position taken by 
Noakes and Wilkins, Wolfsfeld argues that the 'information and images collected by 
American journalists resonated both professionally and politically with an injustice 
and defiance frame' a perspective which 'dominates the political culture of American 
television news' (1997: 160). The author argues that the 'Palestinians were the clear 
winners in the cultural contest over the intifada' because they were successful in 
emphasising that the occupation was to blame. However in the absence of any 
audience research it is speculative to impose a priori categories of understanding on 
viewers, by assuming that they will employ an 'injustice and defiance frame' when 
interpreting the uprising. Also the same criticism applies to his assumption that the 
inequities of the occupation were the dominant theme in coverage. As a former 
member of the IDF the consequences of the intifada may be clear to the writer, but 
some audience research suggests that ordinary viewers are unlikely to understand its 
social ramifications unless they are properly explained (Philo & Berry, 2004). 
Gilboa (1993) argues that the media coverage of the intifada was 'biased' 
against Israel, but despite this 'American chiefly blamed the PLO for the violence and 
12 
were divided on other important issues: whether the riots were acts of violence or acts 
of disobedience, whether the reason for the violence were legitimate or not' (1993: 
98). Gilboa points to public opinion research which found that 63 percent of 
Americans thought the PLO a 'terrorist organisation' and only fourteen percent who 
saw it as a 'national liberation movement', and claimed that 'despite the forceful 
demands of the Palestinians to establish an independent Palestinian state5 the US 
public did not support this solution' (1993 : 102) However some may question the 
impartiality of Gilboa's methods. Much of the research he cites which purports to 
show an anti-Israel bias was produced by pro-Israel lobby groups like the Anti- 
Defamation League, whilst some of the opinion polling questions he cites are leading. 
For instance one question asked: 
Which of the two opinions is closer to yours: The US shouldn't negotiate with 
the PLO because they are terrorists and they refuse to recognise the right of 
Israel to exist; or in order to bring about peace in the Middle East we should 
be willing to talk to all parties involved? (1993: 104) 
More recent research on the al Aqsa intifada has argued that there is an 
imbalance in media coverage which favours, Israel. For instance Lowstedt and 
Madhoun (2002) cite research which looked at a six month sample of American 
Public Radio (NPR) broadcasts which found that 81 per cent of Israeli deaths in the 
conflict were reported as opposed to only 34 percent of Palestinian deaths. The 
imbalance was even more marked in relation to the deaths of children, with 89 percent 
of Israeli child deaths reported compared to 20 percent of Palestinian child deaths. 
The researchers also found that whilst NPR was more likely to report the deaths of 
Israeli civilians than Israeli security personnel (84 percent to 69 percent) the opposite 
was true with regard to Palestinians where the deaths of Palestinian fighters was more 
likely to be reported than the deaths of Palestinian civilians (72 percent to 20 percent). 
They suggest that because of this imbalance 'consumers of US public media are likely 
to believe that nearly 50 percent of the people killed were Jews, and most of the 
children killed were Jews too' (2002: 48). Although the authors offer no audience 
research to back up these claims, audience research on British perceptions on the 
conflict did suggest that viewers tended to assume that Jewish casualties were at least 
as high as Palestinian ones and that this mirrored their relative prominence in news 
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broadcasts (Philo & Berry, 2004). Lowestedt & Madhoun also point to a six months 
study of NBC, CBS and ABC reports on al Aqsa intifada which found that Israelis 
were reported as 'responding' or 'retaliating' to Palestinian far more often than 
Palestinians were described as 'retaliating' (79 percent to 9 percent). They suggest 
that the 'impression was thus fostered that Israel acts violently in self defence, in 
response to violence initiated by their foes almost nine times more than Palestinians' 
(2002: 48). They also point to coverage which often presents attacks on Israelis as 
breaking a period of 'calm' despite the fact that the 'calm' had included the killing of 
many Palestinians: 
When Israelis are killed by Palestinians the acts are often referred to by the US 
media as the end of a 'calm' period, as a 'flare-up in violence'. For example, 
on September 18 and 19,2002, six Israelis were killed in the two Palestinian 
suicide bomb attacks in six weeks. All major US news outlets referred to the 
preceding six weeks as 'calm'. However during that time, 54 Palestinians were 
killed by the Israelis, most of them unarmed civilians, totally uninvolved in 
resistance activities (2002: 48) 
Ackerman (2002) also argues that there is an imbalance in American media 
coverage, in that the Palestinian perspective that they are resisting a violent military 
occupation is presented infrequently. He argues that even the use of the words 
'occupied' and 'occupied territories' has become rarer in recent years: 
The word 'occupation' has become almost taboo for American reporters. Even 
the designation 'occupied territories' once routine has all but disappeared. In 
the early 1990s 'occupied territories' showed up in hundreds of AP articles 
every year- 699 in 1992 and 731 in 1993. Nearly a third of all articles 
mentioning Palestinians used the term. By the end of the decade the number of 
appearances had dwindled to a few dozen. During the first eleven months of 
2000, barely one I percent of articles mentioned the dreaded phrase. On the 
three major networks' evening news broadcasts- 'ABC World News Tonight', 
'NBC Nightly News, ' and 'CBS Evening News'- the West Bank or Gaza were 
ninety nine news stories since the fighting began in late September. Of those 
14 
ninety nine stories, only four used the word 'occupied, ' 6 occupation' or any 
other variation. (2002: 62). 
Ackerman argues that the upshot of this is that 'instead of honest account of 
each sides' grievances, journalists reporting on the clashes in the West Bank and Gaza 
offer what is, in effect, a daily catalogue of seemingly unprovoked Palestinian 
aggression' (2002: 62). For instance, Ackerman points to a bulletin on NBC's 'World 
News Tonight' (9 October 2000) presented by Jim Wooten which reported on 
skirmishes between the IDF and Palestinians in Nablus, in which Palestinians were 
presented as 'looking for confrontation' with Israel, wielding 'rocks and bottles', 
initiating a 'gun battle' yet 'one more example' of how their 'anger is turning more 
violent and more deadly' (2002: 62). However Ackerman argues that the Palestinian 
grievances are not difficult to locate or present, and that j ournalists also avoid 
reporting the perspective of the UN which has frequently criticised the occupation: 
But what are the Palestinians' grievances? Why did they choose to confront 
Israel's soldiers? Like most of his colleagues, Wooten maintains a studious 
silence, not mentioning the Israeli army posts surrounding Nablus or the 
checkpoints controlling the entrances to the town- even before the current 
round of violence began. Nor does he mention the bypass roads for settlers 
only or the ongoing expropriations of Palestinian land for expansion of the 
four nearby settlements, which are populated by armed militants many of 
whom support extremist religious leaders like the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, 
who advocated the expulsion of Arabs from the West Bank. And finally, he 
makes no reference to the fact that the entire apparatus of military occupation 
is illegal under the Geneva Conventions or that the UN Security Council 
resolutions have repeatedly demanded Israel's withdrawal. (2002: 63) 
Ackerman also points to other instances where US newspapers have chosen 
not to report criticism of Israel by bodies such as the United Nations and Amnesty 
International. For instance when at the beginning of the intifada the UN security 
council passed a resolution condemning Israel's 'excessive use of force against 
Palestinians' Ackerman claims that only three of the top thirty six US newspapers in 
the Nexis database devoted an article to the vote with none of the headlines 
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mentioning Israel by name. Shortly afterwards Amnesty International released a 
statement condemning Israel's 'pattern of gross human rights violations that may 
amount to war crimes'. Ackerman notes that this statement was briefly noted by the 
Boston Globe and Washington Post but ignored by most of the other major 
newspapers including the New York Times. Ackerman also suggests that the US media 
are far more likely to accept the Israeli version of events when Palestinian civilians 
are killed in controversial circumstances and points to US media coverage of the 
killing of Mohammed al-Dura. Whilst the Palestinians regarded the killing as 
perpetuated deliberately by the IDF, Israeli spokesmen argued that the boy had been 
'killed in the crossfire'. Ackerman found that the phrase 'killed in the crossfire': 
appeared in the US media with remarkable uniformity: 'NBC Nightly News' 
and 'CBS Evening News' (both 30 September 2000), along with the Baltimore 
Sun, Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post (all I October 
2000) all used some variation of 'caught in the crossfire' to describe the boy's 
shooting, even though Israeli responsibility was fairly clear. Israel later 
acknowledged its soldiers had shot the boy with one of its spokesmen 
admitting that the initial denial had damaged the government's credibility. 
(2002: 66) 
Noam Chomsky (e. g. 2000,1999,1996,1993,1992,1991,1988) has written 
extensively on US media coverage of the conflict and accused the press of 
systematically misrepresenting fundamental aspects of the dispute. Chomsky's 
method has been to compare what appears in the American press, with a particular 
emphasis on major publications such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Time 
and Newsweek with reports from the Israeli, European and Arab media, the United 
Nations, human rights groups, as well as what has been published in official 
government documentation and historical texts. Chomsky then uses these alternative 
sources of information as a method for evaluating the veracity and accuracy of what is 
reported in the American press. Chomsky argues that the American press has 
consistently viewed the conflict from an Israeli perspective, and presents evidence to 
show that Israeli human rights abuses such as extra-judicial killings, torture, collective 
punishments and theft of land and water are largely ignored by the media, whilst 
Palestinian attacks on Israelis are highlighted and condemned. He argues that the long 
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history of Israel defying U`N resolutions is ignored, whilst American diplomatic and 
financial support for policies which breach international law and the Geneva 
Conventions is rarely mentioned in the media. One of the most serious charges he 
makes is that j oumalists have consistently misrepresented the Palestinian and wider 
Arab position towards Israel, presenting it as intransigent and unwilling to come to 
any accommodation with Israel, whilst presenting the Israelis as the more 
accommodating partner. Chomsky presents evidence including UN resolutions, peace 
plans as well as official Arab and Israeli statements which suggest the obverse, that it 
was the Palestinians and Arab states who have strived for a negotiated settlement 
since the 1970s, and that this has been consistently rejected by Israel and the United 
States. Such evidence he suggests has been dispatched to 'Orwell's useful memory 
hole' (1999: 71): 
American commentators are still more extreme in their rejection of the 
historical record, as in the sample of cases cited. In the early years the PLO 
was no less re . ectionist than Israel, and its call for a 'democratic secular state' 
was not what it appeared on the surface. But it simply cannot be denied that 
from the mid 1970s, the PLO has moved increasingly towards an 
accommodationist position. Whilst concealing this record, propagandists 
search desperately for statements by PLO spokesmen that reveal their 
unremitting hostility to Israel and unwillingness to accept it. Israeli doves have 
regarded such efforts with contempt, pointing out that the same logic would 
lead to the conclusions that no one should have any dealings with the Zionist 
movement or the State of Israel, since its leaders have consistently rejected 
any Palestinian rights and have repeatedly indicated that they regard as any 
political settlement as a temporary stage leading to further expansion. What is 
more they have acted on these principles. We return to the record which is not 
without interest and is generally concealed here. That outright propagandists 
should resort to these practices is not very surprising; that, after all, is their 
vocation. It is interesting that the practice is common across a broad spectrum 
of western opinion, particularly in the US as one aspect of the ideological 
support for Israel. (1999: 76-77) 
17 
In an analysis of the 'Oslo 11' peace agreement struck in 1995 and the 
assassination of Yitzak Rabin soon after, Chomsky claims that American and British 
journalists misrepresented what had been agreed. In particular he points to claims that 
Israel had agreed to relinquish the West Bank and Gaza, despite the fact that that 
Israeli leaders had made clear public statements that they would not allow the 
Palestinians full statehood,, and what autonomy they would be granted would be 
confined to less than half of the West Bank: 
The signing of Oslo 11 and the Rabin assassination shortly afterwards received 
enormous attention and coverage. Typical headlines after the signing give the 
flavour. 'Israel agrees to quit the West Bank. ' 'Israel Ends Jews' Biblical 
Claim on the West Bank. ' In 'Rabin's historic trade with Arabs, ' a 'historical 
compromise. ' 'Israelis, Palestinians find a painful peace, ' establishing an 
'undeniable reality: The Palestinians are on their way to an independent state; 
the Jews are bidding farewell to portions of the Holy Land to which they have 
historically felt most linked. ' 'Score one for Clinton. ' 'At White House, 
symbols of a day of awe'... The New York Times lead story after the 
assassination reported that Rabin had 'conquered the ancient lands on the 
West Bank of the Jordan' and then 'negotiated the accord to eventually cede 
Israeli control of them to the Palestinians'... The former Jerusalem bureau 
chief of the Washington Post reported that 'when Rabin Israelis the possibility 
of 'separation' of walling off the Gaza Strip and West Bank and getting the 
Palestinians out of sight and mind- the majority responded with enthusiasm'. 
'Those who murdered Rabin, and those who incited them, didn't do so 
because they opposed to create a Palestinian Bantustan' the New Statesman 
correspondent reported from Jerusalem, chiding Edward Said for thinking 
otherwise. 'No: they knew that the course Rabin was charting would lead, 
unless stopped, to a Palestinian state'... One intriguing feature is that the 
factual assertions are not even close to true. Israel did not 'agree to quit the 
West Bank' or 'Ends Jews' Biblical Claim on the West Bank. ' It signed no 
4agreement extending Palestinian rule to most of the West Bank' or 4to 
eventually cede Israeli control of West bank lands to the Palestinians. ' Rabin 
never so much as hinted at an offer of 'walling off the Gaza Strip and West 
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Bank'; quite the contrary, he was adamant, clear and consistent that in 
stressing that nothing of the sort was even a remote possibility. (1999: 553-4) 
Chomsky claims that there are at least three clearly identifiable reasons why 
the American media is more sympathetic to the Israeli position.. Partly, he claims, it is 
because of the influence of the pro-Israel lobby, but he suggests that this extends 
beyond the American Jewish community to incorporate 'major segments of liberal 
opinion, the leadership of the labour unions, religious fundamentalists' as well as 
'conservatives' who support high military spending and 'adventurism abroad' (1999: 
13). Secondly, Chomsky claims that Israel serves as a strategic ally of the United 
States in an area of the world which holds the bulk of the planet's energy reserves' 
Thirdly he notes that Israel had proved useful as a conduit for military aid and training 
to repressive regimes who could not be directly supported because of adverse 
publicity or congressional bans imposed because of major human rights abuses. 2 
British Research 
In Britain very little academic research on media coverage of the conflict has been 
untaken, reflecting the general paucity of empirical media research in universities 
(Philo & Miller, 200 1). However Christopher Mayhew, an MP and the journalist 
Michael Adams produced a book in 1975 accusing the press and broadcast media of 
favouring the Israeli over the Palestinian perspective. The authors accused the press of 
failing to report Israeli contraventions of international law in the occupied territories 
such as land expropriations, the bulldozing of houses, and the use of torture and 
collective punishments. They also argued that the press provided little historical 
context and didn't feature the Arab point of view: 
Editors were curiously reluctant to criticise Israeli policies and actions, even 
when those conflicted with United Nations resolutions, as over Jerusalem, for 
instance, where Israel's annexation of the Arab sector of the city and the 
subsequent expropriation of hundreds of acres of Palestinian land were carried 
out in defiance of specific rulings by both the Security Council and the 
General Assembly ... 
On the other hand, these same editors fastened with relief 
on the mistakes of the Arabs, and were especially severe in their denunciations 
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of terrorism on the part of a desperate minority of Palestinians, who now 
began to resort to force in an effort to break the hold of the Israelis on the 
occupied territories ... In short, it was very rare, 
in those years after 1967, to 
find in the British press any coherent statement of the Arab point of view over 
the Palestine question or any explanation of the origins of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. (Mayhew & Adams, 1975: 80-8 1) 
The authors maintained that this was partly as a consequence of the existence 
of a number of 'highly articulate supporters of Israel' employed as correspondents and 
editors. They pointed to reporters such as David Spanier of The Times, John Kimiche 
of the Evening Standard, Eric Silver and Terence Prittie at the Guardian, as well as 
editors of the New Statesman and The Economist. Mayhew and Adams argue that this 
influence was reinforced by broader public relations involving a 'wide variety of 
individuals and organisations' (1975: 7 1): 
[The Israeli case] was made openly and the whole ineffectively, through such 
organisations as the Zionist Federation and the Jewish National Fund, with 
their research bureaux and their press officers. It was made more discreetly 
through the influential Board of Deputies of British Jews and the powerful 
Zionist members of the Jewish community in Britain, men like Lord Janner, 
Lord Shinwell, Sir Marcus Sieff, as well of many Jewish MPs, who can claim 
the ear of the Editor of The Times or the Director-General of the BBC where 
lesser mortals would be turned away. It was made more crudely through 
Jewish advertisers. And it was perhaps most effectively made, in the long run, 
by the many Zionist sympathisers, both Jewish and gentile, who were actually 
employed in the press or who, as freelance commentators, enjoyed a wider 
readier access to the columns of our leading newspapers than did comparable 
writers whose views were critical of Israel. Among these last, we must note 
the truly extraordinary phenomenon of the Jewish correspondents employed in 
Israel by almost every newspaper and the BBC ... nor should one forget the 
Israeli Embassy in London, whose staff were diligent, as they had every right 
to be, in cultivating the press and in inviting them for highly organised tours of 
Israel. (1975: 71-72) 
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The authors spoke of the problems they had getting articles which were critical 
of Israeli actions published in the Guardian, Times or Observer and the controversy 
that ensued when articles were published. For instance Adams recalls the pressure that 
was brought to bear on the editor of the Guardian after the journalist had reported on 
Israeli violations of the Geneva Conventions in the Gaza Strip: 
The editor of the Guardian, who published the despatches I sent, found 
himself the target for much criticism and even abuse as a result. A campaign 
was orchestrated in which the British Embassy, the Jewish press in Britain and 
a number of individuals tried to discredit me, and through me the paper. The 
Jewish Observer published an 'Open Letter to the Guardian' criticising the 
editor's irresponsibility and suggesting that somehow he was in league with 
what the writer called 'your Arab friends'... A paper called Israel 
Today ... openly accused me of publishing anti-Semitic material. The Israeli 
press attache wrote a very long letter denying the precise accusations that I 
had made about breaches of the Geneva Conventions by the Israelis in 
Gaza ... These were the outward and visible signs of the pressure being exerted 
to silence me, and while they were not difficult to answer, I could not be 
surprised if the editor was disturbed by them and the personal interventions 
which were being made to him. (1975: 78) 
On television and radio the authors suggested that the situation was little 
different because a 'natural pro-Israel bias was built into our broadcasting simply 
because our society includes a talented and influential Jewish minority. '(1 975: 95). 
The authors pointed to a study showing that during the 1973 October War, Israeli 
sources interviewed on the radio programme World at One outnumbered Arab sources 
by a factor of four to one. There were also claims that organised lobby groups were 
able to exert pressure on television broadcasters if material was considered critical of 
Israel. Brian Magee, the former Labour MP for Waltham Forest argued that television 
presented reality through an Israeli prism: 
Unfortunately we in this country tended to look at the conflict very much from 
one side, the Israeli side, until quite recently. And when we were infected by 
the one-sidedness, the fanaticism almost. For instance, our television and 
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newspapers reported the Six Day War of 1967 almost entirely from the Israeli 
point of view, without much audible protest from anyone, so far as I can 
remember. Yet when it was all over I presented a programme on ITV which 
raised the questions, how did the Arabs feel now, what are their reactions to 
defeat, how do they see their immediate future, and before the program had 
even finished the switchboard at Television House was jammed with 
telephone calls protesting about British television being given over to the Arab 
point of view. There were shoals of letters afterwards, the Directors of the 
Company received personal complaints, there was a reference to the program 
in the House of Commons. (The Listener, 19 March 1970, cited in Mayhew 
and Adams, 1975: 104) 
Such pressure appeared to effect the approach taken by the BBC towards 
impartiality. When questioned by a member of the Council for Arab British 
Understanding about perceived pro-Israel bias in programming, the BBC Secretariat 
appeared to argue, in a quite remarkable letter, that the Corporation should not seek to 
provide equal coverage of the Israeli and Palestinian viewpoints, but instead should 
reflect in its coverage the greater power of the pro-Israel lobby: 
One must acknowledge that j ournalists doing an honest job in this country 
have to take an account of the Israeli or Zionist public relations activities are 
conducted with a degree of sophistication which those on the other side have 
rarely matched, and that supporters of Israel in this country represent a much 
more vocal and powerful minority that supporters of the Arab cause. In other 
words, an accurate reflection of publicly expressed attitudes on the issue will 
inevitably reveal at times a preponderance of sympathy for the Israeli side. If it 
exists it will be reflected no matter however hard one tries to be neutral and 
fair. Indeed we would be open to justified censure if we, so to speak cooked 
the books and pretended that situation was different. (Jim Norris, BBC 
Secretariat to Mr Michael Adams, 23 January 1974, cited in Mayhew and 
Adams, 1975: 98). 
I want to finish this literature review by noting studies which have examined how 
Arabs and Palestinians have been represented in popular culture. Although these 
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depictions are fictional, there is a danger that they can reinforce representations 
present in news and current affairs programming. 
Representations in Popular Culture 
A number of studies have examined how Palestinians and Arabs more 
generally have been depicted within popular culture (Shaheen, 2003; Al-Quazzaz, 
1983; Said, 1981; Suleiman, 1983; Campbell 1995, Fuller 1995). For instance 
Campbell examined depictions of Iranians in US motion pictures and argued that 
'theoretically these films represent sheer entertainment, but because the images 
duplicate those presented on television and in newspapers they underscore 'factual 
portrayal" (1995: 185). Campbell concluded that the movie depictions of Iranians 
fostered 'stereotypes of irrationality, terrorism, cruelty and barbarism' (1995: 185) and 
that these films 'contextaulised within a political climate not only celebrate hostility 
towards Iranians, they foster enmity and promote military aggression' (1995: 186). 
Similarly Fuller in another study of US films found that depictions of Arabs centred 
on 'predominant terrorist themes of kidnapping, actual violence, bombs, hijacking, 
political terrorism' and were embued with an 'underlying US overzealous brand of 
patriotism' (1995: 195). Shaheen in a study of more than 900 Hollywood films found 
that Arabs were primarily presented as 'heartless, brutal, uncivilised religious 
fanatics' with a love for great wealth and lascivious fondness for white women. 
Palestinians he found were never presented positively as 'normal folk' and no 
American films showed 'Palestinian families struggling to survive under occupation' 
(2003: 187). Instead Palestinians were frequently portrayed as 'ruthless terrorists' 
particularly during the 1980s: 
Films from the 1980s such as The Delta Force (1986) and Wanted: Dead or 
Alive (1987) present Lee Marvin, Chuck Norris and Rutger Hauer blasting 
Palestinians in the Mideast and in Los Angeles. In the 1990s, Charlie Sheen 
and Kurt Russell obliterate Palestinians in Lebanon and aboard a passenger jet, 
in Navy Seals (1990) and Executive Decision (1996) ... Seven films, including 
True Lies (1994) and Wanted: Dead or Alive (1987) project the Palestinian as 
a nerve gassing nuclear terrorist. In more than eleven movies including Haýf 
Moon Street (1986), Terror in Beverly Hills (198 8), and Appointment with 
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Death (1988), Palestinian evildoers injure and physically threaten Western 
women and children ... The reader should pay special attention to 
Black Sunday 
(1977), Hollywood's first major movie showing Palestinians terrorising and 
killing Americans on US soil. Telecast annually the week of Super Bowl 
Sunday the movie presents Dahlia, a Palestinian terrorist, and her cohort Fasil. 
They aim to massacre 80,000 Superbowl spectators, including the American 
President, a Jimmy Carter lookalike. (2003: 187) 
Clearly researchers have employed very different methodologies in assessing 
how the Israel-Palestine conflict has been portrayed in the media. However some 
areas of consensus can be located. Most of the research appears to suggest that the 
Israeli perspective tends to be more heavily featured than the Palestinian and that 
Palestinians have been portrayed in a worse light generally than Israelis, with their 
grievances rarely explained. Some American commentators have suggested that the 
fact that Israel is a US ally partly explains the preference in coverage. Others have 
suggested that the imbalance is a result of Israel's more developed system of public 
relations. The research into popular culture representations suggests that many motion 
pictures reinforce the most negative image of Palestinians as 'ruthless terrorists'. 
Factors Affecting the Production of News 
In chapter four I discuss the various constraints and forces which shape the contours 
of news reporting of the conflict. However before that I want to review the literature 
in this area. Researchers have approached the subject from a number of different 
perspectives. Some have adopted a political economy approach focusing on the 
impact of commercial pressures on the production of news. Others have examined the 
relationship between j ournalists and sources, questioning who gets to speak and who 
is denied the opportunity to air their perspective. Within this tradition can also be 
added research which examines how public relations and political advertising has 
affected the interaction of journalists and sources. Another approach has been to look 
at the professional and institutional values that journalists profess to uphold and how 
these affect reporting, chiefly among these the BBC and its ethos of 'impartiality'. 
Other researchers have examined how news coverage can be constrained by a nation's 
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foreign policy and how state and corporate actors can place pressure on media 
organisations to curtail critical coverage. Another strand of research has examined 
how lack of specialist knowledge and the formalised nature of journalism training can 
effect news coverage, whilst another approach, which looks at cultural contexts and 
value systems, has examined how j oumalists are influenced by society's particular 
cultural mores and traditions in determining what is newsworthy and how to frame 
issues. I will begin this review by examining the effects of commercial pressures to 
maximize audiences. 
Commercial Imperatives 
A number of commentators have stressed the pressures and constraints placed on 
media organisations by their need to maximise audiences and ensure profitability (e. g. 
Miliband, 1973; Golding & Elliot, 1980; Curran & Seaton, 2004; Philo, 1995: 
Barnett, 1998; Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Sparks, 1999). Curran and Seaton note 
how the need to deliver mass audiences to advertisers serves to skew programmes 
towards: 
... a preference 
for 'entertainment' as opposed to 'serious' 
programmes ... Commercial pressures have also led programme makers to 
emphasize the personal and human interest aspects of documentary stories. 
Thus structural social problems are treated in the form of individual case 
studies. This kind of audience reaches a wider audience, particularly amongst 
young women, than other documentary styles. The prominence given to 
certain types of programmes on commercial television is a direct consequence 
of the pressures generated by the advertising for the production of certain 
types of audiences. (Curran & Seaton, 2004: 188-189) 
What are sometimes referred to as 'news values' can be seen partly as a 
consequence of commercial pressures to produce bulletins which grab audiences. In 
Making the News Golding and Elliot suggest that two of the most important 'news 
values' are visual attractiveness and entertainment. They cite comments from a former 
head of ITN news who argued that the 'key to putting more hard news on the air 
effectively lies, I am sure in putting more pictures and less talk into news 
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programs ... the challenge is to turn hard factual important news into pictures' (cited in 
Golding & Elliot, 1980: 87). The authors also noted pressures towards 'softer' 
coverage. They found that journalists regarded the 'human interest angle as an 
important way of making events palatable or comprehensible to audiences of 
broadcast news', and that this sometimes created a tension between those journalists 
who regarded news as a serious weighty issue and those who saw it Primarily as a 
product to be packaged and sold. 
However partly tempering commercial pressures in British j ournalism has 
been both the public service tradition of the BBC and a framework of public 
regulation. The Independent Broadcasting Authority, which was created at the outset 
of commercial broadcasting, had a strong public service ethos and insisted that quotas 
of news and current affairs programming be shown in prime time. Such expectations 
were made conditions of franchise renewals despite pressure from broadcasters and 
advertisers. 'Advertisers understand that current affairs and news programming is a 
condition of the survival of the commercial television companies, there is no use 
complaining about it' remarked an advertising executive in the trade j ournal 
Campaign in 1979 (cited in Curran & Seaton, 2004: 18 1). However the 1980s and 
1990s saw moves towards the de-regulation of broadcasting in Britain and 
subsequently the creation of a more market orientated system. Following the 1990 
Broadcasting Act the Independent Broadcasting Authority was replaced by the 
'lighter touch' Independent Television Commission (ITC) whose remit was more 
geared to preventing abuses than setting aspirational standards. The ITC had no role 
in fostering quality and could not insist that news or current affairs is broadcast in 
peak time. Stephen Barnett notes that even before the new body came into being 
television executives were threatening to axe documentaries like World in Action 
unless they achieved very high ratings: 
Even before the new regime was implemented Carlton's then director of 
programmes, Paul Jackson, insisted that current affairs programmes could 
only keep their peak time place through consistently high ratings. He told the 
Daily Telegraph in 1992: 'If World in Action were in 1993 to uncover three 
more serious miscarriages of justice while delivering an audience of three, 
four of five million, I would cut it. It isn't my job to get people out of prison' 
(Barnett, 1998: 82) 
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Deregulation also led to a further concentration in the broadcast industry with 
an acceleration of the trend towards corporate oligopoly. Curan and Seaton note that 
the competition amongst a small bands of giant conglomerates led to further pressures 
to cut costs and 'an almost inevitable lowering of standards, it is [for instance] 
cheaper to buy in agency news than send a reporter to the scene' (2004: 184). Barnett 
suggests that this increase in competition together with a relaxation of regulation has 
inevitably led to programming becoming more consumerist. This process he argues 
has been 'accelerated massively' by the new market research techniques underpinned 
by increases in the power of statistical analysis: 
The result is a focus group mentality which has seeped from the media into 
business and of course into politics. If focus groups tell us that one Brit carries 
the weight of ten Americans, a hundred Germans or a thousand Algerians, we 
steer our news bulletins and current affairs in that direction and adopt the same 
attitude as the Sun columnist Richard Littlejohn: 'Does anyone really give a 
monkey's about what happens in Rwanda? If the Mbongo tribe wants to wipe 
out the Mbingo tribe then as far as I'm concerned that's a matter for them 
(Barnett, 1999: 84) 
Barnett suggests at its most extreme this approach can mean that broadcasters avoid 
programming which might challenge viewers' conventional wisdom in case such 
material is alienating and cites comments from the Discovery Channel as to why they 
rejected the documentary Living Islam: 'For us Islam means terrorism, 
fundamentalism and the mistreatment of women. If you can't major on that then we 
don't want to know. ' (cited in Barnett, 1999: 85). Colin Sparks suggests that the 
trends towards deregulation and privatisation are eroding the space for public debate 
and collective action: 
The destruction or at least erosion of the constitutive public life of society 
throws the private sphere into even greater prominence. The disparate pursuits 
of the individual come to occupy the space once filled by the citizen. The 
growing number and importance of the fragmentary and specialised media of 
leisure pursuits are the concomitant of this economic process ... As the public 
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sphere disappears its characteristic organs atrophy or transform themselves . 
Those that survive and the newly created replacements for the casualties are 
and more and more concerned with the narrow private world defined within a 
pre-given framework of Politics, economy and society. (1991: 7 1) 
Philo (1995) notes that the 1990 Broadcasting Act also changed the structure of the 
BBC, forcing the Corporation to commission a quarter of its original programming 
from outside companies. This introduction of market forces led to pressures to cost 
costs and hence quality in news and current affairs. High quality news and current 
affairs programming require continuity in staff, in-depth knowledge and expertise, as 
well as the ability to develop projects over long periods. However as Philo notes the 
4new pressures mean that the trend for television production as whole is now towards 
working on a short time scale, often with independent companies on low budgets' 
(1995: 227) The free market then can act as a significant impediment to a critical and 
informed journalism: 
To develop television which is critical and which explains required in-depth 
study and commitment. These are not the priorities of the commercial market 
which in its most unregulated form will be concerned only with grabbing the 
attention of audiences and delivering them to advertisers at the lowest possible 
cost (1995: 229) 
Sourcing 
Herman and Chomsky (1988) note that the mass media are drawn into a symbiotic 
relationship with a powerful institutional sources by economic necessity and 
reciprocity of interest. The requirements to produce a set number of news bulletins 
every day requires a constant flow of information. Fishman (1980) describes this as 
the 'principle of bureaucratic affinity' whereby only a large institution can cater to the 
information needs of a media outlet. In practice this is achieved through stationing 
reporters on 'beats' and anticipating future events through the use of the 'news diary' 
(Golding and Elliot, 1980). Journalistic 'beats' serve to place institutional sources, 
often state bureaucrats in a powerful structural position as suppliers of official 
information and statistics. Many studies have suggested that news generation mainly 
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involves the interaction of journalists and government bureaucrats and is essentially 
'passive'. For instance, Hess (198 1) in his study of Washington correspondents found 
that j ournalists used no documents in approximately three quarters of their stories. 
Official sources tend to be perceived as credible and trustworthy due to their status 
and prestige. Fishman suggests that this is because j ournalists uphold a 'normative 
order of knowers' in society, which can mean that officials' claims to knowledge are 
sometimes taken as factual (1980: 144). This he claims can lead to a 'moral division 
of labour: officials have and get the facts, reporters merely get them. ' (1980: 145). 
Herman and Chomsky (1988) suggest that such practices also have other advantages, 
since if journalists want to utilise unofficial sources they have to check material 
carefully to avoid possible libel suits. This, of course, serves to increase the costs of 
suchjournalism. 
In Britain the relationship between the state's information managers and 
journalists is formalised and controlled through the 'lobby system'. Here journalists 
are granted particular 'informational privileges' such as special access to official 
documents and briefings from officials: 
The largest group of 'lobby correspondents' are the 140 political journalists 
based at Westminster, who have their own rules and 'officers' to supervise the 
system. There are also smaller lobby groups covering areas such as education, 
industry and defence. Lobby correspondents have other privileges such as 
access to White Papers and Government documents before they are released to 
the general public. Any who break the rules may have their lobby privileges 
withdrawn. The system has been attacked by some j ournalists, especially 
American, since instead of encouraging investigation it produces a reliance on 
the government to provide pre-packaged information. (Glasgow Media Group, 
1985: 1) 
The lobby system illustrates at least three key features of British journalism. Firstly 
that 'political authorities can assume a consensus amongst most j ournalists on the 
range of views that are to be featured in any 'serious' fashion' (Glasgow Media 
Group, 1985: 3). The reliance on political sources ensures that debates then become 
framed and bounded by the political consensus at Westminster. Secondly that a 
hierarchy of authority and credibility exists, reflecting the class divisions within 
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society, whereby official views are considered inherently more authoritative than 
those offered by oppositional sources. In replying to this charge Richard Francis, the 
former Director of News and Current Affairs at the BBC only served to confinn its 
validity: 
The BBC's j ournalists do indeed find it natural to ask 'an important person'- a 
senior civil servant or government minister, for instance- for they are the 
people whose decisions largely determine how things will be run in our 
democracy (New Statesman, 20 April 1979, cited in Glasgow Media Group, 
1985: 2-3) 
Thirdly the structural position of the state's public relations professionals and their 
monopoly on the dissemination of public policy information hinders the ability of 
journalists to report critically on issues of public concern. As David Leigh notes: 
Deprived, in theory at least, of independent right of access to infort-nation 
about public affairs, the j ournalists depends on what he is told as a favour. The 
frequent reason for claiming secrecy on power-holders' operations is to allow 
them to present their own unchallenged version of reality: the obverse of the 
secrecy coin is always propaganda. From the point of view of a politician, the 
ideal journalist is one who will accept misleading statements and disguise their 
source. (Leigh, 1980: 33, cited in Glasgow Media Group 1995: 5) 
The close professional and personal relationships linking j oumalists and official 
sources also gives those sources leverage through the use of threats and rewards in 
ensuring j oumalistic compliance. They may encourage reporters to carry dubious 
stories or threaten to cut off information if other sources are consulted. 
Hall et. al. (1978) have described the position of official sources as 'primary 
definers' due to both their institutional legitimacy as elected representatives, and the 
routine practices and values of journalists. Hall et. al. argue that 'primary definers' are 
routinely 'over-accessed' by the media and are able to establish the definition of the 
topic in question and map out the terms of debate. It is argued that this definition of 
the scope and terms of an issue then comes to pre-structure any further discussions 
within the media, and future commentators must work within this framework of 
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debate. However this theory has been criticised on a number of grounds. Some have 
argued that it fails to take account of the effects of commercial imperatives and 
journalistic cultures. Others have attacked it for presenting a model of source access 
that is 'structurally over-determined' and unable to deal with situations where 
'primary definers' lose control of the agenda (Schlesinger, 1990; Dalghren, 1995; 
Schlesinger & Tumbler, 1994; Davis, 2000). 
Public Relations 
Although institutional elites may, due to their structural position, have privileged 
access as sources, they also heavily utilise the services of public relations 
professionals (PRPs) to manage their messages. The UK public relations industry has 
been grown at an unprecedented rate since the 1980s, with annual growth rates of 20- 
25 percent during most of that decade (Davis, 2000). Although the recession at the 
end of the 1980s signaled a slowdown, the period from 1993 onwards has again 
witnessed a rapid expansion in fee income for consultancies (Davis, 2000). The 
primary users of the PR sector have been corporate and governmental clients. As a 
number of commentators have noted the fortunes of the PR sector and the 
Conservative Party in the 1980s were closely linked (Miller & Dinan, 2000; Franklin, 
1994; Philo, 1995). The Conservative Party became reliant on PR firms for both the 
selling of privatisation policies and election support, as well as for legitimation and 
the management of public opinion in the face of a number of crises. These included 
the decline in the manufacturing sector and rises in unemployment (Philo, 1995), the 
Falklands conflict (Glasgow Media Group, 1985), counter-insurgency campaigns in 
Northern Ireland (Miller, 1994), and the 1984/5 Miner's Strike (Jones, 1986). 
Research commissioned by the Institute of Public Relations (IPR) in 1994 showed 
that professional public relations continues to be dominated by corporate and 
governmental clients. Only 9 percent of PRPs work for non-profit organisations (more 
than half of which are business trade bodies). No Unions and oppositional political 
groups featured in the IPR survey. Of consultancy work which comprises 47 percent 
of the total, the vast ma ority (over 90 percent) is commissioned by corporate clients 
seeking to improve their consumer, corporate, financial, trade and government 
relations. Oppositional groups who wish to contest the agenda with powerful 
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government or corporate sources are likely to find themselves out-resourced in the PR 
battle both in terms of manpower and financial clout. As Davis (2000) notes this 
confers significant advantages to the better resourced side: 
More PR resources mean more PR contacts, greater output of information 
subsidies, multiple modes of communication, and continuous media 
operations. Even though smaller organisations are increasingly drawn to using 
PR consultancies and employing PRPs most continue to be effectively 
excluded by the high costs ... In effect the 'costs of market entry' into the 
professional PR world once again restrict full participation by smaller 
opposition organisations. These extreme differences in economic resources 
mean well-resourced organisations can inundate the media and set the agenda 
while the attempts of resource-poor organisations become quickly 
marginalised. (Davis, 2000: 48) 
In Northern Ireland Miller (1994) notes the disparity in PR resources between 
Sinn Fein, with five voluntary press staff and a budget of f 7000, competing against a 
government information service employing 145 PR staff and equipped with a budget 
of f, 20 million. Davis (1998) noted that public service trade unions striving to prevent 
government cuts and privatisations were comprehensively and consistently out- 
resourced by both corporations and government departments during the 1980s. For 
instance, Jones (1986) in his study of press coverage of the 1984/5 Miner's strike 
noted that during the conflict the National Coal Board spent f4.5 million on 
advertising and increased its press staff from 6 to 25. 
It has been suggested that recent changes in the economic structure of the 
media industry are making journalists more dependent on the output of professional 
PR. The deregulation of media industries in the 1980s together with the introduction 
of new technologies and the introduction of competition into public service 
broadcasting have all contributed to a media environment under tremendous pressure 
to cut costs. Tunstall (1996) argues that such pressures have led to a fall in the level of 
investigative j ournalism and an increased dependency on news sources. Tunstall cites 
evidence that journalists now have to produce three times as much copy as in the 
1960s, with no equivalent increase in resources. Such strictures, he maintains, have 
led journalists to become less investigative and increasingly reliant on PRPs to 
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provide them with 'information subsidies' (Sigal, 1973; Gandy, 1980; Fishman, 1980; 
Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Institutional sources are keen to subsidise the costs of 
news gathering by employing PRPs to manage the flow and presentation of 
information because this serves to reinforce their position as primary sources and 
makes it more difficult for under-resourced oppositional sources to compete: 
In effect, the large bureaucracies of the powerful subsidise the mass media 
and gain special access by their contribution to reducing the media's costs of 
acquiring the raw materials of, and producing news. The large entities that 
provide this subsidy become 'routine' news sources and have privileged access 
to the gates. Non-routine sources must struggle for access, and may be ignored 
by the arbitrary actions of the gatekeepers. (Herman & Chomsky, 1988: 22) 
Changes in the relationship between j ournalists and sources are difficult to 
estimate not least because it is in the interests of both parties, that the terms of 
relationship remain as veiled as possible. However according to Davis 'it is evident 
that both sources and j ournalists have become transformed in their relations by what, 
in effect, amounts to a massive transfer of news-gathering resources, away from 
'independent' journalists and towards partisan sources' (2000: 44). Although this can 
clearly be seen in the rise to prominence of a certain type of PRP the 'spin doctor', 
these are 'just one aspect of a general transition that has seen the erosion of the lines 
that traditionally separated the participants in the media production process' (2000: 
45). 
Despite the advantages enjoyed by powerful institutional sources oppositional 
sources have also sought to use PR strategies to get their message across. 
Environmental organisations and NGOs have invested in PR facilities (Lowe & 
Goyder, 1983; Anderson, 1991; Hansen, 1993) as have pressure groups and trade 
associations involved in the criminal justice area (Ericson et. al., 199 1; Schlesinger & 
Tumbler, 1994), gay and lesbian advocacy groups (Miller & Williams, 1993), and 
paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Miller, 1994). Charities and the voluntary sector 
have also increased their use of PR. Deacon (1996) in a survey of voluntary sector 
found that 31 percent of organisations employed press officers, 43 percent used the 
services of external PR agencies and 56 percent monitored the media. In organisations 
with annual budgets in excess of f250,000 the figures increased to 57 percent, 81 
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percent, and 78 percent. Research by Davis (1998) found that two-thirds of unions 
had at least one part-time press officer, a quarter used PR consultancies and 57 
percent used other agencies to monitor the media. A number of charities including the 
National Children's Home, St. John's Ambulance and the Royal British Legion have 
all won IPR awards in the 1990s for the strength of their PR campaigns (Davis, 2000). 
Other organisations such as the Terence Higgins Trust (Miller & Williams, 1993), and 
Friends of the Earth (Anderson, 1993) have through careful and skilful use of PR 
techniques improved their credibility and accessibility as news sources. Whilst 
powerful institutional sources do possess privileged access, there may be times when 
oppositional groups are able to contest and even overturn elite dominance. For 
instance, this may be possible when the political centre is divided. 
Pressure, Intimidation, Censorship and the Law 
If the use of public relations, with its attendant benefits for compliant j ournalists, can 
be seen as the 'sweet stuff then the obverse, the 'fear stuff is the application of 
pressure or 'flak' to j oumalists and news organisations. Chomsky & Herman (198 8) 
point to the use of letters, petitions, lawsuits, legislation, speeches and threats by state 
and corporate actors to try to pressurise and intimidate media outlets. This pressure 
can be applied directly by, for instance, threatening not to renew a broadcaster's 
franchise, or can be more indirect by appeals to constituents such as stockholders, 
directors and advertisers. The funding and use of think tanks is another method for 
creating pressure. In America right-wing pressure groups such as Freedom House, and 
Accuracy in Media (AIM), have been consistent in their criticism of the media for its 
'persistent liberal bias' and failure to represent the interests of business favourably. 
Chomsky & Herman suggest that the function of such groups are 'to harass the media 
and put pressure on them to follow the corporate agenda and a hard-line, right-wing 
foreign policy' (1988: 27). For instance, when the Reagan administration was 
criticised in the media for supporting the 'dirty wars' in Central America in 1980s, 
Freedom House produced a report denouncing the imbalance of coverage in the 
media. 
In the UK Philo has noted that during the 1980s the Conservative party 
frequently pressurised the BBC because of what it considered unfavourable coverage. 
Criticism of government policy by the Corporation and the prominence given to the 
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problems of unemployment, poverty and Northern Ireland angered the Tory party who 
strongly criticised the institution. The party with the help of Lord Chalfont, set up its 
own Media Monitoring Unit which in its reports echoed the complaints of AIM in the 
US, that the BBC was 'persistently biased in favour of the Left' (cited in Philo 1995: 
202). The reports rated every programme viewed with classification of possible bias. 
Programmes such as Panorama and World in Action were singled out for particular 
criticism. An episode of World in Action examining the impact of unemployment was 
classified as 'attacking the Right and promoting the Left' (cited in Philo, 1995; 202). 
During the Falklands war the Conservative party was also very critical of the 
BBC. A Panorama programme which featured Labour and Conservative opposition 
to the was branded by one Tory MP as an 'odious subversive travesty', and the 
Corporation was forced to admit that 'it was not neutral' in the conflict (Glasgow 
Media Group, 1985: 127). At the time of the Gulf War the BBC also adopted a 
cautious approach. In a report on the allied bombing of the Al-Amiraya bunker in 
which hundreds of civilians were killed it was repeatedly stressed that the causalities 
could well have been Iraqi propaganda. Philo and McLaughlin commenting on this 
noted that: 
In the period of the war both the BBC and ITN were afraid of being accused by 
British politicians of showing 'Iraqi propaganda'. Such propaganda might 
include anything that gained sympathy for the Iraqi population. Consequently 
in the early days of the war, pictures of civilian casualties provided by the 
Iraqis were accompanied by heavy qualifications suggesting that they might 
not be authentic. These qualifications reduced the emotional impact of the 
pictures and protected the broadcasters against future criticism. (1995: 152) 
Broadcasting was also attacked repeatedly over its coverage of Northern 
Ireland. The documentary Death on the Rock which dealt with the killing of three 
unarmed IRA personnel in Gibraltar and the disinformation campaign intended to 
justify the action, greatly angered the Tory Party, and it was widely suspected that the 
decision by Thames TV to show the documentary was an important factor in its 
franchise not being renewed. As Miller notes in his examination of government 
information control during the conflict, intimidation was often backed by the full use 
of the State's legal powers: 
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To support the PR effort there have been official attempts to impose tight 
controls on media practice. This is done, both by the use of the law and by the 
routine use of government intimidation of the media. In the former case, the 
number and severity of powers available to circumscribe the media have 
steadily increased since the 1970s. they include the Prevention of Terrorism 
act, the Emergency Provisions Act, The Official Secrets Act and the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act, which have all been passed and/or tightened since 
the 1970s (0 Maolain 1989). In particular the 1989 revision of the PTA allows 
the police to demand access to any j ournalistic material should they believe it 
is likely to have 'substantial value' in a terrorist investigation. The 1989 
official secrets Act further narrowed the sphere of debate by making it illegal 
for anyone associated with intelligence or security matters to speak or be 
reported in the media. No public-interest defence is permissible. (1994 : 47) 
The Conservative government also resorted to direct censorship in the conflict, 
with the introduction of the broadcasting ban in October 1988, which prevented the 
transmission of statements from the members or supporters of eleven Irish political 
and military organisations. Miller notes that this was 'the first, and so far, the only use 
of this power since the beginning of British broadcasting history directly and overtly 
to rule out a whole class of political viewpoints' (1994: 48) 
Media executives have stated that the struggle between broadcasters and the 
Conservative government during the 1980s did take its toll. The former Assistant 
Director-General of the BBC Alan Protheroe commenting on the atmosphere created 
by government pressure referred to fortnightly 'ritual crucifixions' when he would be 
dragged across the coals by the Board of Governors (World in Action; 28 February 
1988, cited in Philo, 1995: 206). A producer who had spent more than twenty years in 
the BBC claimed that: 
The Conservatives used a kind of salami-cutting technique by attacking the 
BBC day after day and constantly put the management into a defensive 
posture .... We were self-censoring as a result of our superiors constantly saying 
ccan you rest it for a while? ' (cited in Philo, 1995; 206) 
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The Conservative Party also strengthened its position vis-a-vis the BBC by 
appointing members of the Board of Governors who were sympathetic to their 
position. These included Malcolm McAlpine whose company had donated more than 
000,000 to the Conservative party, and Stuart Young brother of the David Young, a 
cabinet minister. However these attempts to intimidate the Corporation were 
contested. When the Conservative Home Secretary asked the BBC to ban a 
programme in its Real Lives series dealing with a Loyalist and Republican 
representative in Northern Ireland the ban was confirmed by the Board of Governors. 
However this led to strikes at the BBC and ITN and the programme was eventually 
shown. 
New Technology 
The last two decades have seen the emergence of host of new communicative 
technologies such as mobile phones, satellite and digital television, and the internet. 
All of these have affected the practices of journalism in different ways. The 
emergence of cable and satellite channels devoted to news, together with pressures to 
cut costs have meant that journalists are having to service more media outlets. This 
inevitably means that they are likely to have less time available to research 
background and provide context. The arrival of the global 24 hour rolling news 
channels at the beginning of the 1990s also coincided with the arrival of satellite 
technology allowing correspondents to report in real time from any part of the globe. 
Barnett suggests that the ability to 'be there' instantaneously in breaking news events 
can push coverage towards the dramatic at the expense of a deeper understanding: 
In foreign reporting mobile satellite technology guarantees that no part of the 
world is inaccessible to TV cameras, but that reporting is instantaneous. The 
result can often be dramatic, live pictures which provide little hard news and 
obscure the absence of any informed or critical reflection, as in the Gulf War 
(Barnett, 1998: 80). 
As Eldridge noted the emergence of CNN during the Gulf War and in particular the 
live reports on the Scud missile attacks on Israel on the first night of the war pushed 
drama in news to new levels: 
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These CNN reports had a raw quality about them. They were unfiltered 
happenings. We can see on reporter know another over as the sirens wail out 
in Dharan and they instinctively duck to avoid the anticipated missile. At 
times, because of the noise or because their voices are muffled by gas masks 
we can barely hear what they say. But what kind of knowledge is this? It was 
fairly described by one critic on BBC2's Late Show as 'immediacy without 
understanding, drama without information' (22 January 199 1). And Jonathon 
Alter, media critic for Newsweek said that is had come to be regarded as 
'good television' in that it had the quality of cinema-verite- something real 
that's going on. (Glasgow University Media Group, 1993: 11) 
The last decade has also seen a huge increase in the amount of agency news 
available instantly to news rooms via live feeds. The former head of news gathering at 
the BBC executive Chris Cramer noted back in 1995 that the amount of agency 
material pumped into the Corporation's newsroom was enormous: 
The sheer volume of news pictures flooding in through our front doors these 
days is almost impossible to handle. I 10 feeds a day at the BBC, six or seven 
hundred a week and growing all the time. The choice of agencies and other 
picture sources is already a headache for most of our newsroom and news 
managers ... the picture flood as I call it is a real tribute to the three 
international news agencies... but it can cloud our judgement. (Address to 
Montreaux. International Television Symposium, 13 June 1995, cited in 
Patterson, 1996: 147) 
In recent years the news agencies have moved from the provision of raw 
footage to providing news packages involving full narration as well as pictures. These 
are an increasingly attractive option to broadcasters under pressure to cut costs, and 
there is a danger that such pressures are forcing newsrooms to become increasingly 
reliant on agency material The BBC's Chris Cramer has denied that the Corporation 
in moving in this direction and argued that major broadcasters such as the BBC only 
'buy agency material as fire insurance' (Broadcast, 30/6/1994). However others have 
suggested that having so many easily accessible news feeds is encouraging bad habits 
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in j ournalism. For instance Williams Points to how much j oumalism training is 
structured around accessing such news services and suggests that this encourages a 
passive and uncritical approach: 
New technology has made the process of finding out a more sedentary affair. 
Rather than telling j ournalists to get out there and 'find out about the patch' by 
talking to people, the teaching newsrooms of today are wired up to an array of 
information services that pump in material; while being linked to local media 
of one kind or another that put across their own news and information 
services. The result is that passivity and spoon-feeding are almost built into 
the process of education. (1999: 274) 
Cultural Contextsl Value Systems 
Another approach to studying how news production has been to focus on how 
journalists select what is newsworthy based on the cultural context of a society. This 
is particularly noticeable in the work of news agencies who have to cater to many 
different markets and require an in-depth knowledge of what is popular in each. The 
former head of Worldwide Television News has commented that: 
A lot of the news stories are of interest to regions. The world breaks down into 
the same kind of news affiliations as a country or city ... In a town like New 
York you've got all the different newspapers appealing to different agendas. 
The same thing happens in global ternis. The Scandinavians like certain kinds 
of stories and the Italians go for certain others which are based on their history 
and culture and the things that are topical in their own societies. (cited in 
Patterson, 1996: 352) 
Hoggart in his introduction to Bad News talked of the 'cultural air we breathe, 
the whole ideological atmosphere of society' which delineates what can and cannot be 
said. This can be thought of as a kind of para-idology, the unquestioned and unnoticed 
background assumptions through which news is gathered and framed. Gans (1979) 
has put forward a list for American journalism which include ethnocentrism, altruistic 
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democracy, responsible capitalism, small town pastorialism, individualism and 
moderation as core unquestioned values. Golding and Murdock suggest that 
journalists have a conception of 'what is acceptable in their society' and that this is 
influenced by both class and organisational factors: 
Other policies current in different newsrooms, some explicit, others more 
covert but generally recognised could similarly be traced to journalists3 sense 
of what was acceptable in their society. Not that this sense was based on a 
sampling of national opinion. The sample such as it was, came filtered both 
through the journalists' personal experiences as members of a particular 
educated elite and through their occupational experience of working in 
broadcasting organisations whose major constituencies, government, 
politicians, and interest groups had clear ideas not so much of what public 
opinion was as what it ought to be (Golding & Elliot, 1980: 69) 
This approach also helps to explain the use of generalised images and stereotypes 
such as 'predatory stockbrokers' or 'hard drinking factory workers' which transcend 
structures of ownership or patterns of work relationships. Journalists are drawing on a 
set of stereotypes and culturally given assumptions which they have in part created. 
However this can be a problem especially in relation to foreign news where 
sometimes such reporting can reinforce stereotypes. Golding and Elliot point out 
broadcasters draw on cliches and stereotypes from their own culture when reporting 
on the developing world: 
In European media, stereotypes of life and customs in foreign parts play a 
large part in the treatment of stories from the Third World. Excitable mobs of 
Latin Americans, exotic primitives in Africa, incomprehensible mystics in the 
East continue to populate news bulletins not because of any malicious intent to 
perpetrate pernicious myths but in an innocent attempt to render usable and 
comprehensible the range of data which is the raw material of news (1980: 
74). 
'Innocent' or not the consequences of using stereotypes because they are 
culturally recognisable can be damaging. Philo in a discussion of research examining 
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public attitudes to the developing world pointed to television coverage of the 1994 
Rwandan genocide where rather than sketching out the complex social and political 
factors behind the atrocities j oumalists fell back on cliches like 'tribal passions', 
interspersing such comments, with 'shots of Africans dancing in grass skirts at a 
border post' (2002: 176). As the Channel Four correspondent Lindsey Hilsum. pointed 
out journalists found it difficult to understand the political roots of the genocide 
because of their own preconceptions about Africa, and so fell back on stereotypes. 
However as Philo notes this is likely to raise audience understanding of the 
developing world. When the author explained to a focus group that Hutu military 
regime had also killed foreigners and university staff, one viewer commented that 'oh 
you don't think of them as having universities' (cited in Philo, 2002: 176). By 
drawing on culturally recognisable stereotypes journalists risk reinforcing viewers' 
ignorance and prejudices rather than actually helping the public understand the world 
better. 
Journalism Training and Critical Skills 
In a review of the development of journalism education in Britain, Williams notes the 
enduring tension between the need to impart the vocational skills of the profession 
and the pressure to confirm to the 'traditional groves of academe' (1999: 274). When 
the first j ournalism courses were introduced in the early 1970s established j ournalists 
were suspicious of the idea that universities could provide an alternative education 
comparable to what they would learn 'on the job'. As the author notes this was still 
the era of the 'dirty overcoat and the nose for news' (1999: 273). Academics were 
also suspicious of the new discipline doubting whether it had the necessary academic 
credentials. Since the 1970s Williams observes that journalism training has become 
more sPecialised and more tied into the use of new technology and the 'mechanics of 
production'. The author also notes that the orientation of many would-be journalists 
has shifted from a socially conscious focus towards one geared more to seeking 'fame 
and fortune'. He argues that this is partly a consequence of a the increasing insecurity 
and casualisation of the profession together with the move towards a more 
consumerist culture where being famous carries an especially high premium, but also 
because the content of journalism studies courses is 'unlikely to stimulate critical 
awareness of key social issues' (1999: 274). 
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Williams also claims that journalism studies courses are unable to provide 
aspiring reporters with the necessary critical skills required to evaluate the veracity of 
information. This he suggests is a function of the two dominant epistemological 
approaches inherent in contemporary journalism studies courses, the journalistic and 
the postmodern. Since the 1980s courses have moved away from teaching the 
traditional sociology of the media and moved over to teaching a cultural studies 
approach informed increasing by a postmodern perspective. However the postmodem 
approach which eschews the use of empirical evidence and advocates a relativist and 
subjective attitude towards truth claims, is unable to critically evaluate the 
information that j ournalists encounter when researching stories or talking to sources. 
Williams maintains that the traditional j ournalistic approach with its largely uncritical 
reliance on information provided by sources is little better suited to the task. 
Journalists, Williams suggests, are 'encouraged to replicate the opinions and 
interpretations of their informers, without the means or methods to verify the truth of 
what they have been told', and since this is 'done in the name of objectivity the 
central totem of the profession, they cannot be told to scrutinise the sources to the 
degree they should be scrutinised' (1999: 276). The upshot of this is that j ournalists 
tend to end up providing a 'highly selective reproduction of the dominant view' 
without critical reflection of evaluation (1999: 277). To foster a more critical and 
informed j ournalism Williams suggests that the j ournalism studies curriculum needs 
to be greatly expanded: 
It is clear that j ournalists need to know about how society works in order to 
report on and make sense of events. Thus they require knowledge of crime, 
work and employment, the global economy, agri-business, ecology and the 
environment, migration and race, contemporary politics, war and conflict, the 
developing world and many other elements of 'social studies'. In order to 
understand, contextualise and make sense of the range of claims and 
interpretations in the nitty-gritty daily routines of journalism, knowledge and 
understanding of key social issues are essential (1999: 278) 
Others have put forward a different set of disciplines that could be integrated into 
journalism studies courses. For instance Brian Winston (1966) has suggested that 
media law, history and ethics together with political theory, should be core elements 
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of j ournalism. training. Boulding (1966) has stressed the importance of j ournalists 
being trained to understand and evaluate information in databases and libraries and 
other reference sources which can then be utilised in developing stories, whilst 
Medsger (1996) in line with Williams has stressed that the 'unique public service 
ethos' of journalism should be an integral aspect of training. 
This review has illustrated the complex matrix of factors which shape the contours of 
news coverage. I now want to move on in the next chapter to a review of the various 
perspectives on the history of the conflict. 
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Chapter 2 Histories of the Conflict 
A nation is a group ofpeople united by a mistaken view about the past and a hatred of 
their neighbours 
Ernest Renan (cited in Shlaim, 2004) 
Zionist Roots and the First Wave of Jewish Immigration into Palestine 
The American historian Howard Sachar (1977) traces the contemporary emergence of 
Zionist thought to the European Rabbis, Judah Alkalai and Zvi Hirsh Kalischer, who 
from the 1830s onwards stressed the need for Jews to return to the Holy Land as a 
necessary prelude to the Redemption and the second coming of the Messiah. Sachar 
argues that such messianic exhortations did not immediately or widely take root 
amongst European Jews. However he suggests that by the 1870s societies generally 
known as Chovevei Zion- 'Lovers of Zion' had formed across Russia, which viewed 
Palestine as a site for national renewal and a refuge from anti-Semitism. 
In 1881 following the assassination of Tsar Alexander 11 large numbers of 
Jews were killed in a series of Russian pogroms. By 1914 up to two million Jews had 
fled Russia to escape persecution. The vast majority sought sanctuary in the United 
States but 25,000 arrived in Palestine in two waves of immigration in 1882-4 and 
1890-1. At the time the Jewish population in Palestine was small. The official 
Ottoman census of 1878 had put the total at 15,011 living amongst a combined 
Muslim/Christian population of 447,454 (McCarthy, 1990). Relations between the 
new Jewish immigrants and the native population were mixed. Jewish settlements 
were built on land that was purchased from absentee effendi landlords. Often the 
locals who had tended the land were evicted with the help of Turkish police and this 
led to resentment and violence. Some Zionists such as Ahad Aham were very critical 
of the way the settlers gained control of the land and treated the local population. In 
1891 he argued that the settlers 'treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty and, 
unscrupulously deprive them of their rights, insult them without cause and even boast 
of such deeds; and none opposes this despicable and dangerous inclination. ' (1923: 
107, cited in Hirst, 1977: 24). There was also evidence that the two groups were able 
to accommodate each other because the settlers also brought benefits. They provided 
employment opportunities, access to medical care, the loan of modem equipment, and 
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a market for produce. Sachar reports that in the 1890s the agricultural settlement of 
Zichron Ya'akov employed more than a thousand Arabs working for 200 Jews. The 
former Guardian Middle East correspondent David Hirst (1977) argues that the 
beginning of the twentieth century brought a new more militant type of settler to 
Palestine, inspired by the ideas of Theodor Herzl and determined to 'redeem the land' 
and 'conquer labour'. The Jewish National Fund, set up to manage Jewish land 
purchases, decreed in 1901 that all land it purchased could never be resold or leased to 
gentiles, and settlers began to boycott Arab labour (Hirst, 1977; Shafir, 1999). 
Theodor Herzl and the Emergence of Political Zionism 
Theodor Herzl, who is commonly regarded as the father of political Zionism, was a 
Jewish Austro-Hungarian j ournalist and playwright. He had been deeply affected by 
the virulent anti-Semitism sweeping across Europe, and as a journalist for the Vienna 
newspaper Neue Freie Presse had covered the notorious Dreyfus trial in Paris, where 
a Jewish officer was falsely charged with passing secrets to the Germans. Herzl felt 
that a central issue for Jews was their dispersal across the Diaspora and their existence 
as a minority in each country they inhabited. This, Herzl argued, led to a dependence 
on the host culture and a suppression of self-determination. Furthermore Herzl 
believed that widespread anti-Semitism meant that complete assimilation into 
European society was an impossibility for most Jews. His solution as laid out in 
1896's Der Judenstaat or The Jewish State was for Jews to create their own state, in 
which they would constitute a majority and be able to exercise national self- 
determination. In contrast to the 'practical Zionism' of the Jewish settlers who began 
to arrive in Palestine from 1882, Herzl adopted a political orientation, cultivating links 
with prominent Imperial statesmen in an attempt to gain a charter for Jewish land 
settlement. 
Herzl had two potential locations in mind for the prospective Jewish state, 
Argentina and Palestine. His diaries show that he was greatly influenced by the 
British imperialist Cecil Rhodes, and in particular the manner in which Rhodes had 
gained control of Mashonaland and Matabeleland from its inhabitants (Hirst, 1977). 
In his diaries he suggests that the settlers should follow Rhodes' example and 'gently' 
expropriate the native population's land and 'try to spirit the penniless population 
across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while 
45 
denying it any employment in our own country' but that 'the process of expropriation 
and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly' (1960: 
88, cited in Hirst, 1977: 18). In order to further this aim Herzl sought out an imperial 
sponsor prepared to grant a settlement charter. He canvassed Germany's Kaiser, the 
Ottoman Sultan and Britain's Joseph Chamberlain stressing to each the benefits that a 
Jewish state and Jewish capital could bring. In 1901 Herz1 travelled to Constantinople 
and met the Sultan. Herzl offered Jewish capital to re-finance the Ottoman public debt 
in a failed attempt to gain a charter for the establishment of a Jewish Ottoman 
Colonisation Association in Palestine. Bohm (193 5) claims that the third article of the 
proposed charter would have given the Jewish administration the right to deport the 
native population from Palestine. Herzl then switched his attention to lobbying British 
politicians. Hirst (1977) suggests that Herzl linked Zionist ambitions to British 
imperial interests, and tried to play on the anti-Semitism of certain British politicians 
by arguing that a Jewish homeland would lessen the flow of Jewish refugees fleeing 
pogroms, into Britain. Herzl lobbied Lord Rothschild for the creation of Jewish 
colonies in Cyprus, ' the Sinai Peninsula and Egyptian Palestine, but the plans met with 
resistance from the Egyptian authorities. In April 1903 Joseph Chamberlain suggested 
to Herzl that the Zionists should consider Uganda as a homeland. The proposal 
received a mixed reception from Zionists and was firmly rejected by the Zionist 
Congress in 1905 which ruled that colonisation should be confined to Palestine and its 
immediate vicinity. Herzl died in 1904, and the task of forwarding political Zionism 
passed to Chaim Weizmann. 
The Second Wave of Jewish Immigration into Palestine 
1904 saw the beginning of another wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine, again 
in response to Russian pogroms. The Israeli historian Ahron Bregman estimates 
35,000 arrived, and argues that these settlers were different from the previous 
immigrants in that they sought to exclude Arab labour and were 'driven by a fierce 
sense of mission and bent on redeeming the land' (2003: 11). The Israeli sociologist 
Gershon Shafir argues that the struggle for the 'conquest of labour' transformed 
Jewish workers into 'militant nationalists' who 'sought to establish a homogenous 
Jewish society' (1999: 8 8) Some Zionists began to stress the importance of armed 
force in creating the Jewish homeland. Israel Zangwill, who had coined the Zionist 
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slogan 'a land without people for a people without land', informed a meeting of 
Zionists in Manchester in 1905 that '[We] must be prepared either to drive out by the 
sword the [Arab] tribes in possession as our forefathers did or to grapple with the 
problem of a large alien population' (Zwangill cited in Morris, 2001: 140). 
The Palestinians, as a subject population under Ottoman rule, were initially 
deferential in their protests. Repeatedly during the 1890s members of the Palestinian 
elite unsuccessfully petitioned their imperial overlords in Constantinople to limit 
Jewish immigration. The late nineteenth century was a period of growing pan-Arab 
awareness which had seen a renaissance, in the appreciation of Arab literature and 
culture. Ovendale argues that both the Ottoman Empire and the spread of Zionism 
were seen as a threat to Arab development. He suggests that 'between 1909 and 1914 
nationalist opposition in Palestine to Zionism grew: there were fears that if the Jews 
conquered Palestine the territorial unity of the Arab world would be shattered and the 
Arab cause weakened. ' (1999: 12). By 1914 the Muslim intellectual Rashid Rida 
argued that the Palestinians had a choice. They could either come to an 
accommodation with the Zionists in which the Zionists, in return for concessions, 
would put a limit on their ambitions or they could oppose them with arms: 
It is incumbent upon the leaders of the Arabs- the local population -to do one 
of two things. Either they must reach an agreement with the leaders of the 
Zionists to settle the differences between the interests of both parties ... orthey 
must gather all their forces to oppose the Zionists in every way, first by 
forming societies and companies, and finally by forming armed gangs which 
oppose them by force. (Rida cited in Hirst, 1977: 32-33) 
The Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate 
During the First World War the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was widely 
anticipated and the Entente Powers began negotiating over contending territorial 
ambitions. In 1916 negotiations between Britain, France and Russia (later to include 
Italy) led to the secretive Sykes-Picot agreement which sought to establish 'spheres of 
influence' for the European Powers within the region. However the agreement also 
accepted the realities of emergent Arab nationalism, and specified the recognition of 
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4 an independent Arab State' or 'confederation of Arab States' within the region. 
British assurances of Arab independence after the defeat of the Axis Powers (which 
had been pledged as a reward for Arab support during the First World War) can be 
found in the correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, British High 
Commissioner in Egypt and Sharif Husain, Emir of Mecca, who was recognised as 
the Keeper of Islam's most holy places. 3 However these pledges by European Powers 
to strive for the recognition of Arab independence conflicted with British assurances 
given, at the time, to Zionist leaders that Britain would seek the establishment of a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine. Zionist leaders established close links with prominent 
British politicians including Lloyd George, Arthur Balfour, Herbert Samuel and Mark 
Sykes. In 1915 Samuel in a memorandum entitled the Future of Palestine proposed 
'the British annexation of Palestine [where] we might plant three or four million 
European Jews' (Weisgal, 1944: 13 1, cited in United Nations, 1990). British support 
for a Jewish homeland was made explicit in the Balfour Declaration of November 
1917: 
His Majesty's Goverm-nent view with favour the establishment in Palestine of 
a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status 
enjoyed by Jews in any other country 
The 'non-Jewish communities', which comprised the 89 per cent of the 
population who were Muslim and Christian, were angered by the declaration. 4 They 
noted that it only spoke of their 'civil and religious rights' making no mention of 
political rights. Conversely for the Zionists the declaration was regarded as a triumph. 
The Israeli historian Avi Shlaim, paraphrasing Chaim Weizmann, argues that it 
'handed the Jews a golden key to unlock the doors of Palestine and make themselves 
the masters of the country' (2000: 7). The legality of the Balfour Declaration has 
since been questioned by some legal experts (Linowitz, 1957; Cattan, 1973). 
After the First World War Britain, Great Britain was assigned control of 
Palestine, through the Mandates system governing the dismemberment of the 
Ottoman Empire. In 1921 the British divided the area in two with the sector east of 
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the Jordan River becoming Transjordan and the area west of the river the Palestinian 
mandate. 
The indigenous population of mandated Palestine feared mass Jewish 
immigration would lead to the further colonisation of their country followed by their 
own subjugation. This view was shared by some prominent British politicians such as 
Lord Curzon who on 26 January 1919, commented to Lord Balfour: 'I feel tolerably 
sure therefore that while Weizmann may say one thing to you, or while you may mean 
one thing by a national home, he is out for something quite different. He contemplates 
a Jewish State, a Jewish nation, a subordinate population of Arabs, etc. ruled by Jews; 
the Jews in possession of the fat of the land, and directing the Administration ... He is 
trying to effect this behind the screen and under the shelter of British trusteeship. ' 
(British Government, Foreign Office, 1919a, cited in Ingrams, 1972: 58). Some 
members of the British establishment believed that by supporting the Jewish National 
5 home they were directly violating the terms of the mandate. Others seemed less 
concerned about the opinions of the Arab population. Chaim Weizmann claimed that 
a British official had told him that in Palestine 'there are a few hundred thousand 
negroes but that is a matter of no significance' (Heller, 1985 cited in Chomsky, 1992: 
435) 
Between 1919 and 1926 the Jewish presence in Palestine swelled with the 
arrival of a further 90,000 immigrants (Bregman, 2003). The community also became 
increasingly militarised, with the creation of what Shlaim describes as an 'iron wall' 
of impregnable strength designed to protect Jewish settlements from Arab attacks. 
The concept of the 'iron wall' had first been deployed by Vladimar Jabotinsky, the 
leader of the Revisionist movement. 6 Jabotinsky was convinced that the indigenous 
Arabs would not accept the Zionist project voluntarily and advocated the creation of 
an 'iron wall' that the local population would be unable to breach: 
If you wish to colonise a land in which people are already living, you must 
provide a garrison for the land, or find a benefactor who will maintain the 
garrison on your behalf. Zionism is a colonising adventure and therefore it 
stands or falls by the question of armed forces. (Jabotinsky cited in Masalha, 
1992: 45) 
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The Zionists also substantially increased their land holdings. Agricultural land 
was purchased from absentee Arab landlords and the peasants who tended and lived 
on them, were evicted. The 1919 American King-Crane Commission, which had been 
sent to Palestine to assess local opinion, reported in their discussions with Jewish 
representatives, that 'the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete 
dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of 
purchase' (British Government, 1947: 3, cited in Laqueur & Rubin, 1984: 29) The 
Zionists also increasingly boycotted Arab labour. The British Hope Simpson 
Commission had criticized the Zionist Keren ha-Yesod employment agreements as 
discriminatory and pointed to Article seven which stipulated that 'The settler hereby 
undertakes that ... if and whenever he may be obliged to hire help, he will hire Jewish 
workmen only' and Article eleven which stated that 'the settler undertakes ... not to 
hire any outside labour except Jewish labourers" (British Government, Cmd. 3686: 
52-3, cited in United Nations, 1990). The tensions created by this labour exclusivism 
the Commission reported, constituted 'a constant and increasing source of danger to 
the country. ' (British Government, Cmd. 3686: 55, cited in United Nations, 1990). 
Throughout the 1920s Arab hostility to the Zionist project manifested itself in 
increasingly prolonged outbreaks of violence. In 1921 Arabs attacked Jews at Jaffa 
during a May Day parade and the violence spread to other towns and the countryside. 
By the time the British army brought the situation under control nearly 200 Jews and 
120 Arabs were dead or wounded. Britain set up a commission of inquiry to 
investigate the violence. The Haycraft Commission reported that the violence was 
spontaneous and anti-Zionist rather than anti-Jewish. The report blamed the Arabs for 
the violence, but also pointed to Arab fears that the mass influx of Jewish immigrants 
would lead to their subjugation. General William Congreve, the commander of 
British forces in the Middle East criticized Herbert Samuel's policy of trying to 
establish a Jewish National home in Palestine in the face of the opposition from most 
of the population (Ovendale, 1999). Shortly afterwards the Arabs sent a petition to the 
League of Nations asking for democratic elections and independence for Palestine 
(Segev, 2001). In 1922 the British government published a White Paper which was 
intended to mollify Arab fears. It denied that the Balfour Declaration paved the way 
for a Jewish State, and that the Arab population, culture and language would be 
subordinated. It also proposed a legislative council made up of Jewish, Muslim and 
Christian representatives, a suggestion that was rejected by the Arabs. Hirst (1977) 
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alleges that a large proportion (likely to give Jewish representatives a majority) of the 
council would have been directly appointed by Britain, and that the Palestinians 
feared that Zionist policies might be legitimized under a constitutional fagade. 
The 1920s and 1930s saw more violent disturbances followed on each 
occasion by Commissions of Enquiry dispatched by Britain to examine causes. After 
1921 there was a period of relative calm before the next major outbreak of violence in 
1929. The flashpoint for the 1929 violence was a dispute over sovereignty of an area 
containing important Jewish and Muslim religious sites. Tension had been brewing 
for some months over this issue, fermented by inflammatory rhetoric in the Arab and 
Hebrew press. In late August 1929 a group of armed Arabs attacked Jewish 
worshippers in Jerusalem and in a week of rioting and violence 113 Jews and 116 
Arabs were killed. In Hebron more than sixty members of a long standing community 
of non-Zionist religious Jews were killed. In response the British set up the Shaw 
Commission of Enquiry, which concluded that the trigger for the violence was Jewish 
demonstrations at the Wailing Wall but that the underlying causes were economic and 
political grievances against the Mandate. An Arab delegation including the Mufti of 
Jerusalem met with British officials in London requesting a prohibition on the sale of 
lands from Arabs to non-Arabs, an end to Jewish immigration and the formation of a 
national parliament. The Hope Simpson Commission dispatched by Britain shortly 
afterwards highlighted the problem of a growing population of landless Arabs and 
recommended controls on Jewish immigration and land purchase. These 
recommendations were carried through in the 1930 Passfield white paper. However, 
these developments were regarded as a serious setback by Zionists who managed 
through lobbying to reverse the terms of the white paper. 
Sporadic violence ignited into a full scale Arab rebellion in the years between 
1936 and 1939. Part of the revolt involved peaceful resistance, including a nationwide 
six month strike and widespread non payment of taxes. It also involved extensive 
violence in which Palestinians, formed into bands and destroyed crops and trees, 
mined roads and sabotaged infrastructure and oil pipelines. They attacked and killed 
Jews, and also targeted Arabs who failed to offer support or who were suspected of 
collaboration. The British historian Martin Gilbert claims that during this period 'most 
acts of Arab terror were met with, often within a few hours, by equally savage acts of 
reprisal by the Revisionists' military arm, the Irgun' (1999: 92). The Arabs demanded 
democratic elections and an end to immigration. The British dispatched another 
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commission of enquiry which in 1937 stated that the Mandate was unworkable and 
recommended partition. The Peel Commission proposed that the north-west part of 
Palestine accounting for 20% of the country though containing its most fertile land 
would become a Jewish state, the remaining 80% would become an Arab state linked 
to TransJordan. Jerusalem, Bethlehem and a corridor to the sea would remain under 
British control. The proposal received a mixed reception amongst Jews. One group 
centred around Jabotinsky's revisionists argued that a Jewish State should only be set 
up in the whole of Palestine and TransJordan. Another which included Weizmann and 
David Ben-Gurion, argued that this was a historic opportunity to create the Jewish 
state. The Israeli historian Simha Flapan suggests that Ben-Gurion accepted the plan 
as a stepping stone to Zionist control of all of Palestine, and points to comments he 
made before the Zionist executive in 193 7 that: 'after the formation of a large army in 
the wake of the establishment of the [Jewish] state, we shall abolish partition and 
expand to the whole of the Palestine' (Ben-Gurion cited in Flapan, 1987: 22) The 
Israeli historian and Ha'aretz columnist Tom Segev (2001) suggests for Ben-Gurion 
the proposal (inherent in the Peel recommendations) for the 'forced transfer' of the 
Arab inhabitants out of the proposed Jewish state, and the creation therefore of a 
'really Jewish' state outweighed all the drawbacks of the proposal. 
The Arabs categorically rejected the Partition scheme arguing that all of 
Palestine was part of the Arabian homeland and it should not be broken up. The 
partition plans were never carried through and the rebellion continued until the British 
finally quelled it. The rudimentary weapons of the Arab guerillas, were overwhelmed 
by vastly superior British military power. Hirst (1977) claims that during this period 
British forces took part in extensive acts of revenge and 'collective punishment'. In 
retaliation for attacks they descended on Arab villages undertook summary executions 
and destroyed possessions and dwellings. Segev (2001) claims that torture was also 
employed by the British authorities. The rebellion had cost the lives of 10 1 Britons 
and 463 Jews (The Times, 21 July 1938, cited in Hirst, 1977: 93). Palestinian losses 
were harder to gauge but Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi estimates upwards of 
5,000 killed and approximately 14,000 injured. (Hirst, 1977). 
The reasons for these increasingly serious outbreak of hostility between the 
communities are contested. Some Israelis argue that the Zionist project was 
essentially beneficial to the Arabs of Palestine, and it was only Arab intransigence and 
xenophobia which prevented mutual accommodation. Cohn-Sherbok (2001), for 
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instance, stresses the legal basis for settlement in the Balfour Declaration which was 
incorporated into the Mandate, and points to the Arab rejection of partition in 1937. 
He argues that Arab violence directed against the Jews was 'incomprehensible' and 
that the Arabs were never prepared to compromise: 'Throughout this period the Arab 
community was unwilling to negotiate over any of the issues facing those living in the 
Holy Land. Jews, on the other hand, continually sought to find a solution to the 
problems confronting the native population while retaining their conviction that a 
Jewish national home must be established. ' (2001: 179). Sachar (1977) argues that the 
Zionist enterprise developed the country, improved the material living standards of 
the Arab population and provided employment opportunities. The attacks on Jews, 
Sachar argues were the result of incitement by xenophobic leaders such as the Mufti 
of Jerusalem and agitation by fascist infiltration from Italy and Germany. Joan Peters 
(1984) has claimed that the Zionist project was so beneficial to the Arab population 
that large numbers were drawn in from outside Palestine. She attributes the large rise 
in the Arab population during the Mandatory period to illegal immigration from other 
Arab countries and argues that because of this the Jewish population in 1948 had as 
least as much right to the land as the Arab 'newcomers'. However a number of British 
and Israeli reviewers have denounced Peters thesis as an academic fraud, and most 
demographers attribute the Arab population rise to decreased mortality rates, due to 
improvements in sanitation and infrastructure. 7 Others provide different explanations 
for the revolt. Hirst points to economic resentment generated by peasant land 
evictions and the boycott of Arab labour: 
Driven from the land the peasants flocked to the rapidly growing cities in 
search of work. Many of them ended up as labourers building houses for the 
immigrants they loathed and feared. They lived in squalor. In old Haifa there 
were I1 000 crammed into hovels built of petrol-tins, which had neither water- 
supply or rudimentary sanitation. Other, without families, slept in the open. 
Such conditions contrasted humiliatingly with the handsome dwellings the 
peasants were putting up for the well-to-do newcomers, or even with the 
Jewish working men's quarters furnished by Jewish building societies. They 
earned half or just a quarter the wage of their Jewish counterparts and Hebrew 
Labour exclusivism was gradually depriving them of even that. (1977: 75) 
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Some Israelis academics such as Gershon Shafir (1999) have characterized 
twentieth century Zionist settlement as similar to a form of European colonialism- the 
4pure settlement colony' model which was imposed on societies in North America and 
Australia. This model 'established an economy based on white labour which together 
with the forced removal or the destruction of the native population allowed the settlers 
to regain the sense of cultural and ethnic homogeneity that is identified with a 
European concept of nationality' (Shafir, 1999: 84). Segev argues that 
"'disappearing" the Arabs lay at the heart of the Zionist dream and was also a 
necessary condition of its realization' (2001: 405). He also maintains that prominent 
Zionists such as David Ben-Gurion believed that the Arab revolt was a nationalist 
struggle designed to prevent their dispossession: 
The rebellion cast the Arabs in a new light. Instead of a 'wild and fractured 
mob, aspiring to robbery and looting, ' Ben-Gurion said, they emerged as an 
organized and disciplined community, demonstrating its national will with 
political maturity and a capacity for self-evaluation. ' Were he an Arab he 
wrote, he would also rebel, with even greater intensity and with greater 
bitterness and despair. Few Zionist understood the Arab feeling, and Ben- 
Gurion found it necessary to wam them: the rebellion was not just terror he 
said, he said; terror was a means to an end. Nor was it just politics, Nashashibi 
against the Mufti. The Arabs had launched a national war. They were battling 
the expropriation of their homeland. While their movement may have been 
primitive, Ben Gurion said, it did not lack devotion, idealism and self- 
sacrifice. (2001: 370-1) 
In the wake of the revolt the British dispatched a further commission of 
enquiry, the result of which was the 1939 MacDonald White Paper. It proposed that 
75,000 Jewish immigrants be admitted over the next five years, after which any 
further immigration would require Arab consent. The White Paper also proposed that 
lands sales be strictly regulated and that an independent Palestine state should come 
about within ten years. The Zionists saw the white paper as a betrayal that seriously 
threatened the creation of the Jewish state, especially in light of the increased 
persecution of Jews throughout Europe. The response was three pronged. One 
element involved maintaining a flow of illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine. 
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Gilbert (1999) claims that many of these Jews were trying to escape persecution in 
Nazi Germany, and other parts of Europe. Another which gathered pace from 1945 
onwards, saw Zionist paramilitary groups launch attacks on the British using 
sabotage, bombings and assassinations. The third involved switching imperial 
sponsors from Britain to the United States. Zionists forged close links with American 
political leaders and used the Jewish vote to pressurize for policies that supported the 
continuation of immigration and the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine. 
American Politics and the Settlement of the Holocaust Survivors 
In May 1942 Zionists meeting in New York, for the American Zionist 
Conference issued the Biltmore Resolution demanding the creation of a 'Jewish 
commonwealth' in mandatory Palestine and began to pressurize American political 
leaders to support its terms. In 1941 Zionists had formed the American Palestine 
Committee. It included within its membership two thirds of the Senate, 200 members 
of the House of Representatives and the leaders of the two main political parties and 
labour organizations (Ovendale, 1999). Unsuccessful resolutions were put before the 
House of Representatives and the Senate demanding free Jewish entry into Palestine 
and its reconstitution as a Jewish commonwealth. Zionist representatives also directly 
lobbied the two major political parties. The 1944 presidential election was a very 
close contest and because of this, Ovendale (1999) suggests Zionist political leverage 
was considerable. America's 4,500,000 Jews were concentrated in three key states 
(New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois) which could swing the election. The 
Republican Party adopted a platform calling for unrestricted Jewish immigration into 
Palestine, no restrictions on land ownership and the conversion of Palestine into a free 
and independent Jewish commonwealth. Roosevelt was under pressure to match this 
and in a private letter to Zionist leaders promised if re-elected to seek the 
'establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth' 
(Ovendale, 1999: 87). 
The politics surrounding the settlement of Jewish refugees at the end of the 
Second World War, are still highly contentious. The debate concerns whether the 
Holocaust survivors wished to settle in Palestine voluntarily, or were left with little 
option because other potential refuges such as the United States were closed to them, 
with at least the tacit support of Zionist leaders. The debate remains emotive because 
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tens of thousands of Holocaust survivors died in displaced persons camps in Europe at 
the end of the war, whilst US congressional legislation gave priority to accepting 
refugees from the Russian occupied states including many Nazi sympathizers and SS 
troopers (Chomsky, 1999) At the time Zionist leaders stressed the vital importance of 
Palestine as a sanctuary for the Jewish refugees in Europe who had survived the Nazi 
Holocaust. It was argued that only Palestine could provide a haven where Jewish 
refugees could rebuild their lives and avoid future anti-Semitism: 
They (the Holocaust survivors) want to regain their human dignity, their 
homeland, they want a reunion with their kin in Palestine after having lost 
their dearest relations. To them the countries of their birth are a graveyard of 
their people. They do not wish to return and they cannot. They want to go 
back to their national home, and they use Dunkirk boats. (Ben-Gurion, cited in 
Gilbert, 1999: 147) 
Gilbert points to attempts by Holocaust survivors aboard ships such as the 
E-xodus to reach Palestine as proof that most of the refugees were desperate to get 
there. The Israeli historian Yehuda Bauer (1970) agues that most refugees were keen 
to settle in Palestine, citing a 1946 Hebrew investigative commission that reported 
that 96.8 per cent of Jewish refugees languishing in European displaced person camps 
at the end of the war wanted to settle in Palestine. Avi Shlaim argues that 'few people 
disputed the right of the Jews to a home after the trauma' of the Holocaust and that 
the moral case for it became 'unassailable' (2000: 23-4). Other Israeli historians 
suggest a different picture. Segev argues that: 
There is... no basis for the frequent assertion that the state was established as a 
result of the Holocaust. Clearly the shock, horror and sense of guilt felt by 
many generated profound sympathy for the Jews in general and the Zionist 
movement in particular. The sympathy helped the Zionists advance their 
diplomatic campaign and their propaganda, and shaped their strategy to focus 
effort on the survivors, those Jews in displaced-persons camps demanding 
they be sent to Palestine. All the survivors were Zionists, the Jewish agency 
claimed, and they all wanted to come to Palestine. The assertion was not true. 
The displaced were given the choice of returning to their homes in Eastern 
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Europe or settling in Palestine. Few were able or willing to return to countries 
then in the grip of various degrees of hunger, anti-Semitism or communism, 
and they were never given the option of choosing between Palestine and, say 
the United States. In effect their options were narrowed to Palestine or the DP 
camps (2001: 491) 
Others such as Feingold, (1970) and Shonfeld (1977) have been very critical 
of the conduct of the Zionist movement in Palestine and America at the end of the 
Second World War. They argue that the Zionist movement should have mobilized to 
pressure the US administration to take in the Holocaust survivors, which would have 
saved the lives of many Jews who died in displaced persons camps in Europe. Segev 
argues that the Ben-Gurion and the Labour leadership in Palestine saw the Nazi 
ascension in the 1930s as potentially 'a fertile force for Zionism' because it created 
the potential for mass Jewish immigration into Palestine (1993: 18). He alleges that 
during the 1930s and 1940s the Labour leadership entered into haavara agreements 
with the Nazis whereby Jews were permitted to emigrate to Palestine with limited 
quantities of capital. He claims that Ben-Gurion's political rivals in the Revisionist 
movement opposed these agreements, and argued that rather than negotiate with 
Germany it should be boycotted. Segev also suggests that after the Kristallnacht 
pogroms Ben-Gurion was concerned that the 'human conscience' might cause others 
countries to open their doors to Jewish refugees, a move which he saw as a threat to 
Zionism. 
If I knew that it was possible to save all the children of Germany by 
transporting them to England, but only half of them by transporting them to 
Palestine, I would choose the second - because we face not only the reckoning 
of those children, but the historical reckoning of the Jewish people (Ben- 
Gurion, cited in Segev, 1993: 28) 
The view that Jewish refugees were used as political leverage to create the 
Jewish state in Palestine, was also shared by some prominent British and US State 
Department officials 8. who feared the effects on stability in Palestine and potential 
Russian penetration. 9 Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman decided to press on with a 
policy supporting the settlement of Jewish refugees in Palestine. Ovendale (1999) 
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suggests that this was primarily because of the 1945 New York election, in which the 
Jewish vote might be decisive. The American State Department official William Eddy 
claims that Truman had informed American ambassadors to the Arab world that 'I am 
sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for 
the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my 
constituents' (1954: 36). 
The End of the Mandate 
In Palestine Zionist paramilitary groups were gradually wearing down British 
morale. Towards the end of the Arab revolt the Jewish community had launched 
attacks against the Arabs. In July 193 8 more than 100 Arabs were killed when six 
bombs were planted in Arab public places. The last of these, detonated in the Arab 
Melon market in Haifa, killed 53 Arabs and a Jew (Palestine Post, 26 July 1938, cited 
in Hirst, 1977: ). Towards the end of the Second World War such tactics were turned 
on the British mandatory authority. Roads, bridges, trains and patrol boats were 
destroyed. British army barracks were attacked and banks and armouries were looted. 
On a single day in 1946 Zionist paramilitary forces launched 16 separate attacks on 
the British army destroying many annoured vehicles and leaving 80 dead and 
wounded (Hirst 1977). Lord Moyne was assassinated by the Stem Gang, British 
officers were captured, flogged and killed and in the most spectacular attack of all, the 
centre of British mandatory power in Palestine the King David Hotel was destroyed 
by 500 lbs of explosives leaving 88 dead including 15 Jews. Funding for the attacks 
was provided by sympathetic sources in the United States. The Hollywood 
scriptwriter Ben Hecht produced an article for the New York Herald Tribune entitled 
'Letter to the Terrorists of Palestine' in which he wrote 'every time you blow up a 
British arsenal, or wreck a British jail, or send a British railway train sky high, or rob 
a British bank, or let go with your guns and bombs at the British betrayers and 
invaders of your homeland, the Jews of America make a little holiday in their 
hearts ... Brave 
friends we are working to help you. We are raising funds for you. ' (15 
May 1947, cited in Hirst, 1977: 119). The violence became so widespread that that by 
early 1947 all non-essential British civilians and military families were evacuated 
from Palestine. Weakened by the Second World War, and demoralized by the 
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attritional warfare, the British were unwilling to sacrifice more lives and money in 
Palestine. Gilbert (1999) suggests they were also wary of alienating Arab opinion 
because they were concerned to protect their oil interests in the region. In February 
1947 the British decided to end the Mandate and hand the question of Palestine to the 
United Nations. 
The United Nations Debates The Future of Palestine 
The UN dispatched a Special Committee to the region which recommended partition. 
Attention then switched to the diplomatic manoeuvring at the United Nations in New 
York. Arab representatives, called before the UN, questioned whether the Mandate 
was ever legal and whether the UN had the legal right to decide on the sovereignty of 
Palestine. They wished to see the issue referred to the International Court of Justice, 
and ultimately they argued it was the people of Palestine who should decide on the 
fate of the country rather than an outside body. ' 0 Zionist representatives were 
sympathetic to the partition plan being debated by member states and lobbied to 
maximise the area that might be allotted to a Jewish State. On the 29 November 1947 
the Partition Plan was carried by a single vote after a last minute change of policy by 
several nations, with a number complaining over the political and economic pressure 
that had been exerted on them. ' 1 Resolution 181 recommended the division of 
Palestine, with the Jewish State allotted 5,700 square miles including the fertile 
coastal areas, whilst the Arabs State was allotted 4,300 square miles comprised mostly 
of the hilly areas. The proposed settlement would mean that each state would have a 
majority of its own population although many Jews would fall into the Arab state and 
vice-versa. Jerusalem and Bethlehem were to become a separate area under UN 
control. 
For the Arabs the partition plan was a major blow. They believed that it was 
unfair that the Jewish immigrants, most of whom had been in Palestine less than thirty 
years, and who owned less than 10% of the land should be given more than half of 
Palestine including the best arable land. The reaction of Zionists is disputed. Some 
historians such as Bregman (2003) argue that the partition resolution was seen as a 
triumph because it allowed for the creation of a Jewish State in an area three times 
that recommended by the Peel plan ten years earlier. Shlaim claims that the reaction 
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was more ambivalent. He suggests that it was accepted by most Zionist leaders with a 
'heavy heart' because they 'did not like the idea of an independent Palestinian state, 
they were disappointed with the exclusion of Jerusalem, and they had grave doubts 
about the viability of the State within the UN borders' (2000: 25). He notes that it was 
dismissed out of hand by Jewish paramilitary groups who demanded all of Palestine 
for the Jewish state. Gilbert suggests that the Zionist leadership realised that war was 
inevitable and that Ben-Gurion 'contemplated the possibility if fighting to extend the 
area allotted to the Jews' (1999: 149). Gilbert cites orders from Ben Gurion that 
Jewish forces should 'safeguard the entire Yishuv [Jewish community in Palestine] 
and settlements (wherever they may be), to conquer the whole country or most of it, 
and to maintain its occupation until the attainment of an authoritative political 
settlement' (Ben-Gurion cited in Gilbert, 1999: 149). Hirst (1977) suggests that the 
partition plan was accepted by the Zionists because they anticipated they would 
quickly be able to militarily overwhelm the Arabs, and unilaterally expand the borders 
of the Jewish state. He points to comments made at the time by the commander of 
British forces in Palestine, General J. C. Darcy who stated that 'if you were to 
withdraw British troops, the Haganah [Jewish fighting forces] would take over all 
Palestine tomorrow' and 'could hold it against the entire Arab world. ' (Crum, 1947: 
220, cited in Hirst, 1977: 134) 
The Unofficial War 
The UN partition plan did not solve the problems in Palestine. The Arab 
Higher Committee rejected it outright and called a three day strike. The Mufti of 
Jerusalem announced aj ihad or holy war for Jerusalem. Fighting between the two 
communities broke out in early December 1947 and the situation quickly deteriorated 
into a civil war. The British, unwilling and unable to restore order, announced they 
would terminate the Mandate on May 15 1948. In the first stage of the conflict lasting 
up until Israel's declaration of Independence on May 14 1948, Jewish forces fought 
against Arab forces marshalled by three commanders. Fawzi el-Kawakji led the Arab 
League, Sir John Bagot Glubb and his 45 British officers the Transjordian Arab 
Legion, and Abdul Qader al-Husseini the Mufti's Arab forces in Jerusalem (Bregman, 
2003). In the early part of this 'unofficial war' the Arab forces won some minor 
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victories and for a time al-Husseini's forces cut the road between Jerusalem and Tel- 
Aviv. In early April Zionist forces launched a major offensive codenamed Plan Dalet. 
According to Avi Shlaim the aim of Plan Dalet was 'to secure all the areas allocated 
to the Israeli state under the LN partition resolution as well as Jewish settlements 
outside these areas and corridors leading to them' (2000: 3 1). Arab towns and cities 
were captured and their populations removed so as 'to clear the interior of the country 
of hostile and potentially hostile Arab elements' in anticipation of an attack by the 
combined armies of the neighbouring Arab states (2000: 3 1). The operation involved 
the application of military and psychological pressure on the Arab population, who 
were reluctant to leave their homes. The Haganah together with paramilitary forces 
sprung surprise attacks on towns and villages launching rockets, mortars and the 
Davidka, a device which lobbed 601b of TNT 300 yards into densely populated areas 
(Hirst, 1977). Psychological pressure was also exerted by spreading rumours via 
clandestine Zionist radio stations and loudspeakers mounted on army vehicles, that 
Jewish forces were planning to bum villages and kill Arabs. An Israeli reserve officer 
recounts that: 
An uncontrolled panic spread through the all the Arab quarters, the Israelis 
brought up jeeps with loudspeakers which broadcast recorded 'horror sounds'. 
These included shrieks, wails and the anguished moans of Arab women, the 
wail of sirens and the clang of fire-alarm bells, interrupted by a sepulchral 
voice crying out in Arabic: 'Save your souls, all ye faithful: The Jews are 
using poison gas and atomic weapons. Run for your lives in the name of Allah 
(Childers, 1976: 252, cited in Hirst, 1977: 141) 
In April and early May 1948 a number Arab towns and cities fell before the 
Zionist offensive creating many refugees. The aims of Plan Dalet remain highly 
contested amongst historians. Some such as Ilan Pappe, Norman Finkelstein, Nur 
Masalha, Walid Khalidi and David Hirst place the operation in the context of long 
held Zionist plans to 'transfer' the native population out of Palestine. 12 They argue 
that the notion of transfer had been inherent in Theodore Herzl's plans for Palestine 
some fifty years earlier (see p. 45-46) and had remained an integral element of Labor 
and Revisionist strategy. Proponents of this perspective also point to the writings of 
Joseph Weitz, who was appointed by the Jewish Agency to head 'transfer 
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committees' which encouraged the 1948 exodus by various fonns of intimidation. In 
1940 he confided in his diary that: 
Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples 
together in this country ... We shall not achieve our goal of being an 
independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is a 
Palestine, at least western Palestine [west of the Jordan river] without Arabs ... 
And there is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to the 
neighbouring countries, to transfer all of them; not one village, not one tribe, 
should be left ... Only after this transfer will the country be able to absorb the 
millions of our own brethren. There is no other way out (Davar, 29 September 
1967, cited in Hirst 1977: 130) 
This perspective, is contested by Israeli historians such as Benny Morris and 
Avi Shlaim who contend that the expulsions were 'born of war not design', being part 
of military expediency rather than political planning. For these historians the 
expulsions were carried out as part of a military strategy that was spontaneous and 
instigated on an ad hoc basis by local commanders. Morris's conclusions, have been 
subjected to a detailed critique by Finkelstein (2000) who argues that the evidence 
that Morris presents show the expulsions to be more systematic and pre-meditated 
than his conclusions suggest. A third explanation, that the Palestinians left voluntarily 
in response to radio broadcasts from their leaders was propagated by some Israeli 
historians after the 1948 war. However although this version of events still has some 
currency across Israel's political spectrum (Pappe, 1999), it has become discredited 
amongst many historians. 13 
The First Arab-Israeli War 
On May 14 1948 as the United Nations debated a truce and trusteeship 
arrangement for Palestine, and the British were evacuating their troops, David Ben- 
Gurion declared the birth of the State of Israel in Tel-Aviv, under a portrait of 
Theodor Herzl. Eleven minutes later, despite objections from the State Department 
and US Diplomatic staff, America became the first country to recognize the new 
Israeli state. The following day the armies of five Arab nations entered Palestine and 
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engaged Israeli forces. The motives of the various Arab armies and the military 
balance of power between Jewish and Arab forces are contested- The ex-Israeli prime 
minister Netanyahu (2000) argues that the conflict was an unequal one involving a 
small Jewish force pitted against a larger and better armed monolithic Arab entity 
determined to destroy the Jewish State at the moment of its creation. Others such as 
Shlaim (2000) dispute this and argue that Jewish forces significantly outnumbered the 
Arabs during all stages of the conflict, and during the final decisive phase by a ratio of 
nearly two to one. The picture of a monolithic Arab force determined to destroy Israel 
is also disputed. Flapan (1987) suggests that the primary objective of King Abdullah 
of TransJordan, (who had nominal control of all the Arab forces) was not to prevent 
the emergence of a Jewish State but to take control of the Arab part of Palestine, as 
part of a secret pact that he had made with Golda Meir in November 1947. Ovendale 
(1999) further suggests that the other Arab States involved were riven by competing 
territorial and political ambitions, in contrast to the Jewish forces who mostly fought 
with a united front. 
In the first stage of fighting leading up to the truce on June II Israeli forces 
consolidated their hold on a number of mixed Arab-Jewish towns, the Eastern and 
western Galilee and parts of the Negev. Jerusalem saw fierce fighting between Israeli 
and TransJordanian forces. During the first truce the Israelis took the opportunity to 
recruit more fighters and substantially re-arm. The U. N. appointed a mediator, the 
Swedish Count Bernadotte, who put forward a proposal for ending the conflict. It 
suggested a union between an Arab state linked to TransJordan and a Jewish state. 
Jerusalem would be part of the Arab state. The proposal was rejected by all sides. The 
Arabs rejected plans to prolong the truce and on July 9 battle recommenced. In nine 
days of fighting leading up to a second truce the Israelis took the initiative capturing 
the Arab towns of Nazareth, Lydda and Ramleh. During this second truce Israel 
mobilized and trained more fighters, many of whom were newly arrived immigrants, 
and arranged the shipment of more weapons. They also consolidated their hold on the 
occupied territories and according to Bregman razed 'Arab villages to the ground so 
that their previous inhabitants who took what they believed to be a temporary refuge 
elsewhere would have nowhere to return to. ' (2003: 57). During the second truce 
Count Bernadotte put forward another proposal for settling the conflict. Territorially it 
was similar to his previous proposal, although Jerusalem would fall under United 
Nations control, and the Palestinians would decide their own political fate in 
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consultation with other Arabs states. The proposal was due to be debated by the 
United Nations General Assembly on 21 September, but on 17 September Count 
Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem, by members of the Stem gang under orders 
from a triumvirate that included Yitzak Shamir, who later became Prime Minister of 
Israel (Bregman, 2003). During this second truce Ben-Gurion proposed to the Israeli 
cabinet launching a major offensive to capture much of the West Bank, but failed to 
gain majority approval and switched his attention to a plan to push Egyptian forces 
back across the Negev into Egypt. At this time Shlaim (1999) claims that Israel 
received a peace proposal from the Egyptian government offering de facto recognition 
of Israel in exchange for Egypt's annexation of a portion of land in the Negev. He 
argues that Ben-Gurion ignored Egypt's proposals, and persuaded the cabinet to 
authorize a series of military offensives designed to capture the Negev. These were 
highly successful with the Israeli army driving the Egyptians out of the Negev and 
following it into Egypt proper. Eventually Britain intervened on the Egyptian side 
under the terms of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, and after forceful pressure from 
President Truman Ben-Gurion agreed to withdraw his troops from the Sinai and 
accept a new truce. 
Post-War Nepotiations: Peace Treaties, Borders and Refugees 
The war ended on January 7 1949. It had extracted a high price on all parties. Israel 
had lost more than 6,000 lives or one percent of its population. It had however made 
huge territorial gains. UN resolution 181 had recommended the Jewish state be 
established in 57% of mandatory Palestine. By the end of 1948 the Israeli state had 
control of 78%. 
After the war the Israelis engaged in immediate nation building. Elections 
were held in January 1949 based on a system of proportional party lists. The Mapai 
party won the most seats with its leader Ben-Gurion becoming the nation's first Prime 
Minister, whilst Chaim Weizmann was installed as President. The Palestinian view 
the events of 1948 as so traumatic they are simply known as Al Nakba or 'The 
Catastrophe'. The refugees created prior to the start of the 'official war' on May 15 
swelled during the conflict. The Israeli historian Illan Pappe, claims that towards the 
end of the war 'several massacres were committed adding an incentive to the flight of 
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the population' and in the final stages of the conflict 'expulsion was even more 
systematic' (1999: 51-2). The war ended with 520,000 Palestinian refugees according 
to Israel, 726,000 as estimated by the UN, and 810,000 as estimated by the British 
government (Gilbert, 1999). The 150,000 Palestinians who were left in the new Israeli 
state, were according to Bregman regarded by Israel as a 'dangerous and not-to-be- 
trusted potential fifth column' and were therefore placed under military rule: 
The military government operated in areas where Arabs were concentrated and 
its main task was to exercise governmental Policies in these areas. It was a 
most powerful body hated by the Arabs, for it effectively controlled all 
spheres of their lives imposing on them severe restrictions: it banned the Arabs 
from leaving their villages and travel to other parts of the country without 
obtaining special permission; it detained suspects without trial and it also, 
frequently, in the name of security, closed whole areas, thus preventing Arab 
peasants access to their fields and plantations which was devastating for them 
for they were dependant on their crops for their livelihood. The military 
govenunent also imposed curfews on whole villages and on one occasion, 
when the village of Kfar Qassem, unaware of the curfew, returned to their 
homes, the Israelis opened fire killing 47. (2003: 74) 
During 1949 Israel, under the auspices of the UN negotiated separate armistice 
agreements with all Arab States involved in the conflict. Jordan moved to annex the 
West Bank whilst Egypt moved to occupy the Gaza Strip but unlike Jordan it made no 
effort to annex the territory. The name Palestine had disappeared from the map, its 
territory having been absorbed into the Israeli and Jordanian States. In late April 
1949 Israel met with delegations from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Arab 
Higher Committee in Lausanne to try and hammer out a peace deal. The two central 
sticking points were borders and refugees. The Arab delegation wanted to see borders 
based on the 1947 UN partition resolution, that they had previously rejected. The 
Israelis argued the permanent borders should be based on the ceasefire lines with only 
minor modifications. No agreement was reached. On December 11 1948 the United 
Nations General Assembly had passed Resolution 194 which resolved 'that the 
refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours 
should be pen-nitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation 
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should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or 
damage to property' This position on the repatriation of refugees Pappe (1999) 
argues, was shared by the UN, Europe and the US. Israel rejected the return of 
refugees and the payment of compensation, arguing that the Arab states had created 
the refugee problem by attacking Israel and they should therefore settle the refugees 
in their own countries: 
'We did not want the war. Tel Aviv did not attack Jaffa. It was Jaffa which 
attacked Tel Aviv and this will not occur again. Jaffa will be a Jewish town. 
The repatriation of the Arabs is not justice, but folly. Those who declared war 
against us will have to bear the result after they have been defeated. ' (David 
Ben-Gurion cited in Gabbay, 1959: 109) 
From June 1949 onwards Pappe argues that Israeli leaders were committed to 
c creating a fait accompli that would render repatriation impossible' (1999: 5 2). In that 
month Joseph Weitz wrote in a memorandum that there was a consensus among 
Israeli leaders that the best way to deal with the abandoned Palestinian villages was 
by 'destruction, renovation and settlement by Jews' (Weitz cited in Pappe, 1999: 52). 
This plan which Pappe claims Israel carried out 'to the letter' required the State 'to 
demolish what was left of abandoned Palestinian villages, almost 350 in all, so that 
the term repatriation itself, would become meaningless' (1999: 52). Pappe suggests 
that for Israelis the subject of the Palestinian refugees raises difficult questions about 
the nature of the Israeli State: 
Israelis - leaders and people alike - have a genuine psychological problem when 
faced with the refugee issue. This is indeed for them the 'original sin'. It puts a 
huge question mark over the Israeli self-image of moral superiority and human 
sensitivity. It ridicules Israel's oxymorons, such as the 'purity of arms' or 
misnomers, such as the 'Israeli Defence Forces', and raises doubts over the 
religious notion of the 'chosen people' and the political pretension of being the 
only democracy in the Middle East which should be wholeheartedly supported 
by the West. In the past it has produced a series of repressions and self denials 
as well as the promotion of unrealistic political solutions ... It was accompanied 
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by an intellectual struggle against the Palestinians, epitomised by the official 
Israeli fabrication of the history of the land and the conflict (1999: 5 8) 
Although the Armistice agreements had ended the military conflict, there 
were no formal peace treaties signed between Israel and its Arab neighbours, setting 
the scene for further sporadic clashes. This failure to negotiate comprehensive peace 
treaties is a contentious issue. Sachar for instance, blames Arab intransigence, 
claiming that Israel repeatedly attempted to make peace but its efforts were rebuffed 
by Arab States: '[The] Arab purpose was single minded and all-absorptive. It was 
flatly committed to the destruction of Israel as an independent state' (1977: 43 0) 
Some historians claim the opposite. Shlaim argues that 'the files of the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry ... 
burst at the seams with evidence of Arab peace feelers and Arab readiness 
to negotiate with Israel from September 1948 on' (2000: 49). 
In the years after 1948 the Arab world instituted an economic boycott against 
Israel, shut its borders and refused its aircraft permission to use their airspace. This 
period also saw a radical demographic shift in the Jewish population throughout the 
Middle East. In the nine years following the 1948 war 567,000 Jews left Muslim 
countries and most settled in Israel, so that the population swelled from 1,174,000 in 
1949 to 1 . 873,000 in 1956 (Ovendale, 1999). Sachar (1977) claims that in many of 
these societies, particularly Iraq and Egypt the Jewish population had 'prospered 
mightily', but argues that in the 1940s they were subject to increasing levels of 
harassment and persecution. He claims that in Libya anti-Jewish riots in 1945 had left 
several hundred dead or wounded, and in Syria the Jewish population saw its property 
and employment rights curtailed. Gilbert (1999) maintains that Israeli officials were 
instrumental in facilitating these population transfers from Muslim countries, known 
in Israel as 'the ingathering of the exiles', because there was a shortage of manpower 
in Israel after 1948. It has been claimed that the methods employed were 
controversial. Gilbert (1999) and Hirst (1977) write that in Iraq, Jewish agents planted 
bombs in synagogues and Jewish businesses in an attempt to stimulate immigration to 
Israel. 
Despite the stabilization of the political and military situation following the 
1948 war clashes along the armistice lines were a constant source of friction between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours. Displaced Palestinians in Arab states began to engage 
in what was known as 'infiltration'. Shlaim alleges that '90 per cent or more of all 
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infiltrations were motivated by social and economic concerns' involving persons 
crossing the ceasefire lines to retrieve property, see relatives or tend their land' (2000: 
82). Many of refugees had been separated from their homes and land and so had no 
employment and went hungry. The other ten percent involved acts of sabotage and 
violence directed against Israelis. Shlaim claims that the Israelis adopted a 'free fire' 
policy towards infiltrators which encouraged the Arabs to organise into groups and 
respond in kind. The British Major John Glubb argued that 'the original infiltrator 
were han-nless and unarmed seeking lost property or relatives. Yet Jewish terrorism 
[i. e. shoot to kill and reprisals raids] made the infiltrator into a gunman (cited in 
Morris, 1997: 5 1). Between the end of the 1948 war and the 1956 Suez war, the 
Israeli authorities estimated that 294 civilians had been killed by infiltrators from 
Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt (Morris, 1997: 97-8). Shlaim claims that in this period 
between 2,700 and 5,000 infiltrators were killed by 'trigger happy' Israeli soldiers 
'the great majority of them unarmed' (2000: 82). Some Israeli historians argue that 
Arab leaders encouraged infiltration as an attempt to weaken and destroy the Israeli 
State. In contrast Shlaim claims that 'there is strong evidence from Arab, British, 
American, UN and even Israeli sources to suggest that for the first six years after the 
war, the Arab governments were opposed to infiltration and tried to curb it'. (2000: 
84). Israel adopted a policy of reprisals directed against villages in Gaza and Jordan . 
Shlaim claims that 'all of these raids were aimed at civilian targets' and 'greatly 
inflamed Arab hatred of Israel and met with mounting criticism from the international 
community' (2000: 83). A specialist reprisal brigade, unit 101 was created, under the 
command of Ariel Sharon. It first major operation involved an attack on the village of 
Quibya in 1953, following the killing of an Israeli mother and two children by a hand 
grenade in Yahuda. Unit 10 1 reduced Quibya 'to a pile of rubble: forty five houses 
had been blown up and sixty-nine civilians, two-thirds of them women and children' 
were killed (2000: 9 1). A UN report found that 'the inhabitants had been forced by 
heavy fire to stay inside, until their homes were blown up over them. ' (2000: 9 1) 
Shlaim also claims that such acts were also carried out against Arab villages within 
the State of Israel: 
Periodic search operations were also mounted in Arab villages inside Israel to 
weed out infiltrators. From time to time the soldiers who carried out these 
operations committed atrocities, among them gang rape, murder and on one 
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occasion, the dumping of 120 infiltrators in the Arava desert without water. The 
atrocities were committed not in the heat of battle but for the most part against 
innocent civilians, including women and children. Coping with day to day 
security had a brutalising effect on the IDF. Soldiers in an army which prided 
itself on the precept of "the purity of arms" showed growing disregard for 
human lives and carried out some barbaric acts that can only be described as 
war crimes. (2000: 83) 
It was against this backdrop of border tensions that Israel became involved in 
a broader struggle between Britain, France and Egypt over control of the Suez Canal. 
1956: The Suez Conflict 
In Egypt following a bloodless coup in 1952, Gamal Abd al-Nassar and his 'free 
officers' took power and turned the state into a Republic. In 1954 Nasser became 
President and began a leftist programme of poverty reduction and agrarian reform. He 
also attempted to make himself the champion of a pan-Arabic renaissance, and the 
leader of the de-cololonisation movement across the Middle East and Africa. 
Ovendale (1999) suggests that the European colonial powers feared the effects of 
Nasser's Arab nationalism on their oil interests and geo-strategic control of the 
Middle East and Africa. France was also hostile because his support for Algerians 
fighting for independence. In July 1956 Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal after the 
US and Britain refused to fund the Aswan Dam Project, which Nasser saw as a means 
to develop Egypt as a modem nation. Britain and France who were shareholders in the 
Canal decided Nasser had to be removed from power. Israel also wanted to see Nasser 
deposed and on 23 October 1956 British, French and Israeli representatives met in 
Paris to devise a military plan (Shlaim, 2000). 
On 29 October 1956 the IDF launched an attack on Egyptian force in the 
Sinai peninsula. The next day Britain and France issued an ultimatum to Egypt and 
Israel to withdraw their force to a distance of ten miles from the Suez Canal. Israel 
complied, Egypt reftised and the following day Britain and France began an aerial 
bombardment of the Egyptian airfields. Israel quickly secured an overwhelming 
military victory capturing Gaza on the 2 November and the whole Sinai peninsula 
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three days later. On November 7 Ben-Gurion delivered a speech to the Knesset where 
'he hinted that Israel planned to annex the entire Sinai peninsula as well as the Straits 
of Tiran' (Shlaim 2000: 179). However under strong pressure from the USA and 
USSR and threats of United Nations sanctions Israel was eventually forced to 
withdraw from all of the Sinai after six months. Some aspects of the war remain 
controversial. A report in Israeli daily Ma'ariv claimed that during the war, 273 
Egyptian prisoners of war had been killed by Israel's 890 Paratrooper Battalion 
commanded by Rafael Eitian, who was one of the architects of Israel's 1982 invasion 
of Lebanon (8 August 1995). Israel's motivations have been the subject of much 
controversy. One version maintains that Israel was driven to attack Egypt for three 
main reasons. Firstly it is argued the Egyptian leader Nasser was planning to lead a 
combined Arab force (Egypt, Jordan, Syria) in an attempt to destroy Israel, and the 
Suez conflict was necessary as a pre-emptive military strike to prevent this. Sachar 
(1977) points to belligerent speeches made by Arab leaders in the months preceding 
the war, which he argues were proof of imminent Arab plans to destroy Israel. He also 
suggests that Egypt's acquisition of large shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia in 
1955 had shifted the balance of power against Israel. Sachar also claims that Israel 
wanted to break Egypt's blockade of the Suez Canal, and stop Palestinian guerrilla 
attacks on Israel. This perspective on Israeli motivations sees the attack on Egypt as 
defensive in orientation and concerned only with strengthening the country's security 
situation. 
Other historians have pointed to other reasons for the attack. Shlaim (2000) 
argues that Israel's military establishment led by Ben-Gurion and Moeshe Dayan 
were determined to goad Nasser into a war by carrying out provocative raids against 
Egyptian forces, despite Egyptian attempts to curb infiltration. The most serious of 
these raids occurred in February 1955 when an Israeli unit led by Ariel Sharon 
attacked the Egyptian army headquarters on the outskirts of Gaza killing 37 Egyptian 
soldiers. Hirst claims that Egypt had consistently tried to avoid military confrontation 
with Israel, and had only 'unleashed thefedayeen [Palestinian guerrillas] under 
pressure from his own public opinion in the wake of further provocations from Israel' 
(1977: 200). Both Hirst (1977) and Shlaim argue that there was no credible evidence 
that Nasser was planning a war with Israel, nor that that the balance of power had 
shifted in Egypt favour. They suggest that the war was undertaken to expand the 
borders of Israel and overthrow Nasser's regime. Shlaim maintains that Israel hoped 
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to absorb the whole of the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank and part of the Lebanon. 
He argues that Ben-Gurion 'exposed an appetite for territorial expansion at the 
expense of the Arabs and expansion in every possible direction: north, east and south' 
as well as 'a cavalier attitude to toward the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the neighbouring Arab states' (2000: 178) 
1967: The Six-Dav War 
During the 1960s the Middle East became a site of cold war rivalry between America 
and the Soviet Union, both of whom were supplying the region's states with weapons. 
In spring 1967 the Soviet Union misinformed the Syrian government that Israel was 
massing troops on its northern border in preparation for an attack on Syria. No such 
troop movements had actually taken place. However the previous year had seen a 
number of border clashes between the two nations and tensions had been running 
high. Israel had threatened publicly to overthrow the Syrian regime unless it stopped 
Palestinian guerrilla attacks launched from Syrian territory. Syria alarmed by the 
Soviet reports, turned to Egypt with whom it had a mutual defence pact. Egypt then 
sent a number of troops into the Sinai, bordering Israel and asked the United Nations 
troops who formed a buffer between the two countries to evacuate their positions. The 
Egyptians troops then moved into Sharm al-Shaykh and proclaimed a blockade of the 
Israeli port of Eliat, which was accessible only through Egyptian waters. Two weeks 
later at 7: 45 a. m. on 5 June 1967 Israel launched an aerial attack on Egyptian airfields 
destroying 298 warplanes, the bulk of the Egyptian airforce, in a single day. Israeli 
ground forces also launched an almost simultaneous land invasion of Egyptian 
territory, forcing their way to the Suez Canal and capturing the Sinai peninsula in two 
days. At noon on 5 June, as part of a defence pact with Egypt, Syrian, Jordanian and 
Iraqi forces attacked targets inside Israel. Within two hours the air forces of all three 
were destroyed by the Israeli airforce, as well as an Iraqi military base near the 
Jordanian border. Jordanian land forces also intervened in support of Egypt. Jordanian 
artillery shelled Israeli towns and its troops entered Arab East Jerusalem and occupied 
Government House. Israel then drove the Jordanian army out of the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem, occupying them both by 7 June. The following day Israeli warplanes 
attacked the American spy ship, the USS Liberty, with cannon, missiles and napalm, 
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killing 34 US service personnel and injuring 171.14 On 9 June Israel attacked Syria, 
despite strong UN pressure, and occupied the Golan Heights. There have been 
allegations in the Israeli press that about a thousand unresisting Egyptian soldiers, as 
well as many Palestinian refugees were killed by the Israeli army (Ha'aretz, 17 
August 1995). The war was an overwhelming military success for Israel. In six days it 
destroyed three Arab armies and made large territorial gains, capturing the Sinai 
Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Arab East Jerusalem. 
The reasons behind Israel's decision to launch the six day war are disputed. 
The official Israeli cabinet documents stated that the 'Government [of Israel] 
ascertained that the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan are deployed for immediate 
multi-front aggression, threatening the very existence of the state' (cited in 
Finkelstein, 1995: 130). Sachar points to Nasser's decision to replace United Nations 
peacekeeping troops in the Sinai with Egyptian troops, and military preparations by 
other Arab nations as evidence that 'the garrot ... was rapidly tightening around Israel' 
(1977: 632). He also points to Israeli motivations to stop Syrian shelling of Israeli 
settlements in the DMZ (demilitarised zone) between Israel and Syria, and guerrilla 
raids into Israeli territory. Another justification given for Israel's attack was that 
Egypt's decision to blockade of the Straits of Tiran which prevented access to the 
Israeli port of Eliat, was according to the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, an 
'attempt at strangulation' which constituted an 'act of war' (Eban, 1992 :334, cited in 
Finkelstein, 1995: 137). 
Some other historians have questioned these explanations and pointed to an 
alternative set of motivations. The twin assertions that the Arab states were planning 
an imminent attack and that they had the military strength to threaten Israel's 
existence are disputed. Finkelstein claims that an 'exhaustive US intelligence at the 
end of the month [May 1967] could find no evidence that Egypt was planning to 
attack' (1999: 134). Menachem Begin and Yitzak Rabin later argued that the Arab 
states had not been planning an attack and that the Israeli government had been well 
aware of this at the time. 15 The claim that the combined Arab armies posed a mortal 
threat to the state of Israel is also disputed. The CIA produced a report in May 1967 
predicting (British intelligence had reached the identical conclusion), that Israel 
would win a war against one or all of the Arab states combined, whoever attacked 
first, in about a week (Finkelstein, 1999). Menachem Begin and Ezer Weizmann have 
also argued that Israel's existence was never threatened. 16 Five years after the war, in 
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an Israeli newspaper article, one of the chief military planners of the campaign 
General Matitiahu Peled, was dismissive of the Arab threat in 1967: 
There is no reason to hide the fact that since 1949 no one dared, or more 
precisely, no one was able to threaten the very existence of Israel. In spite of 
that, we have continued to foster a sense of our own inferiority, as if we were a 
weak and insignificant people, which, in the midst of an anguished struggle for 
its existence, could be exterminated at any moment ... it is notorious that the 
Arab leaders themselves, thoroughly aware of their own impotence, did not 
believe in their own threats ... I am sure that our General Staff never told the 
government that the Egyptian military threat represented any threat to Israel or 
that we were unable to crush Nasser's army, which with unheard of 
foolishness, had exposed itself to the devastating might of our army ... To 
claim that the Egyptian forces concentrated on our borders were capable of 
threatening Israel's existence not only insults the intelligence of anyone 
capable of analysing this kind of situation, but is an insult to the Zahal [the 
Israeli army] (Maariv, 24 March 1972, cited in Hirst, 1977: 211) 
Other posited explanations for Israel's decision to attack it Arab neighbours 
include a desire to safeguard the deterrent image of the IDF. Shlaim (2000) suggests 
that the Egyptian blockade represented a threat to Israel's 'iron wall' of militarised 
strength. Others suggest different motivations. Neff claims that on the eve of the 1967 
War the CIA had identified three Israeli objectives: 'the destruction of the centre of 
power of the radical Arab socialist movements' [i. e. Nasser's regime], 'the destruction 
of the arms of the radical Arabs', and the 'destruction of both Jordan and Syria as 
modem States' (Neff, 1984: 230, cited in Finkelstein, 1999: 143). Hirst (1977) argues 
that Israeli military planners had been preparing the attack since they were forced to 
leave the Sinai in 1956, and cites comments from General Bums, the chief of staff of 
UNTSO in the early 1960s that Israel would probably seek to go to war again soon to 
break the Arab economic blockade and overcome its economic difficulties. Another 
explanation that has been cited as a motivation for Israel's decision to go to war 
involved a desire to expand the boundaries of Israel. Proponents of this view, point to 
comments made by the Israeli commander Yigal Allon shortly before the 1967 war 
that 'in the case of a new war' Israel must seek as a central aim 'the territorial 
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fulfilment of the land of Israel. ' (cited in Finkelstein, 1999: 143). There is evidence 
since the 1950s in the writings of David Ben-Gurion and other Israeli leaders that 
there had been a desire to expand Israel to incorporate all of Jerusalem and the West 
Bank. The Israeli historian Benny Morris notes: 
A strong expansionist current ran through both Zionist ideology and Israeli 
society. There was a general feeling shared by prominent figures as Dayan and 
Ben-Gurion, that the territorial gains of the 1948 war had fallen short of the 
envisioned promised land. Bechiya Le Dorot- literally a cause for lamentation for 
future generations- was how Ben-Gurion described the failure to conquer Arab 
East Jerusalem; leading groups in Israeli society regarded the Jordanian 
controlled West Bank with the same feeling. (Morris, 1989: 410-411, cited in 
Finkelstein, 1999: 221) 
The conflict triggered a second mass exodus of Palestinians, many of whom 
became refugees for a second time, as they had sought refuge in the West Bank and 
Gaza after having to abandon their homes in 1948-9. Nur Masalha, senior lecturer at 
the Holy Land Research Project at the University of Surrey, argues that 'there is no 
evidence to suggest that there were wholesale or blanket expulsion orders adopted or 
carried out by the Israeli army in June 1967, although the policy of selective eviction, 
demolition and encouragement of 'transfer' continued for several weeks after the 
Israeli army occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip. ' (Masalha, 1999: 100). Masalha 
maintains that in 1967 'evictions and demolitions were evident in numerous 
geographical locations in the West Bank' and that 'young men from several cities and 
refugee camps were also targeted for deportation' (1999: 10 1). Peter Dodd and Halim 
Barakat in their study of the 1967 exodus, River without Bridges provide similar 
explanations for the exodus: 
The exodus was a response to the severe situational pressures existing at the 
time. The situational pressures were generated by the aerial attacks upon a 
defenceless country, including the extensive use of napalm, the occupation of 
the West Bank villages by the Israeli army, and the actions of the occupying 
forces. Certainly the most dramatic of these was the eviction of civilians, and 
the deliberate destruction of a number of villages [Imwas, Yalu, Bayt Nuba, 
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Bayt Marsam, Bayt Awa, Habla, al-Buý and Jiftlik]. Other action, such as 
threats and the mass detention of male civilians, also created situational 
pressures (Dodd & Barakat, 1969: 54 cited in Masalha, 1999: 96) 
William Wilson Harris (1980), who reached similar conclusions himself in his 
analysis of the exodus, estimates that 250,000 residents of the West Bank, 70,000 
residents of the Gaza strip and 90,000 residents of the Golan Heights were forced to 
flee their homes during 1967. The displaced residents of the West Bank were 
prevented from returning to the area by harsh measures. Testimony in the Israeli 
press, from a unnamed soldier serving in the 5 th Reserve Division on the Jordan River, 
details the fate of displaced Palestinians attempting to return to their homes: 
We fired such shots every night on men, women and children. Even during 
moonlit nights when we could identify the people, that is distinguish between 
men, women and children. In the mornings we searched the area and, by 
explicit order from the officer on the spot, shot the living, including those who 
hid or were wounded, again including the women and children" (Haolam Haze 
10 October 1967 cited in Masalha, 1999: 99) 
There were reports that after the war Israel began destroying Palestinian 
homes in the newly occupied territories. The American historian Alfred Lilienthal 
claims that 'according to UN figures, the Israelis destroyed during the period between 
II June 1967 and 15 November 1969 some 7,554 Palestinian Arab homes in the 
territories seized during that war; this figure excluded 35 villages in the occupied 
Golan Heights that were razed to the ground. In the two years between September 
1969 and 1971 the figure was estimated to have reached 16,312 homes. ' (1978: 160) 
On 19 June 1967 Israeli leaders formulated an offer to hand back the Golan 
Heights, the Sinai and the Gaza Strip in return for demilitarisation agreements, peace 
treaties and assurance of navigation rights from Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Bergman 
(2003) suggests that the decision, taken two months later, by Arab leaders meeting in 
Khartoum to issue the famous 'three noes' to peace, recognition and negotiations with 
Israel led to the Israeli decision taken on October 30 to officially withdraw the offer, 
and harden its attitude. Shlaim (2000) disagrees arguing that there was no evidence 
that the conditional offer of withdrawal was ever presented to the Arab states, and that 
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the offer was almost immediately killed by political and military leaders who wanted 
to retain a large part of the captured territories, and began in mid-July to approve 
plans for constructing settlements on the occupied Golan Heights. He maintains that 
the 'three noes' at Khartoum referred to 'no formal peace treaty, but not a rejection of 
a state of peace; no direct negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties; 
and no dejure recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state' (2000: 
258). He argues the conference was 'a victory for Arab moderates who argued for 
trying to obtain the withdrawal of Israeli forces by political rather than military 
means' (2000: 258). There have also been claims that Israel turned down a peace 
treaty with Egypt and Jordan at the conference. 17 
Shlaim claims that there was no Israeli debate about handing back East 
Jerusalem, but that Israeli leaders were split on how much of the West Bank they 
wanted to retain. He suggests outright annexation was favoured by only a few, 
because it would mean absorbing large numbers of Arabs into the Jewish state. Most 
favoured one of two options. The 'Allon Plan' proposed limited autonomy for 
Palestinians in part the West Bank (Israel would still own the land and control 
security in the autonomy area), with Israel taking control of a large strip of the Jordan 
Valley, much of the area around Jerusalem and the Judean desert. These parts of the 
West Bank would then be colonised with Jewish settlements and army bases. The 
second option involved handing back to Jordan part of the West Bank with Israel 
keeping approximately a third of the area. Neither proposal was acceptable to King 
Hussein or the Palestinians. 
Resolution 242 and the War of Attrition 
The 1967 war was followed by UN Security Council unanimously adopting resolution 
242, which has become the framework document for successive attempts to resolve 
the conflict. The resolution called for the 'withdrawal of Israeli an-ned forces from 
territories occupied in the recent conflict' in line with the principle 'emphasise[d]' in 
the preambular paragraph of the 'inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by 
war'. It also 'emphasised' the 'need to work for a just and lasting peace in which 
every State in the area can live in security' as well as a 'just settlement of the refugee 
problem' and the establishment of navigation rights. Egypt and Jordan agreed to 
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resolution 242 whilst Syria rejected it. The Palestinians also rejected it on the grounds 
that it only spoke of their plight as a refugee problem, making no mention of their 
rights to self-determination and national sovereignty. Israel accepted the resolution in 
1970. The meaning of the withdrawal clause has been contested. Israel has argued that 
because the definite article 'the' was not included in the English version of the 
resolution ffrorn territories occupied' rather than 'from the territories occupied') it 
means that the scope of withdrawal was left vague and that Israel did not have to 
withdraw from all the territories it occupied in the conflict. Israel has also argued that 
many of the nations who endorsed the resolution including the United States, United 
Kingdom, USSR and Brazil agreed that Israel did not have to withdraw from all the 
territories (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999). Finkelstein (2001) disputes this. 
He points to statements made by the United Nations General Assembly President that 
'there is virtual unanimity in upholding the principle that conquest of territory by war 
is inadmissible in our time under the Charter' (U. N. General Assembly 1967a, cited in 
Finkelstein, 2001: 145). This affirmation, the President continued was 'made in 
virtually all statements' and that 'virtually all speakers laid down the corollary that 
withdrawal of forces to their original position is expected. ' (U. N. General Assembly 
1967a, cited in Finkelstein, 2001: 145). The debates at the UN Security Council, 
Finkelstein argues, were similarly unambiguous with virtually all representatives 
stressing both the inadmissibility clause and the need for a complete Israeli 
withdrawal. 18He also argues that the American position was for a full Israeli 
withdrawal. 19 
Having failed to secure an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories 
Egypt fought the 'war of attrition' against Israel between 1967 and 1970. Shlaim 
argues President Nasser's immediate purpose was to 'prevent the conversion of the 
Suez Canal into a de facto border, while his ultimate goal was to force Israel to 
withdraw to the prewar border' (2000: 289). Egypt bombed Israeli troop 
concentrations in the occupied Sinai and Palestinian guerrillas launched cross border 
attacks against Israel. Israel then attacked military and civilian targets within Egypt 
and Jordan. Numerous Egyptian coastal towns and cities were heavily damaged by 
Israeli air attacks. The Israeli commander Ezer Weizman recalled the fate of an 
Egyptian border city Ismailia which the Israeli army bombarded 'incessantly, 
devastating it from the air as well as with land-based artillery' so that aerial 
photographs 'showed its western portions resembling the cities at the end of World 
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War 11' (Weizman cited in Gilbert, 1999: 410). Moeshe Dayan was later to claim that 
Israeli attacks during the war of attrition had created one and a half million Egyptian 
refugees as well as emptying the entire Jordan Valley of its inhabitants (Al Hamishar, 
10 May 1978). The war was finally brought to a halt in August 1970 when both sides 
agreed to a US sponsored ceasefire. Morris (1992) estimates that in the three years of 
conflict, 367 Israeli soldiers and more than 10,000 Egyptian soldiers and civilians 
were killed. 
Settlement Building, Economic Integration and the Occupation 
In the aftermath of the 1967 war Israel established settlements on the newly captured 
territories and placed the Palestinian residents under military rule. Two major reasons 
were given for the creation of settlements. One stressed their security value: 
There was also a strategic justification for not wanting to give up the occupied 
West Bank and that was that it turned Israel's 'narrow waist' into something 
wider. Before seizing the West Bank Israel's width at some parts measured 
scarcely nine miles from the Jordan bulge to the Mediterranean, and by 
clinging to the occupied territories west of the Jordan river Israel made it more 
difficult for a potential Arab invasion force coming from the east to cut in two. 
(Bregman, 2003: 126-7) 
Some Israelis were dismissive of the security argument alleging it was a 
pretext to satisfy international public opinion. One official writing in the Israeli press 
claimed that 'we have to use the pretext of security needs and the authority of the 
military governor as there is no way of driving out the Arabs from their land so long 
as they refuse to go and accept our compensation' (Haaretz, 23 November 1969, 
cited in Hirst, 1977: 24 1). A second strand of thought justified settlement building and 
retention of the occupied territories, on the basis of divine rights. Victory in the six 
day war was seen by many religious Jews as a sign of support from God and evidence 
that the messianic era was at hand, leading to a surge in support for religious 
nationalism. A number of new parties and organisations were formed who advocated 
permanent control and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, because, it was 
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argued, these areas were a central component of the biblical land of Israel. Harold 
Fisch, the former rector of Israel's Bar-Ilan University, argues that God promised 
Abraham the land of Israel as an eternal possession, and this provides justification for 
sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza Strip: 
The covenant between the people of Israel and its God, which includes the 
promised land as an integral part, is an important objective within the entire 
scheme of creation. It is from this fact that the linkage between the people of 
Israel and its land is rooted-in the transcendental will of God who created all in 
his honor (Fisch, 1982: 189) 
These arguments are echoed in more contemporary comments. In a recent 
interview in the Observer, Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, was quoted as 
saying 'Israel is the promised land- promised to Jews and no-one else' (13 July 2003). 
The viewpoint has also gained ground in the U. S. via the Christian fundamentalist 
movement, who are key supporters of George W Bush and the Republicans. A BBC 
programme interviewed the pastor of a major church in Texas who explained his view 
that: 
Well you understand that the Jewish state was something that's born in the 
mind of God and we are a people who believe the scripture and the scripture 
says very clearly that God created Israel, that God is the protector and defender 
of Israel. If God created Israel, if God defends Israel, is it not logical to say 
that those who fight with Israel are fighting with God? (BBC Radio 4, A Lobby 
to be Reckoned With, 7 May 2002) 
Other arguments for Israel's rights to keep and settle the lands captured in 
1967 included the position that since the land has changed sovereignty many times 
over the last two thousand years, the Jews have as much claim, as any others who had 
controlled it since they were exiled. 20 Some Israelis have argued that since the Arabs 
rejected partition in 1947 they have given up their rights to a share of mandatory 
Palestine. Others point to the legal status of the Balfour Declaration or argue that 
since Israel won the territories in a 'war of self-defense' they have a right to keep 
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them. Benjamin Netanyahu argues that to prevent Jews from building settlements in 
the occupied territories is a form of apartheid: 
Careful manipulation of the media by the Arabs has left many Westerners with 
the indelible impression that Arab paupers are being kicked off their hovels in 
droves to make way for Jewish suburbs in the 'densely populated West 
Bank. '... For what is manifestly occurring is that the West, which so sharply 
condemned anti-black apartheid in South Africa, is being used by the Arabs as 
an enforcer of anti-Jewish apartheid that pertains in the Arab's own countries. 
(2000: 189-192) 
In a review of Israel's settlement building programs Israel Shahak and Norton 
Mezvinsky (1999) note that until 1974, Moeshe Dayan oversaw settlement activity. 
His policy was to limit settlements primarily to Hebron, Northern Sinai and the Jordan 
Valley, as part of a bargain he made with the Palestinian feudal notables who 
controlled the villages. After 1974 Shahak and Mezvinsky argue that religious settler 
groups, primarily Gush Emunim, and their political allies in the Knesset came to the 
fore in determining settlement policy, with the support of both Labor and particularly 
the Likud party. In 1973 Israel introduced the Galili Plan which Shafir suggests 
transformed the Alon plan's 'militaryftontier to a combination of a messianic frontier 
and a suburban ftontier' (1999: 92) Some commentators have pointed to the extreme 
ideological views of many religious settlers which justify attacks on Palestinians and 
attempts to expel them from the occupied territories in what is seen as a process of 
4purification' or 'sanctification' of the land .21 Hirst 
has suggested that even prior to 
1974, the creation of settlements was at the expense of Palestinians: 
Sometimes it was necessary to uproot an entire village- though not necessarily 
all at once. For years the impoverished inhabitants of Beit Askariyah watched 
in impotent dismay as the great cantonments of the Kfar Etzion settlement 
went up around them, relentlessly encroaching on their agricultural and 
grazing land before swallowing up their homes too. In January 1972, the army 
expelled 6,000 bedouins from Rafah in north-east Sinai. It demolished their 
houses, poisoned their wells, and kept them at bay with a barbed wire fence. 
The Bedouins were eventually employed as night watchmen or labourers- on 
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their own property and in the service of those who had taken it from them. 
(1977: 242) 
In 1981 the Likud administration introduced the Drobless Plan. Shafir 
suggests that its purpose was to 'scatter Jewish settlements among Arab towns and 
villages in order to ensure that no homogenous Palestinian inhabited area, the 
potential core of a Palestinian state would remain' (1999: 92). In a more recent study 
Amnesty International (I 999c) examined how settlement building and Palestinian 
house demolitions and are 'inextricably linked with Israeli policy to control and 
colonize areas of the West Bank', a policy that has been 'energetically followed for 
over 30 years by all administrations from 1967 until the present time. ' The process of 
colonisation the report continues depends 'not just on finding land that is physically 
'suitable'. but on alienating it from the Palestinians, defending it against Palestinian 
use, and ensuring through such processes as registration and leasing that Palestinians 
are disqualified from having any future benefit from that land'. Amnesty International 
argue that the damage to the 'tight knit pattern of Palestinian villages' has been 
pervasive. Settlement building is prohibited by the Fourth Geneva Convention, article 
49 of which stipulates that 'the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of 
its own population into the territory it occupies'. The Israeli government has disputed 
this, arguing that the area is 'administered' rather than 'occupied' and that article 49 
of the Conventions has 'no bearing' on the Israeli settlements because the Convention 
was intended to cover forced transfers during the second world war, whilst 'the 
movement of individuals to these areas is entirely voluntary, while the settlements 
themselves are not intended to displace Arab inhabitants, nor do they do so in 
practice' (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996). The practice has, however, been 
repeatedly condemned by the European Union and United Nations who have deemed 
the settlements illegal and in need of removal in multiple resolutions. The practice 
was recently condemned in United Nations resolution 55/132 by 152 votes to four 
(Israel, United States, Micronesia, Marshall Islands) 
In Jerusalem, Israel initiated a policy of 'Judaization' in an attempt to change 
the demographic, physical, cultural, legal and economic status of the city. It 
appropriated Arab land in the city and demolished Arab housing. In the Jewish 
Quarter prior to 1948, approximately 20% of the property was Jewish owned. After 
1967, Hirst suggests that Israelis 'relentlessly forced out the 5,500 [Arab] inhabitants 
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who lived there' (1977: 23 5). The demolitions and evictions occurred all over the city, 
with the victims of land expropriations receiving either inadequate levels of 
compensation or sometimes none. Moves to change the legal and demographic 
structure of Jerusalem have drawn criticism from the international community. In 
1999 the United Nations condemned such actions by 139 votes to one (Israel). 22 Hirst 
also notes that Arab culture was suppressed or denigrated especially in schools. 23 The 
Israeli state quickly moved to integrate the Arabs living in the occupied territories into 
the Israeli economy. Some historians such as Sachar suggest that for Palestinians this 
was a generally beneficial process creating 'unprecedented affluence' as part of a 
'comparatively painless' occupation (1977: 688-9). Other Israelis were critical of this 
process arguing that Israel was instituting colonial policies in which a powerful Israeli 
minority was exploiting a captive Arab population for the benefit of its cheap labour 
and its role as a market for Israeli products: 
Better men than I have enlarged on the grim paradox that threatens the Zionist 
vision, the social and moral failure of that vision, which are to be expected 
from the transformation of the Jews into employers, managers and supervisors 
of Arab hewers of wood and drawers of water, and all of it plus the slogan of 
'Integration'... There is an inescapable process in a population that is divided 
into two peoples, one dominant, the other dominated. No! The State of Israel 
will not be such a monstrosity. (Ya'akov Talmon cited in Sachar, 1977: 713) 
There has also been commentary in the Israeli press suggesting the conditions 
under which the Palestinians were obliged to work for Israelis were exploitative and 
humiliating. Palestinians with jobs in Israel were not legally allowed to spend the 
night there so that many had to be bussed in over long distances from the occupied 
territories, sometimes extending their working day to 17 hours. The Israeli magazine 
Haolam Haze reported on those that were permitted to sleep illegally on Israeli farms: 
'Too far away for the eye to see, hidden in the orchards, there are the sheep pens for 
the servants, of a sort that even a state like South Africa would be ashamed of (22 
December 1982, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 14 1). In a Jerusalem Post interview, the 
Israeli j ournalist Aryeh Rubinstein asks Amos Hadar, Secretary General of the 
Moshav [agricultural] movement whether he agrees with the use of Arab labour 'but 
only on condition that they will live in subhuman conditions, degraded, and not under 
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human conditions, more or less? ' 'Correct' replies Hadar stressing that 'there is a 
difficult question here'. 'There is no choice but to employ Arabs' but they must be 
bussed in and out of Israel every day. 'It is hard, it is costly it is problematic from an 
economic standpoint but there is no other solution' (26 December 1982, cited in 
Chomsky, 1999: 141) There has also been criticism of Israeli use of Arab child 
labour. Israel's Arabic language communist newspaper Al-Ittihad described a child 
labour market at Jaffa: 
In this market foremen get rich by exploiting the labour of children and young 
men from the occupied areas. Every morning at 4. a. m. cars from Gaza and the 
Strip start arriving there, bringing dozens of Arab workers who line up in the 
street in a long queue. A little later at 4: 30 a. m. Arab boys who work in 
restaurants in the town begin to arrive. These boys work in restaurants for a 
month on end, including Saturdays ... Dozens, indeed hundreds of boys, who 
should be at school come from Gaza to work in Israel. The cars can be seen 
coming and going from earliest dawn. At about 6. a. m. Israeli labour brokers 
start arriving to choose 'working donkeys' as they call them. They take great 
care over their choice, actually feeling the 'donkeys' muscles. (30 April 1973, 
cited in Hirst, 1977: 246) 
Militga Occupation/Administration 
Israel imposed a military administration on the occupied territories, which seriously 
restricted the social and political rights of its residents. According to the United 
Nations and human rights groups, it also involved extensive human rights violations. 
Israel argued that the policies were necessary to protect the state from attacks by 
infiltrators or Palestinians in the occupied territory, who they claimed were 
susceptible to PLO incitement. Morris suggests that that severe repression coupled 
with 'massive use' of informers and collaborators by the Israeli security service Shin 
Bet meant that armed activity by the PLO in the occupied territories was 'virtually 
eradicated' by 1971 (1992: 279). Some commentators such as Chomsky, have 
suggested that the imposition of such policies had another objective, that by making 
life difficult for the Palestinians in the occupied territories, they would emigrate and 
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allow Israel to absorb the parts of the occupied territories that it wanted, without 
having to worry about a large Arab population that would 'dilute' the Jewish 
character of the Israeli state. Chomsky points to the official government records of a 
meeting at the start of the Israeli occupation in September 1967, when Moeshe Dayan 
urged government ministers to tell the Palestinian residents of the occupied territories 
that 'we have no solution, that you shall continue to live like dogs, and whoever wants 
to can leave-and we will see where this process leads... In five years we may have 
200,000 less people-and that is a matter of enormous importance' (Beilin, 1985, cited 
in Chomsky, 1992: 434). Professor Ian Lustick suggests that Israel also wanted to 
break up the territorial continuity of Israeli Arab villages in the Galilee and points to 
the 1976 Koenig memorandum in which, the Israeli Minister of the Interior 
recommended the 'coordination of a smear campaign against Rakah activists ... the 
harassment of 'all negative personalities at all levels and at all institutions' and the 
employment of techniques for 'encouraging the emigration of Arab intellectuals, and 
for downgrading the effectiveness of Arab university student organizations' 
(1980: 256). It is widely argued that the policies Israel instituted, breached 
international law. They also led to it being frequently condemned at the United 
Nations General Assembly and Security Council by near unanimous votes. 24 These 
policies included the systematic torture of prisoners 25 , 
imprisonment without trial26, 
collective punishmentS27, theft of natural resources, curfews and searches 28 , 
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demolitions and deportations. The practices have also attracted criticism from human 
rights groups: 
Amnesty International has for many years documented and condemned 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by Israel 
directed against the Palestinian population of the Occupied Territories. They 
include unlawful killings; torture and ill-treatment; arbitrary detention; unfair 
trials; collective punishments such as punitive closures of areas and destruction 
of homes; extensive and wanton destruction of property; deportations; and 
discriminatory treatment as compared to Israeli settlers. Most of these 
violations are grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention and are 
therefore war crimes. Many have also been committed in a widespread and 
systematic manner, and in pursuit of government policy; such violations meet 
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the definition of crimes against humanity under international law. (Amnesty 
International, 2002) 
Palestinian Nationalism and the Rise of the Opposition Movements 
In the aftermath of the 1948 the refugees who were displaced had begun to formulate 
a vision of 'the return'. Initially it was hoped the hoped the United Nations or the 
Arab States themselves would help the refugees achieve this objective. However as 
the years passed the lack of concrete progress began to frustrate the refugees and they 
became increasingly disillusioned by the leaders of the Arab States. By 1964 Yasser 
Arafat had established a small guerrilla organisation, which was granted a secure base 
by Syria's radical Baathist regime. Fatah's philosophy from the outset was to mobilise 
popular Arab support behind guerrilla operations of increasing scale and intensity 
conducted against Israel. Prior to the 1967 war Hirst (1977) alleges that Egypt, Jordan 
and Lebanon had all tried to prevent guerrilla incursions into Israel, but that after the 
war this became more difficult as popular support for guerrilla operations increased. 
By February 1968 Fatah members had taken control of the National Council of the 
PLO and Arafat became Chairman. The aftermath of the war also saw the formation 
of Dr George Habash's PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) began to 
build a strong base of support in the refugee camps of the Gaza Strip. 
In March 1968 Israeli forces launched an attack on the Karameh refugee camp 
in Jordan. Israel claimed the attack was in retaliation for attacks 7 which had killed six 
people and wounded 44. Fifteen thousand troops backed by tanks attacked the camp. 
Rather than retreat to the hills the guerrilla forces stayed and fought and suffered huge 
losses. Half the Palestinian guerrillas, 150 in all were killed, together with 128 
members of the Jordanian army and 29 Israeli soldiers (Hirst, 1977). Although the 
guerrillas had lost many fighters it was considered a significant victory because the 
Israelis had suffered unusually high casualties and met fierce resistance. The battle of 
Karameh led to an influx of volunteers from across the Arab world to join the 
guerrilla movements. In the years after 1967, as well as engaging in a guerrilla war, 
the Palestinians began to formulate a vision of what a future Palestinian entity would 
look like. The result of this was the vision of the 'Democratic State of Palestine'. The 
brainchild of the PLO planner and negotiator Nabil Shaath, the Democratic State of 
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Palestine would involve the dismantling of the Israeli state and its replacement with a 
non-sectarian binational Palestine in which Christian, Moslem and Jew would live 
together in equality. (Hirst, 1977) The new entity would it was claimed include the 
Jews already residing there and the Palestinians who had been displaced in 1948 and 
1967. These proposals were not immediately or universally accepted by Palestinians. 
Hirst (1977) suggests that some saw them as capitulation to the enemy or at best 
premature considering that Israel was still militarily dominant. Others feared that the 
more technologically advanced Jews would dominate them, whilst some considered it 
a tactical propaganda move aimed at international opinion. The concept was a 
complete non-starter for almost all Israelis. Israel had been constructed out of 
Palestine with huge military and diplomatic effort as a state for the Jewish people and 
there was no desire to dilute its Jewish character. Furthermore Israelis were fearful of 
the extreme anti-Jewish rhetoric emanating from its Arab neighbours and worried that 
any returning refugees might want to take revenge for being displaced from their 
lands. 
In the two years after the 1967 war the forces of Fatah and the other guerrilla 
movements had gone from 300 to more than 30,000 and substantial funding was 
coming in from the Arab world. The number of operations also increased 
dramatically. Fatah records claim that 98 per cent of these occurred outside the State 
of Israel with two thirds of them occurring in the West Bank. Fatah regularly insisted 
that the army and 'Zionist institutions' were its real targets, not civilians especially 
women and children, and if these were attacked it was in response to attacks on 
Palestinian civilians, and was selectively done. However Hirst (1977) points out that 
although the 'great bulk' of attacks were aimed at military targets, civilians were 
unquestionably targeted. Bombs were planted in supermarkets in Jerusalem and bus 
stops in Tel Aviv and rockets were fired on settlements in Kiryat Shmoneh and Eilat. 
Whilst Fatah confined its actions to historic Palestine, the PFLP did not. It attacked 
targets all over the world. It hijacked foreign airliners. It firebombed branches of 
Marks and Spencers because of their fandraising for Israel. It blew up an Arab oil 
pipeline because the extraction was by an American oil company on behalf of a 
'feudal' Arab monarchy. The main purpose of these actions George Habash 
maintained, was publicity: 
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When we hijack a plane it had more effect than if we killed a hundred Israelis 
in battle. For decades world public opinion has been neither for nor against the 
Palestinians. It simply ignored us. At least the world is talking about us now 
(Der Stern, 19 September 1970, cited in Hirst, 1977: 304) 
However the opposition movements were to suffer a major blow in 1970. The 
PLO had formed a state-within-a-state in Jordan, openly threatening the rule of the 
Hashemite monarchy. Following an assassination attempt on King Hussein and a 
series of hijackings carried out by the PFLP, the King set his army upon the guerrillas. 
In ten days of bloody struggle thousands of guerrillas were killed, and within a year 
most of the fighters and political elements of the Palestinian movement were expelled 
and ended up in Lebanon. 'Black September' as it became known amongst 
Palestinians produced an organisation bearing the same name. Its most well known 
operation was the taking of Israeli athletes as hostages at the 1972 Munich Olympics. 
Eight black September members took eleven Israeli athletes hostage at the Olympic 
village in Munich demanding the release of 200 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel. In 
the German rescue operation four of the Palestinian hijackers and all eleven Israeli 
hostages were killed. Three days later Israel launched attacks on Syria and Lebanon. 
There were reports that up to 500 people, mostly civilians, were killed in nine separate 
simultaneous Israeli air attacks (Al-Nahar Arab Report, 18 September 1972, cited in 
Hirst, 1977: 251) 
The Phantoms and Skyhawks swooped on the suburban Damascus resort of al- 
Hama; the bombs fell indiscriminately on Palestinians in their hillside 
dwellings and on Syrians, in their cars or strolling by the river Barada on their 
weekend outing. Survivors recounted how they were machine-gunned as they 
ran for cover (Hirst, 1977: 25 1) 
In 1973 there were further hijackings by Arab groups. In that year Israel had 
also shot down a Libyan airliner which had strayed over the occupied Sinai peninsula, 
killing all 106 passengers. Later, Black September militants took over the Saudi 
Embassy in the Sudanese capital demanding the release of Palestinian militants held 
in Jordanian jails. The authorities refused and a Jordanian together with an American 
and a Belgian diplomat were killed. There followed, in quick succession, hijackings 
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of Japanese, American, and Dutch airliners. The worst loss of life occurred at Rome 
airport in December 1973 when Palestinian militants killed 34, mainly American, 
civilians. Eleven months later a British Airways VC 10 was hijacked by the Martyr 
Abu Mahmud Group, who called on the British Government to 'declare its 
responsibility for the greatest crime in history, which was the establishment of the 
Zionist entity, and foreswear the accursed Balfour Declaration, which brought 
tragedies and calamities to our region' (cited in Hirst, 1977: 321-2). In the wake of 
this hijacking Yasser Arafat, very publicly attempted to rein in the militants by 
arresting a number and amending the PLO criminal code to make hijacking that 
resulted in loss of life a capital offence. 
The early 1970s had also seen the PLO begin to make diplomatic headway at 
the United Nations in its quest for institutional legitimacy and support for Palestinian 
nationalism. In 1970 a General Assembly resolution was passed recognising the need 
for Palestinian self-determination. General Assembly resolution 2649 'condemn[ed]s 
those Governments that deny the right to self-determination of Peoples recognised as 
being entitled to it, especially of the peoples of southern Africa and Palestine' In 1974 
UN resolution 3246 was passed which again stressed the need for Palestinian self- 
determination but also added as a corollary that it was legitimate to 'struggle for 
liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available 
means, including armed struggle'. In November 1974 the UN adopted resolution 3236 
which for established UN support for the creation of a Palestinian state: 'The General 
Assembly.... reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, 
including (a) the right to self-determination without external interference (b) the right 
to national independence and sovereignty'. 
Many Israelis especially on the right disputed the whole notion of Palestinian 
nationalism arguing that it was a post 1967 invention created by the Arab states in 
order to wage a surrogate war against Israel. In 1969 the Israeli prime minister Golda 
Meir stated that 'It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine 
considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took 
their country away from them. They did not exist' (Sunday Times, 15 June 1969, cited 
in Shlaim, 2000: 311). Similarly Netanyahu has argued that both Palestinian 
Nationalism and Palestinian refugees are post- 1967 fabrications: 
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Indeed, most Palestinian Arabs have homes. Many of them, in fact, live as full 
citizens in Eastern Palestine-today called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
Similarly, most of the Arabs of Judea-Samaria are not homeless refugees; they 
live in the same homes they occupied before the establishment of Israel. The 
number of actual refugees is close to nil (2000: 156-8) 
This is disputed by multilateral bodies such as the United Nations, who have 
explicitly recognised in many resolutions the existence of a distinct Palestinian 
people, their rights to national self-determination, and the existence of over three and 
a half million refugees. 
1973 The October War 
The War of Attrition had failed to secure the return of the occupied Sinai for Egypt 
but had instead left many of the Suez coastal cities devastated by Israeli raids. Shlaim 
claims that in the early 1970s Egypt made numerous attempts to regain the occupied 
Sinai through diplomacy but her peace overtures were rejected by Israel. 29 Shlaim 
suggests Israel's 'diplomacy of attrition' together with its openly annexation plans for 
the Sinai left Sadat with no diplomatic option and made war inevitable. 
On 6 October 1973 Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked Israeli troop concentrations in 
the occupied Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights. The Arab armies achieve early 
successes with the Egyptian army crossing the Suez Canal and advancing into the 
Sinai, and the Syrian army forcing back the Israelis on the Golan Heights. Eventually 
the Israeli army turned the tables and regained the territorial losses it initially 
sustained. The war cost the lives of 2,832 Jews and 8,528 Arabs (Shlaim, 2000) There 
have been suggestions that the conflict nearly precipitated both a nuclear exchange 
between the superpowers and an Israeli nuclear strike on Egypt. 30 
The nature of the attack and the motivations of Syria and Egypt are contested. 
Netanyahu argues that the Arab forces had 'enormous advantages' over the Israelis, 
and the Israeli army had fought a 'pulverizing battle to keep the front from collapsing 
in the face of overwhelming numbers' (2000: 282). He claims that 'Israel's army was 
able, albeit by a hair's breadth, to prevent defeat in the face of a surprise attack' and 
that having 'so little to show for an onslaught stacked so decisively in their favour' 
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was what brought Sadat to negotiating table to sign a peace treaty with Israel at Camp 
David in 1979 (2000: 282). In contrast, Shlaim suggests that the Egyptian/Syrian 
attack was a limited venture designed to bring Israel to the negotiating table and force 
a political settlement in which the lands captured in 1967 would be returned. In an 
exact reversal of Netanyahu's thesis, Finkelstein (1999) argues that it was Israel who 
finally agreed to come to the negotiating table at Camp David after Egypt and Syria 
demonstrated that they possessed a 'military option'. 
Following the Yom Kippur war the Arab world led by Saudi Arabia instituted 
an oil embargo on the West leading to a sharp rise in oil prices, which it is argued 
precipitated a major global recession. This again had the effect of focusing 
international attention on the need to resolve the conflict, or at least to neutralise some 
of its more dangerous elements. 
Conflict in Lebanon 
Having been forced out of Jordan in 1970, the PLO relocated to Lebanon from where 
it fought a guerrilla war against the Israeli state, attacking both military and civilian 
targets. Sachar (1977) lists numerous deadly attacks by Palestinian infiltrators on 
Israelis and argues that during the mid 1970s the 'violence continued almost without 
respite' (1977: 8 10). Netanyahu notes that the PLO were using Lebanon as a base 
from which to fire Katyusha missiles across the border into Israel, which he maintains 
had a very damaging effect on the lives of those in Israel's northern settlements: 
The PLO used the territory of its de facto state to shell Israeli cities and towns. 
For years, the entire population of the northern border towns and villages were 
regularly driven into underground bomb shelters by barrages of PLO launched 
Katyusha missiles, the little brothers of the Scud missiles that Iraq launched 
against Israel in 1991. By 1982, the population levels Kiryat Shemona and 
Nahariya had fallen ominously; factories, schools and beaches were being 
closed repeatedly to avoid mass casualties during the shellings; and fear of 
economic ruin and depopulation had spread. (2000: 218-19) 
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During this period Israel bombed PLO positions, Lebanese villages and 
Palestinian refugee camps. The Israeli military analyst Ze'ev Schiff justified attacks 
on civilians on the basis that guerrillas used the villages and refugee camps for 
shelter: 
In south Lebanon we struck the civilian population consciously because they 
deserved it 
... the importance of [Mordechai] Gur's [Israeli chief of staffl 
remarks is the admission that the Israeli army has always struck civilian 
populations, purposely and consciously ... the army, 
he said, has never 
distinguished civilian [from military] targets.. [but] purposely attacked civilian 
targets even when Israeli settlements had not been struck (Haaretz, 15 May 
1978, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 181) 
The Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban argued that 'there was a rational 
prospect ultimately fulfilled that affected populations would exert pressure for the 
cessation of hostilities' (Jerusalem Post, 16 August 198 1, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 
182) The Lebanese villagers though were unarmed and could do little to stop the 
armed guerrillas, and the Lebanese army was too weak to remove the Palestinians, 
who had virtually formed a state-within-a-state. Official government casualty 
statistics suggest that the scale of Israeli raids was disproportionate to the Palestinian 
attacks. The Israeli authorities estimated that 106 Israeli civilians were killed in 
attacks by Palestinian guerrillas on Israel's northern border in the period between 
1967 and the 1982 Israeli invasion, at a rate of approximately seven a year (Haaretz, 
22 June 1982, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 74). The American j ournalist Judith Coburn 
reported that diplomats in Beirut and UN officials estimated 3500 Lebanese citizens 
killed between 1967 and 1975 and at least twice as many Palestinian civilians, giving 
a rate of more than a thousand per year. Touring Southern Lebanon in the mid 1970s 
Coburn found many villages 'attacked almost daily in recent months ... 
by airplane, 
artillery, tanks and gunboats' with the Israelis employing 'shells, bombs, 
phosphorous, incendiary bombs, CBUs [cluster bombs] and napalm' against Lebanese 
villages and refugee camps as part of what she claimed was a 'scorched earth' policy 
to remove the population and create a de-militarised zone. (New Times, 7 March 1975, 
cited in Chomsky, 1977: 190). By 1977 it was estimated that 300,000 Lebanese 
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Muslims had been turned into refugees by the Israeli attacks (New York Times, 2 
October 1977, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 191) 
The PLO continued its diplomatic offensive at the United Nations. In 
November 1974, the United Nations officially granted the PLO observer status and 
later that month Yasser Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly for the first time, 
giving his 'gun and olive branch' address. The leadership of the PLO argued for the 
ending of the armed struggle, in return for the creation of a mini Palestinian state in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip and a settlement of the refugee issue. This move was 
not accepted by all factions within the organisation, the PFLP leading the rejectionist 
wing which was against the concept of the mini-state and recognising the legitimacy 
of the Israeli state. These moves did not impress the Israelis. Israel's Foreign Minister 
claimed that 'the voice of Arafat was, and remains the voice of indiscriminate terror, 
the voice of the gun, with nothing in it of the olive branch of peace' (cited in Hirst, 
1977: 335). The call for the creation of a Palestinian mini state between Israel and 
Jordan was similarly dismissed as a platform from which the PLO would attempt to 
destroy Israel. The Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot argued that 'no reasonable 
person ... can ask us to hand over these regions to the PLO, unless it expects Israel to 
commit suicide' (14 November 1974, cited in Hirst, 1977: 336) 
In the mid 1970s both sides as well as Syria became involved in the Lebanese 
civil war. The relative stability which had prevailed in the country after the 1943 
power sharing National Pact broke down in the mid 1970s, culminating in the all out 
civil war of 1975-6. To simplify greatly, the conflict concerned two rival groupings, 
the right-wing Christian-Maronite-Phalangist alliance backed by Israel, which was 
economically dominant in the country, and the predominately poor majority leftist 
Muslim-Lebanese-Palestinian grouping. In mid 1976 with the leftist Muslim coalition 
gaining the upper hand in the conflict, the Syrians intervened on the side of the 
Christians occupying most of Lebanon apart from a southern strip bordering Israel. 
The intervention of the Syrian army at the behest of the Christians (and with the tacit 
support of Israel) brought a truce and relative calm to all but Southern Lebanon. The 
18 months of civil war had devastated Beirut, which became partitioned, and killed 
tens of thousands of Palestinians and Lebanese. In April 1976 Israel and Syria reached 
a secret agreement with American mediation, splitting the area into 'spheres of 
influence'. Syria agreed to keep its troops north of the Litani River and not to install 
surface to air missiles there, recognising Southern Lebanon as Israel's security buffer. 
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In the mid 1970s Israel began supplying the two major Christian Maronite 
militias, the Phlangists and Chamouns with weapons. Jonathan Randal (1983), the 
former senior foreign correspondent of the Washington Post suggests was 
strategically useful for Israel because it tied down two of Israel's enemies, the Syrians 
and Palestinians, both of whom had come into conflict with the Christians by 1977. 
Israel was also backing General Haddad's South Lebanon Army which was acting as 
its proxy force in South Lebanon. Randal (1983) notes that this was controversial 
because Haddad's forces had been involved in serious abuses including many 
instances of large scale killings of civilians and involvement in the unlawful deaths of 
UN personnel. In 1978 Israel mounted a large scale invasion of Southern Lebanon 
claiming that it was in response to a Palestinian attack in Israel which had left 37 
Israelis and nine Palestinians dead. The scale and effects of the invasion are disputed. 
Gilbert claims that 'several dozen PLO soldiers were killed or captured' and 'all PLO 
installations were systematically destroyed' (1999: 490). Randal claims it was 
civilians rather than guerrillas who bore the brunt of the attack: 
The destruction was a scale well known in Vietnam. Aping the prodigal use of 
American firepower in Indochina, the Israelis sought to keep their own 
casualties to a minimum- and succeeded. But they failed to wipe out the 
Palestinian commandoes, who had plenty of time to scamper to safety north of 
the Litani River. Piling mattresses, clothes and families in taxis and 
overloaded pickup trucks, more than two hundred thousand Lebanese also fled 
north out of harm's way. They became exiles in their own country, squatters 
seizing unoccupied apartments, the source of yet more tension in West Beirut. 
The Israelis did succeed in massive killing: almost all the victims were 
Lebanese civilians-some one thousand according to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. More than six thousand homes were badly 
damaged or destroyed. Half a dozen villages were all but levelled in a frenzy 
of violence in which Israeli troops committed atrocities (1983: 209) 
After three months under pressure from the United Nations, who condemned 
the attack, the IDF withdrew from southern Lebanon replaced by a United Nations 
force. Most of the positions abandoned by the IDF were taken by the SLA. In January 
1979 Ezer Weizman, the Israeli Defence Secretary announced a controversial pre- 
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emptive policy against Palestinian guerrillas in Southern Lebanon. He declared that 
Israel would not only strike in retaliation but 'at any time and any place that Israel 
deemed desirable' (cited in Randal, 1983: 220). In 1981 hostilities escalated in 
Lebanon. On July 17 Israel launched a major bombing raid on Southern Lebanon 
hitting refugee camps, ports, Lebanon's main oil refinery and all but one of the 
bridges over the Litani and Zahrani rivers (Randal, 1983). The Israelis claimed that 
the raids were necessary to deal with a PLO arms build-up in Southern Lebanon. The 
Palestinians held fire for three days and then began shelling and rocketing Northern 
Israel. On July 17 Israel bombed the Fakhani district in West Beirut, home to the PLO 
offices. More than one hundred and twenty Palestinian and Lebanese civilians were 
killed leading to international condemnation of the raid. The Palestinians then 
launched artillery attacks on twenty eight Israeli towns and settlements damaging 
crops and orchards, whilst tens of thousands of Israelis were temporarily forced to flee 
their homes in northern Israel (Randal, 1983). In the wake of this exchange both sides 
agreed to an American brokered ceasefire. 
Diplomacy and the Camp David Accords 
During this period a number of attempts were made by the Palestinians to push for a 
peace settlement. Palestinian representatives put forward a United Nations Security 
Council resolution in January 1976 which called for a two state solution on the 1967 
borders 'with appropriate arrangements .... to guarantee .... the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of all states in the area and their right to live in 
peace within secure and recognised boundaries. ' (UN Security Council Resolution 
S/1 1940). The resolution received nine votes in favour including France and the 
Soviet Union but was blocked by a single vote against from the United States. 
Chomsky (1999) points to PLO acceptance of the Soviet-American peace plan of 
October 1977, the Soviet peace plan of 1981 and the Saudi 1982 peace plan as well as 
a number of public statements by PLO representatives in the late 1970s that the 
Palestinians were proposing to end the armed struggle in exchange for the creation of 
a mini-state in Gaza and the West Bank .31 He notes that all such overtures were 
rejected by Israel. Some Israelis such as Benjamin Netanyahu have dismissed all 
Palestinian peace overtures as part of an attempt to force Israel to accept a PLO 
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'Trojan horse' whose purpose is to destroy the Israeli state. He argues that after the 
1973 war the Palestinians realised they couldn't destroy Israel with a 'frontal military 
assault' but were planning 'an interim phase in which Israel would be reduced to 
dimensions that made it more convenient for the coup de grace'. This would be 
achieved in two phases 'first create a Palestinian state on any territory vacated by 
Israel' and 'second mobilize from that state a general Arab military assault to destroy 
a shrunken and indefensible Israel' (2000: 239). Netanyahu claims that the Arabs 
have been deceiving the Western nations with a moderate front: 
For the PLO is a Pan-Arab Trojan Horse, a gift that the Arabs have been trying 
to coax the Arabs into accepting for over twenty years, so that the West in turn 
can force Israel to let it in at the gates. The Arabs paint their gift up prettily 
with legitimacy with the pathos of its plight, with expressions for the 
cherished ideas of freedom, justice, and peace. Yet no matter how it is dressed 
up to conceal the fact, the ultimate aim of the gift remains: to be allowed 
within Israel's defensive wall, to be parked on the hills overlooking Tel-Aviv, 
where it can perfon-n its grisly task. Every inch of Western acceptance -the 
cover stories the banquets, the observer status, the embassies, and any territory 
the PLO has been able to get its hands on-it uses to push ever closer to its goal. 
(2000: 256) 
In March 1978,350 Israeli reservists sent a letter to Begin which accused the 
government of preferring to build settlements and create a 'Greater Israel' rather than 
make peace with the Arab world. This was partly in response to Prime Minister 
Begin's decision to support the creation of a number of new Gush Emunim 
settlements deep in the occupied territories. The letter marked the creation of the 
Peace Now movement which in September 1978 organised a mass rally of 100,000 
Israelis in Tel-Aviv, the largest political demonstration in the state's history. The 
European Economic Community also pushed for a solution to the conflict during 
1979. Leaders of the EEC meeting in Venice in June 1979 issued statements 
supportive of Palestinian statehood, and the president-elect of the European 
Commission Gaston Thom travelled to the Middle East and met Yasser Arafat. The 
PLO was recognised by Ireland and Austria and Giscard d'Estaing recommended the 
group be accepted as a partner in peace negotiations. The Europeans also attempted to 
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widen 242 to include Palestinian self-determination. Ovendale (1999) claims that the 
United States made it clear that it would veto any European resolution in the Security 
Council which supported Palestinian rights. 
In March 1979 Israel signed a peace agreement with Egypt in Washington, on 
terms very simi ar to the ones rejected by Israel in 1972. The progress to the final 
settlement had been long and tortuous involving diplomacy stretching over several 
continents and many years. Israel agreed to hand back the Sinai peninsula in exchange 
for a comprehensive peace treaty, and demilitarisation of most of the Sinai. Both 
parties had compromised. Israelis agreed to remove the settlements and airfields, 
Egypt dropped the issue of Jerusalem, and the two sides agreed on only a vague 
autonomy plan for the Palestinians that would be implemented in stages over a 
number of years. The two signatories took a great deal of criticism over the 
conclusion of the peace treaty. Begin was attacked by the right and religious parties 
for returning the Sinai, while Sadat was criticised for breaking with Arab unity, by 
signing a peace treaty with Israel without having achieved a deal on Jerusalem, 
Palestinian statehood or a full Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory. Finkelstein 
(2001) suggests that the Israeli government agreed to peace with Egypt because it 
would neutralise the most powerful Arab military force threatening it, and 
subsequently allow it to break the nexus of the Palestinian national movement in 
Lebanon. On 30 July 1980 the Israeli government formally annexed all of Jerusalem, 
and the following year the Golan Heights were annexed in violation of the Israel- 
Egypt peace agreement and resolution 242. Both annexations drew immediate 
condemnation from the UN Security Council (Resolutions 478 and 497) who declared 
the annexations illegal, and demanded their rescission. The plans for Palestinian 
autonomy were not developed. Shlaim suggests that the Begin administration 
deliberately sabotaged the autonomy negotiations and expanded expropriations of 
Palestinian land and settlement building, because it wanted to retain control over the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip: 
Begin managed the autonomy talks in such a way that nothing could possibly 
be achieved. The first sign was Begin's appointment of Dr. Yosef Burg, the 
minister of the interior, to head Israel's six-man negotiating team. Burg was 
the leader of the National Religious Party, which saw Israel's right to Judea 
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and Samaria as embedded in Scripture and supported the settlement activities 
of Gush Emunim. (2000: 381-2) 
The Invasion of Lebanon 1982 
On 6 June 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon and attacked PLO forces. It also engaged the 
Syrian army in its drive towards Beirut. In the early days of the conflict the Economist 
correspondent G. H. Jansen reported that the Israeli policy was to surround towns and 
cities 'so swiftly that civilian inhabitants were trapped inside, and then to pound them 
from land, sea and air. After a couple of days there would be a timid probing attack: if 
there was resistance the pounding would resume' (Middle East International, 2 July 
1982, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 219). By the time an American sponsored cease-fire 
came into effect on 11 June the Israeli army had reached the southern outskirts of 
Beirut. Shlaim (2000) suggests that Israel was expecting their Christian allies in 
Lebanon, led by Bashir Gemayel, to attack the PLO forces who by this time, were 
trapped in West Beirut. However Gemayel was reluctant to take on the Palestinians 
and the Israelis did not want to get involved in potentially costly street fighting. By 13 
June the Israelis had surrounded Beirut and for the next two months they laid siege to 
the city and bombarded it with heavy weaponry. The Israeli commander Ariel Sharon 
who led the Israeli attack claimed that 'no army in the history of modem warfare ever 
took such pains to prevent civilian casualties as did the Israeli Defence Forces' and 
that the 'Jewish doctrine" of tohar haneshek (purity of arms) was adhered to 
4 scrupulously' with the Israeli army 'attacking only predetermined PLO Positions and 
in bombing and shelling buildings only when they served as PLO strongholds' (New 
York Times, 29 August 1982, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 243-4). Gilbert (1999) also 
stressed that the Israelis concentrated their attacks on PLO strongholds, although he 
notes that on one occasion a hospital was seriously damaged. Others reports from 
journalists in Beirut suggested that the Israeli attacks were indiscriminate. The 
Independent journalist Robert Fisk claimed the Israelis were employing 'time-on 
target salvoes' which 'laid 50 shells at a time' across residential areas 'slaughtering 
everyone within a 500 yard radius of the explosions' (2001: 284). He also claimed 
that the Israelis used cluster bombs, and phosphorous bombs, which were designed to 
create fires and cause untreatable bums. The Israeli daily Ha'aretz reported that 
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vacuum bombs, which ignite aviation fuel in such a way as to create immense 
pressure and literally implode large buildings, were also dropped on residential areas 
(I I August 1982). A Canadian surgeon Chris Giannou who had been working in a 
Palestinian hospital testified before the US Congress that he had witnessed the 'total, 
utter devastation of residential areas, and the blind, savage, indiscriminate destruction 
of refugee camps by simultaneous shelling and carpet bombing from aircraft, 
gunboats, tanks and artillery'. He testified that cluster bombs and phosphorous bombs 
had been used widely in residential areas and that he had seen 'savage and 
indiscriminate beatings' of prisoners, which were sometimes fatal as well as frequent 
use of torture. 32 The bombing intensified during July and August and Hirsh Goodman 
reported it continued even after an agreement in principle for the PLO to leave had 
been reached (Jerusalem Post, I October 1982, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 241). In July 
supplies of food, water, medicines and fuel were cut to the city. By August 4 Elaine 
Carey reported that eight of the nine orphanages in Beirut had been destroyed by 
cluster and phosphorous bombs, despite clear markings and Israeli assurances that 
they would be spared (Christian Science Monitor, 4 August 1982, cited in Chomsky, 
1999: 225). On August 12 the bombing reached a peak. The American journalist 
Charles Powers argued that: 
To many the siege of Beirut seemed gratuitous brutality ... The arsenal of 
weapons unleashed in a way that has not been seen since the Vietnam war, 
clearly horrified those who saw the results firsthand and through film and 
news reports at a distance. The use of cluster bombs and white phosphorous 
shells, a vicious weapon was widespread ... In the 
last hours of the last air 
attack on Beirut, Israeli planes carpet bombed Borg el Brajne [a refugee 
camp]. There were no fighting men left there only the damaged homes of 
Palestinian families, who once again would have to leave and find another 
place to live. (Los Angeles Times, 29 August 1982, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 
242) 
Eventually at the end of August the PLO forces were evacuated from Beirut to 
Tunis. Outside Beirut there were reports of widespread destruction of refugee camps 
and Lebanese villages. In Sidon, Fisk claims over 2000 Lebanese civilians were killed 
in air attacks he describes as 'the most ferocious ever delivered upon a Lebanese city' 
98 
(2000: 204). The head of the UN refugee agency that administered the camps Olof 
Rydbeck said that 32 years of work had been 'wiped out' with 'practically all of the 
schools, clinics and installations of the agency in ruins. '(New York Times, 19 August 
1982, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 223). The scale of civilian and PLO casualties during 
the war are contested. Gilbert (1999) claims that 460 Lebanese civilians and 6000 
PLO fighters were killed. The Lebanese police estimated 19,085 killed though to 
August with 6775 killed in Beirut, 84 per cent of them civilians (Christian Science 
Monitor, 21 December 1982, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 221). The United Nations 
estimated 13,500 houses severely damaged in West Beirut, thousands more in other 
parts of the country, not taking into account damage to the refugee camps which were 
towns themselves (Christian Science Monitor 18 November 1982, cited in Chomsky, 
1999: 223). There were also reports that all the teenage and adult Lebanese and 
Palestinian males, were taken to camps where they were humiliated and tortured. 33 
Chomsky cites testimony from the IDF Lieutenant Colonel Dov Yirmiah which 
appeared in the Israeli daily Yediot A hronot on the fate of Palestinian and Lebanese 
detainees: 
He tells story after story of prisoners savagely and endlessly beaten in 
captivity, of torture and humiliation of prisoners, and of the many who died of 
beatings and thirst in Israeli prisons or concentration camps in Lebanon .... The 
long and repeated interrogations were accompanied by constant beatings, or 
attacks by dogs on leashes, or the use of air rifles that cause intense pain but 
do not kill... New loads of clubs had to be brought into the camps to replace 
those broken under interrogation. The torturers were 'experts in their work, ' 
the prisoners report, and knew how to make blows most painful, including 
blows to the genitals, until the prisoners confessed that they were 'terrorists' 
(8 November 1982, cited in 1999: 240) 
Other reports in the Israeli press claimed that members of the Israel's proxy 
militia the South Lebanon Army were allowed in the camps to torture prisoners and 
that some gang raped women and attempted to force them to have sex with dogs 
(Koteret Rashit, 16 March 1983, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 236). After the PLO had 
agreed to leave Lebanon one of the war's most notorious incidents occurred at the 
refugee camps at Shatila and Sabra. After the departure of the PLO from Lebanon, the 
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Israeli forces sealed off the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on September 16 and 
allowed in between 100 and 130 Phalangist and Haddadist troops. Ariel Sharon 
claimed that the camps contained 2,000 well armed Palestinian fighters and the 
Christian forces had been sent in to clear them out. However Edward Walsh argues 
that 'no one has publicly explained how the Israelis expected 100 to 130 Phalangists 
to defeat such a force of Palestinians' (Washington Post 26 December 1982, cited in 
Chomsky, 1999: 369), and in a visit to the camp a few days before the killings 
journalists reported finding no military presence (Time, 4 October 1982, cited in 
Chomsky, 1999: 369). Once in the camps the Phalangist forces raped and killed many 
of the camps inhabitants who were primarily women, children and the elderly. The 
death toll is disputed. The official Israeli Kahan Commission estimated 7-800 killed, 
the Lebanese authorities pit the figure at approximately 2,000, whilst the Israeli 
j ournalist Amnon Kapeliouk (1984) citing evidence from the International Committee 
of the Red Cross estimated 3-3,500. Responsibility for the killings have also been 
partly attributed to the United States who gave explicit assurances that the Muslim 
civilian population of West Beirut would be protected as part of the PLO deal to 
evacuate Beirut (Ovendale, 1999). The massacres were condemned by the United 
Nations by 147 votes to two (Israel, United States), and international lawyers in 
Belgium have since attempted to indict the Israel commanders Ariel Sharon and 
Amos Yaron for war crimes. 
The Lebanon war appeared to split Israeli society. Some questioned whether 
the scale of death and destruction inflicted on Southern Lebanon was proportionate to 
the threat posed by Palestinian militants. In 1983 a debate on Zionism was held at Tel- 
Aviv University where Aluf Hareven of the Van Leer Institute commented: 
According to the figures provided by the Ministry of the Interior Yosef Burg, 
in 1980,10 Jews were killed by terrorists and in 1981- 8. In contrast we have 
killed about a thousand terrorists in 1982, and caused the loss of life of 
thousands of inhabitants of an enemy country. If so, it results that for every 6- 
8 Jews sacrificed, we kill in return thousands of Gentiles. This is undoubtedly, 
a spectacular situation, an uncommon success of Zionism. I might even dare to 
say-exaggerated. (Migvan, OctoberNovember 1982, cited in Chomsky 1999: 
74) 
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The massacres at Sabra and Shatila also led to the largest protests in Israel's 
history. On the September 25 1982 more than 400,000 Israelis joined a Peace Now 
demonstration in Tel-Aviv. Others suggested that a large part of the population was 
unconcerned if not approving of the events at the refugee camps: 
In the matter of Sabra and Shatila- a large part of the community, perhaps the 
majority, is not at all troubled by the massacre itself. Killing of Arabs in 
general, and Palestinians in particular, is quite popular, or at least 'doesn't 
bother anyone' in the words of youth these days. Ever since the massacre I 
have been surprised to hear from educated, enlightened people, 'the 
conscience of Tel Aviv', the view that the massacre itself, as a step towards 
removing the remaining Palestinians from Lebanon is not terrible. It is just too 
bad that we were in the neighbourhood (Haaretz, 19 November 1982, cited in 
Chomsky, 1999: 395) 
Israel's motives for launching the attack are contested. Mitchell Bard (2003), 
the director of the American-Israeli Cooperative Institute, points to three reasons for 
Israel's decision to attack Lebanon. Firstly he claims that the PLO were repeatedly 
breaching the ceasefire negotiated by the Americans in July 1981 and attacking 
Israelis across the Lebanese border. Secondly he alleges that 15-18,000 PLO members 
were encamped in Southern Lebanon and were equipping themselves with a huge 
arsenal including rockets, surface to air missiles, mortars, tanks and enough weapons 
to arm five brigades. He suggests that Israeli strikes and commando raids could not 
prevent the emergence of this 'PLO army'. Finally Bard points to the attempt on the 
life of the Israeli ambassador to London Shlomo Argov by the Abu Nidal group. All 
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of these explanations have been disputed . Shlaim suggests that Israel 
had two 
objectives, to create a new political order in Lebanon and to 'destroy the PLO's 
military infrastructure in Lebanon and to undermine it as a political organisation' 
(2000: 396). Former IDF education officer Mordechai Bar-on argued that 'there is no 
doubt that the [war's] central aim was to deal a crushing blow to the national 
aspirations of the Palestinians and to their very existence as a nation endeavouring to 
define itself and gain the right to self-determination' (New Outlook, October 1982, 
cited in Chomsky 1999: 203). With the PLO infrastructure destroyed and the refugees 
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dispersed, some commentators suggest that the organisation might revert to hijacking 
and therefore undermine its growing political status: 
If the PLO were now thrown out of Lebanon-or, better yet, reduced to mad 
dog terrorism that would destroy its growing political and diplomatic 
legitimacy-then Israel stood a better chance of annexing the West Bank and 
Gaza strip still thoroughly loyal to Arafat's leadership despite his many errors. 
(Randal, 1983: 250) 
Shlaim (2000) suggests that another aspect of Sharon's 'big plan' was to install 
Israel's Christian ally Bashir Gemayel in power in Lebanon, and force the Palestinian 
refugees out of Lebanon to Jordan, leading to the overthrow of the Hashemite 
monarchy and its conversion to a Palestinian state, thereby weakening international 
pressure on Israel to vacate the West Bank and allowing Israel to annex the territory. 
Neither of the larger geo-strategic aims were achieved. Bashir Gemayel was 
assassinated shortly after the war whilst the Hashemite monarchy remained intact in 
Jordan. 
In the aftermath of the Sabra and Shatila killings, American marines returned 
to Lebanon as part of a multinational force. They however soon came into conflict 
with Shia and Druze forces opposed to Israel's occupation of Southern Lebanon. 
When US warships shelled Druze positions, it appeared that the US had entered the 
civil war in support of the Christian-Israeli alliance. On 23 October a suicide bomber 
killed 256 American and 58 French troops leading to the withdrawal of American and 
European forces. A Shiite group with links to Iran later claimed responsibility for the 
attack. Ovendale (1999) claims that after the 1982 war Israel and the United States 
strengthened their political and military ties, by embarking on joint weapons projects. 
In 1986 the Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu revealed to a Sunday Times 
interview the existence of Israel's substantial nuclear arsenal, revelations which were 
to earn the Israeli an 18 year prison term. Recent newspaper reports suggest that the 
Israeli nuclear arsenal has increased to approximately 200 warheads, many of which 
are fitted to American supplied Harpoon cruise missiles capable of hitting any of 
Israel's Arab neighbours (Observer, October 12 2003). 
In the mid 1980s further attempts were also made to find a negotiated solution 
to the conflict. In February 1985 Yasser Arafat and King Hussein of Jordan issued the 
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Amman Declaration which proposed Palestinian self-determination within a 
Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. The composition of the negotiating team proved 
a problem with Israel refusing to negotiate with any PLO members. Margaret 
Thatcher attempted to push the plan and proposed a peace conference to include PLO 
members. However the plans were derailed by a series of events. Firstly Abu Nidal, 
backed by Syria, threatened to assassinate any PLO members who accepted 
Thatcher's invitation. Then on 25 September 1985 three Israelis were killed on a boat 
in Larnaca. The Israeli government blamed the PLO. The PLO claimed the three were 
Mossad agents. Israel then dispatched a number of American made F- 16 fighters to 
bomb the PLO headquarters in Tunis. In the attack, 58 Palestinians and 15 Tunisians 
were killed. The attack was supported by US but condemned by the European 
Community and United Nations. Soon afterwards a small Palestinian group, the 
Palestine Liberation Front hijacked the Achille Lauro and killed an elderly Jewish 
passenger before surrendering. Following the hijacking the US pressurised Britain to 
cancel a scheduled meeting between the Foreign Secretary and PLO members. Britain 
then insisted that the PLO members sign a statement denouncing all fon-ns of political 
violence. The PLO members refused, arguing that this would cover armed resistance 
to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the meeting was 
cancelled. Soon afterwards King Hussein of Jordan announced the end of his 
collaboration with the PLO leadership blaming Arafat's refusal to accept resolutions 
242 and 338. In the wake of this rupture between the PLO and Jordan, King Hussein 
and Shimon Peres kept close diplomatic links and considered ways of restarting peace 
talks whilst excluding any members of the PLO from negotiations (Shlaim, 2000). 
Israel's pursuance of the 'Jordanian option' Shlaim suggests was blocked by the 
Israeli premier Yitzak Shamir who was opposed to any international conference 
which might involve pressure from outside mediators. 
1987: The First Intifada 
On December 9 1987, following the death of four Gazans the previous day, in a road 
traffic incident Palestinians from the Jebalya refugee camp began throwing stones at 
an Israeli army compound. Within days unrest spread to the West Bank. Unarmed 
Palestinian men, women, and children attacked Israeli soldiers and armoured 
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personnel carriers. Benny Morris claims that the Intifada was 'not an armed rebellion 
but a massive, persistent campaign of civil resistance, with strikes and commercial 
shutdowns accompanied by violent (though unarmed) demonstrations against the 
occupying forces' (1992: 561). The factors behind the Intifada, which was to last six 
years until it was called off by the Palestinian leadership in the wake of the Oslo 
agreements, are contested. Netanyahu has argued that the Israeli administration in the 
occupied territories had instituted a 'liberal policy aimed at radically improving the 
lives of the Palestinians' and that material and educational prosperity had gone hand 
in hand with political rights including 'a press consisting of newspapers representing 
various factions (some openly sympathetic to the PLO) and the right to directly appeal 
all decisions to the democratic court system' (2000: 176). He argues that the impetus 
for the Intifada was 'virulent PLO agitation' that led the population in the occupied 
territories to adopt 'ever more extreme and implacable positions' (2000: 177). He also 
claims that the PLO had forced children out of their schools to take part in 
confrontations with Israeli forces. Gilbert blames Jordan for not integrating the 
Palestinians living in the West Bank into Jordanian society before 1967, and argues 
that the impetus for the Intifada came from a 'bitter hard core of extremists who were 
prepared to face Israeli bullets in order to defy the occupiers and assert their national 
identity' (1999: 525) Some Israelis blamed outside agitation for the Intifada. Yitzak 
Rabin accused Iran and Syria of fermenting unrest. Others have questioned whether 
Israeli policy in the occupied territories was really liberal and suggest that the Intifada 
was the result of severe and persistent human rights abuses. A report by the Israeli 
Committee for Solidarity with Bir Zeit (the West Bank University periodically closed 
by the Israeli authorities) described the Israeli administration in the occupied 
territories as an 'attempt to revive an old well-known colonial method in a new 
'original' Israeli form' in order to create 'an Israeli Bantustan, which imposes on the 
Palestinians the role of hewers of wood and drawers of water for Israeli society'. To 
achieve this the report claimed that there was widespread and violent suppression of 
all forms of political activity, and that 'quislings from the Village Leagues' together 
with settler groups inflicted 'humiliation, harassment and terror' on the local 
population. 35 The United Nations also produced a number of reports in the mid 1980s 
which were critical of Israeli human rights abuses in the occupied territories and 
pointed to widespread acts of violence committed against Palestinians by armed 
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settlers. 36 Israel Shahak, argues that such abuses were the main factor behind the 
Intifada and cites examples from the Israeli press: 
In fact, before the Intifada, the daily oppression, humiliations, land 
confiscations and arbitrariness of the Israeli regime were steadily increasing. 
This increase, duly recorded by the Hebrew press, was the chief reason for the 
outbreak of the Intifada. Readers of Israel's Hebrew-language press are aware 
of how outrageously the Israeli armed forces were behaving before the 
Intifada. On June 19,1987, Eyal Ehrlich reported in an article in Haaretz 
headlined, 'An occupier against his will, ' the testimony of a young Israeli 
soldier assigned to serve in the border guards. Whenever a Palestinian is 
accosted to show his I. D., the soldier wrote, its checking is always 
accompanied by 'a slap, a punch. a kick. ' 'The border guards usually enjoy 
beating the Arabs, ' the account continues. They derive pleasure from 
it ... Sometimes I feel like a Nazi when I watch my friends in action. I try hard 
to stay away from one of my commanders ... He always behaves very badly 
toward the locals: with violence, beatings, and the like ... The soldiers spit in 
the faces of the Arabs, or they kick them in the testicles. And there is always 
that slap in the face. ' An article in Hadashot of July 7,1987 by Menahem 
Shizaf was headlined, 'Border guards order the Arabs to masturbate and to 
lick the floor. ' It described the treatment meted out to Palestinian workers 
from the occupied territories who were found spending the night in shacks in 
Israel rather than returning to their homes. (Washington Report on Middle East 
Affairs, March 1991) 
The Israeli Minister of Defence Yitzak Rabin explained that the Israeli 
response to the Intifada would consist of 'force, might, beatings' (New York Times, 23 
January 1988, cited in the New York Review ofBooks, 17 March 1988), whilst Prime 
Minister Shamir was reported in the Israeli publication Hadashot as warning those 
protesting the occupation that they would be crushed 'like grasshoppers' with their 
heads 'smashed against the boulders and walls' and that 'we say to them from the 
heights of this mountain and from the perspective of thousands of years of history that 
they are like grasshoppers compared to us' (6 January 1988, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 
482). By February 1988 the Intifada became formalised with the establishment of the 
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United National Leadership of the Uprising. The organisation encouraged strikes 
amongst those who worked in Israel and attacks on the Israeli administrative 
structure. Taxes were withheld, those who worked as administrators and tax collectors 
resigned and Israeli goods were boycotted (Ovendale, 1999). Roadblocks were set up 
to keep out the Israeli army and Palestinians tried to create an alternative system of 
local self-government independent of the military authority. 
In February 1988 the United States attempted to put forward a peace plan 
based on Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories. The plan was rejected by 
Israel, and the PLO who noted it made no mention of statehood. In April Abu Jihad, 
the PLO second in command was assassinated by Israel in Tunis. The Tunisian 
government complained to the United Nations Security Council. The Israeli daily 
Ma'ariv later reported that the future Prime Minister Ehud Barak had directed the 
assassination from a navy ship off Tunis (4 July 1988). In July King Hussein of 
Jordan announced that his country was severing its links with the West Bank 
effectively killing the 'Jordanian option' that had long been favoured by the US and 
some Israeli leaders. In September Yasser Arafat told the European Parliament in 
Strasbourg, that the PLO would accept Israel's right to security if Israel recognised a 
Palestinian mini-state. In November the Palestinian National Council meeting in 
Algiers agreed to recognise Israel, as well as all UN resolutions dating back to 1947 
and to foreswear its claim to all of mandatory Palestine. It also proclaimed the 
establishment of the state of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Israeli 
Prime Minister, Shamir, dismissed the resolutions as a 'deceptive propaganda 
exercise, intended to create the impression of moderation and of achievements for 
those carrying out violent acts in the territories of Judea and Samaria' (cited in 
Shlaim, 2000: 466). Yasser Arafat wanted to appeal to the UN General Assembly, 
but despite being recognised by more than sixty nations the United States refused him 
an entry visa (Ovendale, 1999). The General Assembly then voted to hold its plenary 
session in Geneva, and Arafat under strong pressure from the American Secretary of 
State, George Shultz, announced that the PLO accepted resolutions 242 and 338, as 
well as Israel's right to exist and renounced 'terrorism'. 
Meanwhile Israel's response to the Intifada was attracting widespread 
international criticism. By January 1989 the US State Department reported that the 
unrest had claimed the lives of eleven Israelis and 366 Palestinians. Some on the 
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Israeli right argued that the criticism of Israel and media coverage of the Intifada was 
biased and unfair, and that the Israeli response was restrained and proportionate: 
Ignoring the Arab reign of terror in the Palestinian streets, the media created 
for themselves nightly instalments of a popular romance drama: heroic 
underdog in search of self-determination taking on a terrifying Israeli 
tyrant ... Since viewers were being told this was an 'army of occupation'- that 
is, it had no right to be there in the first place- the media managed to transform 
even the most necessary aspects of maintaining law and order into 
unforgivable crimes. Utterly lost from the images on the screen was the 
organised nature of the rioting, the internecine violence, and the terrorised 
lives of the innocent Arabs (and Jews) who were ground under the intifada's 
heel. Similarly lost were the restrictive firing orders that stayed the hand of 
every Israeli soldier, and the swift trial of the 208 Israelis who in any way 
disobeyed these orders- as against the tens of thousands of Israeli soldiers and 
reservists who followed the regulations with impeccable restraint. (2000: 18 1- 
2) 
The United Nations, NGOs, human rights groups and some Israeli soldiers 
disputed this. In December 1988 the United Nations General Assembly passed a 
resolution by 106 to 2 (Israel, United States) which condemned the conduct of the 
IDF and settlers during the Intifada. The resolution 
Declare[d] once more that Israel's grave breaches of that Convention are war 
crimes and an affront to humanity'. Amongst many criticisms the resolution 
4 strongly condemned' the 'implementation of an 44iron-fist" policy against the 
Palestinian people ... the escalation of Israeli brutality since the beginning of 
the uprising ... the Ill-treatment and torture of children and minors under 
detention and/or imprisonment ... the killing and wounding of defenceless 
demonstrators ... the breaking of 
bones and limbs of thousands of civilians ... the 
usage of toxic gas, which resulted, inter alia, in the killing of many 
Palestinians' (United Nations, 1988). 
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Israel was particularly criticised for its treatment of children during the 
Intifada. A thousand page Save the Children study documented the 'indiscriminate 
beating, teargassing, and shooting of children. ' The report found that the average age 
of the victims was ten years old and that the majority of those who were shot were not 
participating in stone throwing. The report also alleged that in 80% of cases where 
children were shot the Israeli army prevented the victims from receiving medical 
attention. The report concluded that more than 50,000 children required medical 
attention for injuries including gun shot wounds, tear gas inhalation and multiple 
fractures (report cited in Finkelstein, 1996: 47). The August 198 9 bulletin f rom 
the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights was entitled 'Deliberate Murder' and 
reported on the targeting of Palestinian children in leadership roles. It found that the 
Israeli army and snipers from 'special units' had 'carefully chosen' the children who 
were shot in the head or heart and died instantaneously (report cited in Finkelstein, 
1996: 47). Others reports from Israelis human rights groups and articles in the Israeli 
press also allege that torture, including severe beating and electric shocks were used 
extensively against detainees including children. 37 
The Intifada also saw the birth of Hamas, the Islamic opposition movement 
formed by Sheik Yassin in February 1988. The organisation which emerged out of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, stressed a return to conservative Islamic values and provided a 
network of health, and social services for Palestinians in the occupied territories. For 
many years the organisation received extensive funding from Israel (Shlaim, 2000; 
Chomsky, 1999; Mishal & Sela. 2000). Shlaim claims that this was done 'in the hope 
of weakening the secular nationalism of the PLO' (2000: 459) Chomsky (1999) 
suggests such a weakening would be beneficial to Israel because it would allow them 
to evade a political solution to the conflict which might involve returning the 
occupied territories. The Hamas charter issued in August 1988 argued that all of 
Palestine belonged to the Muslim nation as a religious endowment and that it was 
each Muslim's duty to engage in jihad (a religious war) to 'liberate' Palestine. The 
degree to which its intentions match its rhetoric is disputed. Most Israelis regard the 
organisation as fundamentalist and uncompromising, dedicated to killing Jews and 
destroying the Israeli state. Two Israeli academics, Shaul Mishal and Avraharn Sela, 
suggest that the organisation is more complex and pragmatic than this. They suggest 
that Hamas utilizes 'controlled violence' as a 'means rather than an end' to mobilize 
political support and is 'cognizant of power relations and political feasibility' (2000: 
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viii). Mishal and Sela argue that its main purpose has been to establish itself as the 
major force in Palestinian political life and that in the future it 'may find that it can 
accept a workable fon-nula of coexistence with Israel in place of armed struggle" 
(2000: ix). In 1989 the groups' founder Sheik Yassin was arrested by Israel, and in the 
occupied territories the Israelis increased their use of deportations and curfews in an 
attempt to suppress the Intifada. They also outlawed the committees administering the 
uprising. This was a problem for Palestinians as they saw the committees as the 
nucleus of the self-governing institutions they hoped to build once the occupation 
ended. 
In 1989 Yitzak Shamir put forward an initiative which proposed elections and 
expanded Palestinian autonomy in exchange for the ending of the Intifada. Shamir set 
down certain preconditions, there would be no Palestinian state, no PLO involvement 
(even if its representatives triumphed in the elections) and no participation in the 
elections for the inhabitants of East Jerusalem. The plans were eventually derailed by 
members of Shamir's own cabinet, principly Ariel Sharon, David Levy, and Yitzhak 
Moda'i who argued that Israel was giving too much away, and was adopting too 
liberal an attitude to the Intifada (Shlaim, 2000). Egypt and the United States then put 
forward their own peace initiatives. These precipitated a split in what was then a 
National Unity government in Israel , which led to its downfall. One part of the 
government, the Labour Alignment, unsuccessfully urged Shamir to accept the 
American initiative, whilst some members of the right wing Likud party, felt Israel 
was making too many concessions and not cracking down sufficiently hard on the 
Intifada. For six weeks the Labor party's Shimon Peres tried unsuccessfully to form a 
new coalition, and eventually Yitzak Shamir formed one in which his Likud part 
linked up with ultranationalist and religious parties. This new coalition which Shlaim 
(2000) claims was the most right wing and hardline (in its attitudes to the Arabs) in 
Israel's history, immediately announced that it would end the Intifada, create new 
settlements and expand existing ones. It also insisted there would be no Palestinian 
state, no negotiation with the PLO and no sharing of Jerusalem. 
The Intifada which continued to smoulder during this period, was re-ignited in 
October 1990 when Israeli troops killed 21 Palestinians on the Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem. The Israelis claimed they had responded to acts of stone throwing directed 
at Israeli worshippers. The Palestinians claimed that the stone throwing only began 
after the Israelis started shooting. The United Nations Security Council condemned 
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the killings, but Israel managed to prevent the United Nations from acting on 
Palestinian demands to replace the Israeli military government in the occupied 
territories with a UN force (Ovendale, 1999). 
In August 1990 the Iraq war intervened when Saddam Hussein invaded 
Kuwait and occupied the country. Five months later an American led coalition 
attacked Iraq forcing its withdrawal from Kuwait. Both the Palestinians in the 
occupied territories and the PLO leadership allied themselves with Saddarn 
Hussein because of the Iraqi dictator's attempt to make a 'linkage' between 
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and Israeli withdrawal from the occupied 
territories, and because he struck at the Israeli state with scud missiles. In 
doing so the Palestinian leadership effectively lost much of the political capital 
it had built up over many years, whilst Israel benefited internationally by not 
responding to the Iraqi attacks. In the aftermath of the war the US moved to 
bring Israel and its Arab adversaries together in an international Peace 
conference. 
The Beginning of the Oslo Process 
In Madrid at the end of October 1991 an Israeli delegation met Palestinian and 
other representatives from Israel's 'confrontation states' (Syria, Jordan, Lebanon). 
Although the Palestinian representatives were pro-PLO, they were not publicly stated 
as being members of the organisation, as this would have landed them in jail under 
Israeli law. The Americans who set up the conference insisted that it be based around 
UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of 'land for peace'. This premise was 
accepted by the Palestinians but rejected by the Israelis (Shlaim, 2000). In the run up 
to the conference the Likud administration announced a new wave of settlement 
building designed to double the settler population in the occupied territories in four 
years. Little progress was made in negotiations either at Madrid or in the five rounds 
of bilateral talks which took place in Washington. Shlaim argues that an 'immense 
gap' separated the parties: 
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The Palestinians started with the assumption that they were a people with 
national rights and that the interim arrangements under discussion were the 
precursor to independence and should be shaped accordingly. The Israeli 
government started with the assumption that the Palestinians were the 
inhabitants of the territories with no national rights of any kind and certainly 
no rights to independence, not even after the end of the transitional period. 
(2000: 493) 
In June 1992 the Israeli population went to the polls to elect a new 
administration. The Likud party pledged to continue the peace process whilst 
retaining all the occupied territories and expanding settlement building. The Labor 
party vowed to conclude a deal on Palestinian autonomy, allow residents of East 
Jerusalem in take part in negotiations and freeze the construction of the 'political 
settlements' deep in the occupied territory. Labor won the election under Yitzak 
Rabin in a major political swing which ended fifteen years of Likud rule. In an Israeli 
newspaper interview just after his election defeat Shamir declared that 'I would have 
carried on autonomy talks for ten years, and meanwhile we would have reached half a 
million people in Judea and Samaria' (Maariv, 26 June 1992) 
Over the next 20 months Israeli and Palestinians sympathetic to but not 
members of the PLO, engaged in 10 rounds of negotiations in Washington that 
produced no tangible results. In the middle of those negotiations Rabin deported 416 
Hamas activists to Lebanon following the killing of an Israeli border policeman. This 
move, which was condemned by the UN as a breach of international law, was 
intended to curb Hamas's influence but actually had the opposite effect. Mishal and 
Sela argue that the deportations were a 'milestone in Hamas's decision to use car 
bombs and suicide attacks as a major modus operandi against Israel', because they 
came into contact with Hezbollah guerrillas who provided training in such techniques. 
(2000: 65-6), They note that Hamas first used suicide attacks shortly after the return 
of the deportees to the occupied territories. 38 
III 
The Declaration of PrinciDles 
While the official negotiations continued the Israelis decided to open up a second and 
secret channel of diplomacy in Oslo. For the first time they agreed to negotiate with a 
section of the PLO. These talks bypassed the bulk of the PLO and Fatah, with 
negotiations directed only towards Yasser Arafat and a few close associates. In 
September 1993 the Declaration of Principles between the Palestinians and Israel was 
finally brought into the open and signed by both parties on the White House lawn. 
The Declaration was an agenda for negotiations which stipulated that within four 
months of signing the agreement Israel had to withdraw completely from Gaza and 
Jericho, with a Palestinian police force taking over internal security in those areas, 
though Israel would still maintain overall responsibility for external security and 
foreign affairs. Elsewhere in the West Bank Palestinians were to take control of five 
spheres: education, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism. Within nine 
months elections were to be held for a Palestinian Authority which was to assume 
responsibilities for those municipal affairs. Final status negotiations were scheduled to 
start within two years and were due to be completed within five years. All of the most 
serious issues affecting the two parties including possible Palestinian statehood, 
borders, refugees, settlements and Jerusalem were postponed to the final settlement 
talks. The PLO agreed to accept UN resolutions 242 and 338, end the armed struggle 
against Israel and amend the parts of the Palestinian National Charter which called the 
destruction of the Israeli state. Israel agreed to recognise the PLO as the representative 
of the Palestinian people. The Declaration of Principles brought to an end to the first 
Intifada which according to the Ahe Israeli human rights group B'Tselem had seen 
160 Israelis and 1,162 Palestinians killed (B'Tselem, 2003a). 
The treaty met with opposition on both Israeli and Palestinian sides. Likud and 
the right wing nationalist and religious parties denounced the agreement as a betrayal 
of the settlers in the occupied territories, an end to Biblical Greater Israel, and a 
mortal threat to the security of the State. They argued that the occupied territories 
could not be ceded by politicians as they had been eternally promised to the Jews by 
God. Binyamin Netanyahu, the Likud leader completely rejected the accord and 
pledged to cancel it if he became Prime Minister. He compared the agreement to the 
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appeasement of Hitler and told Peres, 'You are even worse than Chamberlain. He 
imperilled the safety of another people, but you are doing it to your own people' 
(cited in Shlaim, 2000: 521). The accord was eventually approved by the Knesset by a 
margin of 61 votes to 50. Israeli public opinion on the accords was generally 
favourable with 65% saying they approved of the agreement and only 13% declaring 
themselves 'very much against' it (Shlaim, 2000). In an analysis of Palestinian 
reaction to the Oslo Accords, Mouin Rabbani identified four distinct positions and 
argued that 'contrary to most press reports the fault line .... within the Palestinian body 
politic is not an ideological one separating peace-loving moderates from violent 
extremists' but rather one which revolves 'primarily around issues of substance and 
procedure' (Middle East International, 24 September 1993). He claimed that only a 
few Palestinians were 'enthusiastic supporters', with a majority whom he 
characterised as 'optimistic and desperate in equal measure' had serious doubts but 
were prepared to give the agreement a chance. He suggested that this large group 
could quickly turn against the agreement if the human rights situation did not 
improve, and the settlement activity and occupation continued. The third group, he 
identified, comprised senior political and cultural figures 39 such as Edward Said, who 
although supporting a peaceful resolution of the conflict, nevertheless regarded the 
accords as a 'deeply flawed' and 'potentially fatal to Palestinian national aspirations'. 
They objected to Arafat signing the document without public debate or consultations 
and believed it was a bad deal. They pointed out the Palestinians were agreeing to end 
the Intifada and renounce their rights to 78 per cent of historic Palestine without any 
guarantee of statehood, agreement to remove settlements (or even stop settlement 
building), and any commitments to improve the human rights situation, or to resolve 
the refugee issue and status of Jerusalem. For this group the agreement undermined 
the internationally recognised rights of Palestinians and 'foreshadows permanent 
dispossession of the majority of Palestinians' as well as creating the potential 
conditions for a civil war. The fourth position that Rabbani identifies is that of the 
rejectionists who comprise both the radical Islamic and secular movements such as 
Harnas and the PFLP, and their supporters in the occupied territories. These groups, 
argues Rabbani, regarded the agreement as a 'textbook case of Bantustanisation' in 
which the principal Palestinian weapon the Intifada was being liquidated so that 
Palestinians could become the joint administrators of the occupation, in a weak 
subservient statelet or series of statelets. Rabbani suggests that had the agreement 
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involved moves towards real statehood and been reached in 'conformity with the 
Palestinian national consensus and properly ratified' then much of the rejectionist 
camp with the exception of Islamic Jihad and sections of Hamas and the PFLP would 
at least have tacitly accepted the deal. 
The 1993 Declaration of Principles was followed in February 1994 by the 
signing of the new set of documents in Cairo. The IDF agreed to redeploy its forces 
from urban centres to rural areas allowing it to maintain control of overall security 
and land crossings. On 25 February Dr Baruch Goldstein, an American born settler 
and member of the Kach party opened fire with an IDF issued Galil assault rifle on 
Muslim worshipers at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron killing 29 people before 
he himself was killed. Rachelle Marshall, aj oumalist and member of the Jewish 
Peace Union, writes that the killings were followed by five week round the clock 
curfew imposed on more than a million Palestinians, during which the IDF killed a 
further 76 Palestinians, mostly stone throwing youths (Washington Report on Middle 
East Affairs, June, 1994). The Israeli journalist Danny Rubenstein was later to argue 
that the Hebron killings 'directly and immediately created the chain of suicide 
bombings and the appalling upward spiral composed of Israeli responses and 
Palestinian counter-responses' (Haaretz, 28 September 1998). In the wake of these 
events Israeli government under pressure from the Palestinians and sections of Israeli 
public opinion moved to outlaw the overtly racist party Kach, but refused Palestinian 
demands to remove the few hundred heavily armed and guarded settlers who lived 
among more than 100,000 Palestinian Hebronites. The Israeli government also 
reftised PLO requests to put the issue of settlements on the negotiating table, arguing 
that under the Declaration of Principles it was not obliged to do so until the third year 
of the interim period. Hamas vowed revenge for the Hebron killings, and shortly 
before the signing of the next stage of the interim agreements in Cairo in May 1994 it 
carried out a car bombing in Afula which killed eight, and the first ever suicide 
bombing in Israel which killed five people. Suicide bombings involved individuals 
strapping explosives, nails, and ball bearing to their bodies which were then detonated 
in densely packed areas such as markets or buses. This new and indiscriminate 
weapon left those who survived permanently scarred or disabled, and significantly 
intensified security fears amongst Israelis. A report from a BBC] News bulletin 
describes the aftermath of a suicide attack on a crowded Israeli market: 
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The two explosions came within seconds of each other cutting down scores of 
people in the heart of the crowded market. It was just after one o'clock and the 
market was full of shoppers. Streams of ambulances came to carry away the 
dead and the injured. It was a place of appalling suffering ... Those who 
escaped injury were led away from the devastation and others arrived 
desperate to see if their friends and relatives had escaped the carnage. (BBC I 
Evening News, 30 July 1997) 
Some Palestinians have tried to justify such attacks by arguing that they are in 
response to the killing of Palestinian civilians by Israelis. Others have argued that they 
are resisting an illegal occupation, or that it is the only effective weapon against a 
much more powerful adversary. Dr Eyad EI-Sarraj, a psychiatrist and winner of the 
1998 Martin Ennals human rights award, has noted that most suicide bombers had 
suffered a severe trauma when young, 'often the torture of a close relative' and that 
'children grow up wanting to take revenge for their trauma. Torture is an integral part 
of that cycle of violence' (Guardian, 24 January 2003). Whatever the motivations or 
factors behind suicide bombings Human Rights groups have unequivocally 
condemned such attacks and demanded that those involved in planning attacks be 
brought to justice. In a report entitled Without Distinction: Attacks on civilians by 
Palestinian armed groups, Amnesty International, argue that indiscriminate attacks on 
civilians cannot be justified whatever the circumstances or provocations: 
The obligation to protect civilians is absolute and cannot be set aside because 
Israel has failed to respect its obligations. The attacks against civilians by 
Palestinian armed groups are widespread, systematic and in pursuit of an 
explicit policy to attack civilians. They therefore constitute crimes against 
humanity under international law. They may also constitute war crimes, 
depending on the legal characterisation of the hostilities and interpretation of 
the status of Palestinian armed groups and fighters under international 
humanitarian law. (Amnesty International, 2002) 
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The Cairo Agreement and slo 11 
The agreement signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994 concluded the Gaza and Jericho phase 
of the redeployment and set the terms for expanding Palestinian autonomy in the West 
Bank. These had three stages. Firstly the Palestinian National Authority was to take 
charge of a number of municipal functions secondly the IDF would withdraw from 
population centres and finally there would be Palestinian elections for a new 
authority. However Palestinian negotiators were disappointed with the new 
agreement. They had hoped that Israel would replace the complex system of military 
ordinances and occupation laws, with the Fourth Geneva Convention and 
international law within the occupied territories, but this was not forthcoming 
(Shlaim, 2000). The United Nations Commission on Human Rights continued to be 
critical of Israeli human rights abuses in the occupied territories. In 1994 it issued a 
resolution 'condemning' settler and IDF killings, torture, imprisonment without trial, 
house demolitions and land expropriations, curfews, collective punishments, 
restrictions on movement and settlement building (United Nations, 1994). 
The construction of illegal Jewish settlements had accelerated following the 
election of the Rabin administration in 1992. Between 1992 and 1995 the settler 
population in the occupied territories (excluding East Jerusalem) rose from 74,800 to 
136,000 (Foundationfor Middle East Peace, 1997). Palestinians believed that 
increased settlement building and expropriations of Palestinian land was a violation of 
the spirit if not the letter of the Oslo Accords, and would ultimately prejudice the 
possibility of a viable Palestinian state. The American historian and Middle East 
commentator, Geoffrey Aronson argued that 'there is no missing the fact that Rabin's 
settlement drive is aimed at putting the future of the city [Jerusalem] and its West 
Bank environs beyond the reach of diplornacy. ' (Report on Israeli Settlement in the 
Occupied Territory, May 1995) He also cited statements from the Israeli commentator 
Ze'ev Schiff that 'when we come to the final stage [of negotiations] nothing will be 
left [in Jerusalem] for the Palestinians to negotiate, apart from the Islamic holy 
places. ' Rabin's administration also embarked on a process of building bypass roads 
linking settlements which could only be used by Jewish settlers and the IDF. This 
plan, Israel Shahak (1995) claimed was originally conceived by Ariel Sharon in 1977 
but was finally implemented by Rabin directly after the Declaration of Principles. He 
argued that its purpose was to create a matrix of control whereby all the Arab 
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population centres were split into enclaves criss-crossed by the roads and settlement 
blocks so that the Israeli army will be able to control the discontinuous cantons 'from 
outside'. Tel-Aviv University professor Tanya Reinhart, argued that Rabin's policies 
'resemble[d] the beginning of Apartheid rather than its end' and were 4almost 
identical' to the South African Bantustan model (Haaretz, 27 May 1994). The 
construction of the bypass road network also allowed the Israeli government to 
enforce closures on the Palestinian areas which restricted Palestinian movement and 
access to employment. Israel justified such measures by arguing that it was necessary 
to prevent attacks by Palestinian militants against Israelis. It did however have very 
serious effects on the Palestinian economy. The Israeli journalist Nadav Ha'etzni 
reported that by May 1995 that curfews and closures had 'devastated the Palestinian 
economy and destroyed 100,000 families in Gaza alone' (Maariv, 5 May 1995, cited 
in Chomsky, 1999: 548). The deteriorating economic situation for Palestinians was 
compounded by Israeli moves to achieve 'separation' by replacing Palestinian 
workers with migrant labour from Thailand, the Philippines, Romania and other parts 
of Eastern Europe. Such factors Shlaim suggests 'actually worsened the situation in 
the occupied territories and confounded Palestinian aspirations for a state of their 
own. ' (2000: 530). Furthermore there was no halt to the bloodshed on both sides. 
Between the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 and the end 
of 1994,93 Israelis and 194 Palestinians were killed in violent incidents (B'Tselem, 
2003) 
In late September 1995 Yasser Arafat and Yitzak Rabin concluded the next 
stage of the interim agreement under which the West Bank was divided into three 
areas. Area A, (3 per cent of the West Bank incorporating Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, 
Qalqilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem and subsequently, in January 1997,80 per cent of 
Hebron) would have its civilian administration and internal security controlled by the 
Palestinian Authority. Area B (23 per cent of the West Bank comprising 440 villages 
and surrounding lands) was to have certain municipal functions administered by the 
Palestinian Authority whilst security would be dealt with by joint Palestinian-Israeli 
patrols. Area C (comprising 74 per cent of the West Bank, including all of the 145 
settlements and the new Jewish neighbourhoods in and around East Jerusalem) would 
remain under complete Israeli control. 
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On November 4 1995 Yitzak Rabin was assassinated by a 25 year old settler, 
Yigal Amir. After the killing the unrepentant Amir accused Rabin of selling out the 
settlers and preparing to give away the occupied territories to the Palestinians. Rabin 
was succeeded as Prime Minister by Shimon Peres who pledged to maintain the 
momentum of the peace process. No Israelis had been killed in suicide attacks since 
the August 21 bombing in Jerusalem which had killed three Israelis and an American. 
Mishal and Sela (2000) suggest that both Hamas and Islamic Jihad were under 
pressure from both the Palestinian Authority and Israel, and did not want to 
antagonise Palestinian public opinion by precipitating a halt to the scheduled Israeli 
redeployments. Mishal and Sela also note that militant groups had been pushing for 
ýa conditional cease-fire with Israel to stop the bloodshed of innocents on both sides' 
(2000: 7 1). In early 1996 Peres ordered the killing of Yahya Ayyash, a Hamas leader 
who had previously masterminded several suicide attacks which had killed 
approximately 60 Israelis. Shlaim claims that the Israeli media had exaggerated his 
status presenting him as 'public enemy number one' whilst 'omitting to mention that 
the attacks he organized came as a response to the [Hebron] massacre. ' (2000: 556) 
The assassination of Ayyash using a booby trapped phone led to Hamas vowing 
revenge and there followed six suicide bombings in February and March 1996 which 
left 62 Israelis dead (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999). Peres's popularity 
declined under attacks from the right, and he moved to suspend talks with the newly 
elected Palestinian Authority and closed the borders to all workers from the occupied 
territories. 
Shortly afterwards Peres launched a major offensive against Hezbollah 
guerrillas in Southern Lebanon. Israel had been fighting a long guerrilla war against 
Hezbollah militants. Hezbollah claimed they were trying to end the illegal Israeli 
occupation of Southern Lebanon, which had been ongoing since 1978, in violation of 
40 United Security Council resolution 425 . Israel claimed that Hezbollah were 
intent on 
the destruction of the Israeli state. Casualty statistics suggest that Palestinian and 
Lebanese civilians had suffered disproportionately in the conflict. In the period 
between 1985 and 1996 the Israeli army estimate that Hezbollah guerrilla and rocket 
attacks had killed six Israeli civilians (Israeli Defence Force, 2003). In a single 
operation in 1993 Amnesty International (I 996a) reported that Israel killed 118 
Lebanese civilians and that 300,000 people were displaced. The journalist and former 
chief inspector of the US Information Agency, Richard Curtiss argues that after this 
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operation, unwritten rules of engagement were crafted by the US State Department's 
Warren Christopher with both sides agreeing to confine attacks to combatants in 
South Lebanon (Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May/June 1996). On 
April 11 1996 Peres launched Operation 'Grapes of Wrath'. This was claimed to be in 
retaliation for rocket strikes on Israeli settlements which had injured 34 civilians, and 
other attacks which had killed eight members of the IDF in Southern Lebanon. 
Hezbollah's view was that they had a right to resist the Israeli troops illegally 
occupying Southern Lebanon, and that the rockets fired on Israeli settlements were 
retaliation for the killing by Israel of three Lebanese civilians. The attack involved 
more than a thousand air sorties and 16,000 shells against less than 500 Hezbollah 
fighters (Haaretz, 21 May 1996). Curtiss claims that many of attacks were 'targeted 
at electric power plants and relay stations, bridges, and other parts of Lebanon's war- 
battered basic infrastructure' (Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May/June 
1996). The Israeli journalist Avi Shavit alleges that 400,000 civilians were forced to 
flee their homes in eight hours, after which the Israeli airforce treated the abandoned 
properties as military targets and shelled them (Haaretz, 21 May 1996). On 18 April 
Israel bombed the United Nations Compound at Qana, killing 106 refugees who had 
sought sanctuary there. Israel stated that the bombing which involved anti-personnel 
munitions was a mistake and that the real target was an area nearby where Hezbollah 
militants had been operating. Both a UN (1996) and Amnesty (I 996b) report found 
that the attack on the UN compound was unlikely to have been accidental, and also 
condemned Israeli missile attacks on ambulances and residential areas which killed 
many civilians. Shlaim suggests that the operation was an attempt by Shimon Peres to 
revive his flagging political fortunes and recast himself 'as the hard man of Israeli 
politics ahead of the crucial general elections' (2000: 560). However it did nothing to 
revive his political fortunes and the following month he was beaten in the General 
election by the Likud candidate Ben amin Netanyahu. i 
The Netanvahu. Administration 
Netanyahu's attitude towards the peace process before his election had been 
one of undisguised antipathy. He had campaigned publicly against its implementation 
in speeches and in print, and had been accused by Rabin's widow of inciting his 
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assassination by making inflammatory public speeches, which likened Rabin to an SS 
officer. His coalition included the far right and settler groups who called for the 
forced deportation of all Palestinians from the occupied territories. Netanyahu's 
central argument was that the peace process had illustrated Israel's weakness, reduced 
the deterrent power of the IDF and damaged the nation's security. He argued that 
Israel had adhered to the Oslo formula whilst the Palestinians had failed to keep their 
side of the bargain, by failing to dismantle militant organisations, collect their 
weapons or extradite their members to Israel. Netanyahu's alternative was to 
renegotiate the redeployments that had been agreed in principle. He argued that these 
threatened Israel's security and that 'whatever the officials of the previous Labor 
administration had whispered in Palestinian ears was irrelevant' (Netanyahu, 2000: 
343). He was also against full statehood for the Palestinians, arguing that Israel had to 
control the exit and entry points to the Palestinian entity as well as its airspace, much 
of the Jordan valley and the West Bank water supply. He also argued that Arab 
nations should resettle the Palestinian refugees. Shlaim claims that as soon as he took 
power Netanyahu began to renege on Israel's Oslo obligations: 
Serious deterioration occurred in Israel's relations with the Palestinians as a 
result of Netanyahu's backtracking. He adopted a 'work-to-rule' approach 
designed to undermine the Oslo process. There was no Israeli pullout from 
Hebron, no 'opening of the safe passage' route from Gaza to the West Bank, 
and no discussion of the further West bank redeployment that Israel had 
pledged to carry out in early September. Instead Palestinian homes without an 
Israeli permit were demolished in east Jerusalem, and plans were approved for 
the construction of new Israeli settlements. The quality of life for the 
Palestinians deteriorated progressively, and hopes for a better future were all 
but extinguished (2000: 576) 
In October 1996 serious violence erupted in Jerusalem when Netanyahu 
ordered the blasting open an archaeological tunnel close to the al-Aksa Mosque. This 
was taken by Palestinians as a statement of sovereignty over Islamic holy sites and 
triggered disturbances in which 15 Israeli soldiers and 80 Palestinians were killed, and 
a further 1500 Palestinians wounded. Under pressure from the Americans Netanyahu 
agreed to the delayed redeployment of Israeli troops from Hebron in January 1997 by 
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signing the Hebron protocol, which also committed Israel to three further 
redeployments in the West bank over the next 18 months. Under the agreement 
Hebron was split into Jewish and Arab zones. The Jewish zone reserved for the 450 
settlers constituted 20% of the city, including its best commercial areas. The 
remaining 80% of the city was reserved for the 130,000 Palestinian Hebronites who 
were subject to frequent curfews and restrictions on movement. 
After the signing of the Hebron protocol Netanyahu approved a number of 
new settlements. In February 1997 he announced plans for 6,500 new dwellings for 
30,000 settlers at Jabal Ghneim (Har Homa) on the outskirts of annexed East 
Jerusalem. Har Homa would complete the chain of concentric settlements around 
Jerusalem and cut off Arab East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. The move 
was met with anger from Palestinians and condemned by the United Nations (1997) 
General Assembly by 130 votes to two (Israel, United States). Palestinians were 
unhappy with more expropriation of their land and called a general strike in protest. 
The US twice vetoed Security Council resolutions condemning the project, whilst the 
General Assembly passed further resolutions calling for a halt to the Har Homa 
project, the removal of settlements in the occupied territories, and the application of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention within the territories. None of these moves stopped the 
construction of the new settlements. In June 1997 the Israeli journalist Jay Bushinsky 
reported that Netanyahu had outlined his 'Allon plus' plan for a possible settlement 
with the Palestinians. The plan involved Israel annexing approximately 60% of the 
West Bank that would include Greater Jerusalem, the hills east of Jerusalem, the 
Jordan valley, the settlements and all the bypass roads connecting them, plus 
permanent Israeli control of the West Bank water supply (Jerusalem Post, 5 June 
1997). The proposals were met with dismay by Palestinian leaders who accused Israel 
of violating the Oslo Accords and trying to destroy the peace process. 
Although the conflict between Palestinian fighters and the IDF and settlers in 
the occupied territories continued to claim more lives, there were no suicide attacks in 
Israel between March 1996 and March 1997. Between March 21 1997 and September 
4 1997 militants carried out three suicide attacks killing 24 Israelis. Hamas 
representatives argued that the attacks were the only way to stop the expropriation of 
more Palestinian land for settlement building and the 'Judaization' of the Holy places. 
On September 23 1997 the Hamas leadership sent a letter to Netanyahu, delivered by 
King Hussein of Jordan, in which Hamas suggested setting up an indirect dialogue 
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with the Israeli government, that would be mediated by King Hussein. The purpose of 
the dialogue would be achieve a cessation of violence as well as a 'discussion of all 
matters' (Ha'aretz, 9 October 1997, cited in Sela & Avraham, 2000: 72). Two days 
later Netanyahu ordered the killing of the head of Hamas's Political Bureau, Khalid 
Mash'al in Jordan. The attempted assassination by two Mossad agents was botched 
and Mash'al's bodyguard captured the two assassins who were later traded for the 
imprisoned Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. The attempted killing 
soured relations with King Hussein, Israel's closest ally in the Arab world and ended 
any opportunity for a cease-fire. The release of Yassin followed by his return to Gaza 
strengthened Hamas's support. 
In March 1998 1,500 reservists included twelve retired major-generals called 
on Netanyahu to stop settlement building and try to end the conflict and normalise 
relations. (Shlaim, 2000). However Netanyahu cancelled the scheduled Israeli 
redeployments, citing security concerns. Despite efforts by both Britain and the US to 
revive the process it ground to a halt. Both sides in the conflict accused the other of 
bad faith in reneging on their Oslo obligations. Netanyahu reiterated his claims that 
the PLO had failed to disarm or arrest militant groups, prevent attacks against Israelis, 
and amend the PLO charter. Others contested this. Tanya Reinhart writing in the 
Israeli publication Tikkun claimed that Arafat had taken strong action against Hamas 
and that this was recognised by Israel's security services: 
Arafat's security services carried out this job [maintaining Israeli security] 
faithfully, by assassinating Hamas terrorists (disguised as "accidents"), and 
arresting Hamas political leaders ... Ample 
information was published in the 
Israeli media regarding these activities, and 'security sources' were full of 
praises for Arafat's achievements. For example, Ami Ayalon, then head of the 
Israeli secret service (Shabak), announced, in a government meeting on April 
5,1998 that "Arafat is doing his job-he is fighting terror and puts all his 
weight against the Hamas" (Haaretz, April 6 1998). The rate of success of the 
Israeli security services in containing terror was never higher than that of 
Arafat; in fact, it was probably much lower. (March/April 2002) 
In a 1998 report, the Israeli peace group Gush Shalom (1998) blamed the 
Netanyahu administration for the breakdown in the peace process and accused the 
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government of 19 separate violations of the Oslo Accords including settlement and 
bypass road building, use of closures, failure to release Palestinian prisoners, torture 
and other human rights abuses, and failure to undertake scheduled military 
withdrawals and move towards final status negotiations. During this period support 
for militant organisations such as Islamic Rhad and Hamas grew whilst the PLO and 
particularly Yasser Arafat lost popularity. Partly this was because of corruption 
scandals that engulfed the PLO leadership which was accused of nepotism and 
siphoning off funds meant for the Palestinian Authority. It was also because of 
Arafat's autocratic style and the serious human rights abuses committed by the 
Palestinian security forces who were using torture and engaging in extra-judicial 
killings against opponents of the Oslo process. There was also widespread anger that 
Arafat had failed to stop settlement building. Geoffrey Aronson claimed that Arafat 
and the other PLO 'outsiders' (those from outside the occupied territories) failed to 
appreciate the significance of the settlements: 
PA chairman Yasser Arafat is briefed infrequently on Israel's settlement 
policy, and his response is generally stunned silence as he looks at the maps 
depicting the dimensions of the enterprise. Palestinian Authority negotiators 
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Ahmad Quray (Abu Ala) have never been 
on a4 settlement tour. ' If one is to judge by their negotiating priorities, they 
have no concept of the role of settlements in the history of Israel's policies in 
the occupied territories, nor do they believe that such an understanding is 
required. (Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories, 
July/August 1998) 
In October 1998 Israel and Palestinian negotiators met at Wye River 
Plantation to negotiate on the next phase of the Oslo process. This brings to an end the 
historical review of the conflict, which has illustrated the extraordinary range of 
viewpoints on the history of the conflict. In the next chapter I will examine how 
journalists have drawn from these perspectives in their reporting of the conflict. 
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Chapter 3 Content Analysis of the Wye Accords 
Introduction 
This content analysis examines how television news covered the Wye Peace summit 
which took place in America in October 1998. The summit which involved Israeli and 
Palestinian delegations meeting in an attempt to further the Oslo peace process, was 
presided over by the American president Bill Clinton. It was widely accepted by all 
parties that the peace process, which had been inaugurated five years previously by 
Yitzak Rabin and Yasser Arafat signing the Declaration of Principles on the White 
House lawn, was encountering some problems. The process had ground to a halt, with 
Israel refusing to carry out the troop withdrawals scheduled in the previous 
agreements. The reasons for the breakdown were contested. The Netanyahu 
government argued that the Palestinians had failed to adhere to their commitments 
under the Oslo agreements by not curbing incitement, preventing attacks against 
Israelis or arresting Palestinians suspected of involvement in attacks. Some prominent 
Israelis disputed this. For instance Ami Ayalon, the head of the Israeli secret service 
(Shabak) had praised Arafat for his attempts to rein in Hamas activists (Ha'aretz, 
April 6 1998). Far right parties and religious settler groups who were part of 
Netanyahu's coalition government favoured withdrawing from the peace process 
completely. They argued that the occupied territories were part of biblical Israel, 
promised to the Jews by God, and should not be returned to the Palestinians in 
exchange for peace. Palestinians were sceptical of the Israeli government's 
commitment to the peace process and noted that Binyamin Netanyahu had been a 
vocal critic of the Oslo process and its 'land for peace' formula. They pointed to 
increased expropriations of Palestinian land, the demolition of thousands of 
Palestinian homes, and the creation of more illegal Israeli settlements. They were also 
angered that Israel had created a grid of military checkpoints and bypass roads across 
the occupied territories, which severely limited their freedom of movement, and 
which had been likened to South Africa's pass laws (cited in Philo & Berry, 2004). 
Many Palestinians believed that the peace process was being manipulated to allow 
Israel to take more and more occupied land, and feared that Yasser Arafat's 
Palestinian Authority could not be relied on to negotiate an equitable settlement. 
The purpose of the content analysis is to examine the range of explanations 
offered to viewers during reporting of the peace conference. These explanations, 
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which were contested by the opposing parties, related to various different aspects of 
the conflict, and the moves towards a settlement. Some explanations referred to the 
historical origins of the conflict. Others focused on why the peace process had ground 
to a halt and who was to blame. There were also the differing perspectives on the 
issues which separated the parties, like settlements and the status of Jerusalem, as well 
as the factors which led some parties to oppose the peace process. The purpose is to 
ascertain whether certain perspectives and explanations were highlighted in coverage 
and whether others were marginalized. It thus looked at questions of representation, 
access and power. 
Methodolggy 
In October 2002 Stephen Bates reported that the Israeli state had commissioned two 
of America's most renowned public relationships professionals in order to try and 
improve Israel's public image and counter what was argued was a bias against Israel 
in the British media (Guardian 12 October 2002). Bates cited comments by Gidon 
Meir, the Israeli foreign ministry's deputy director for public affairs, who described 
the Palestinian public relations strategy as a 'strategic threat'. Meir argued that the 
'Palestinians understand that one of the most important weapons in this conflict is a 
camera ... In some places we are winning and in others we are losing and are engaged 
in damage control'. Meir is emphasizing the importance of the mass media as a site in 
the struggle for public legitimacy. The winning of public consent in democratic 
societies is vital for the exercise of power and this is no less true in an international 
context. The ability to engineer that consent is partly dependent on the capacity to 
make sure that a particular perspective or ideology becomes widely accepted. The 
mass media then serve as a site of conflict where various groups struggle to make sure 
that their perspective predominates whilst that of the their rivals is marginalized. 
However this struggle does not take place on a level playing field. Some groups 
because of their place in the institutional structure of British political life, or ability to 
access public relations resources have inbuilt advantages in making sure their 
perspective is heard. The methodology employed here, Thematic Analysis, examines 
how competing viewpoints are covered (or excluded) by journalists in controversial 
areas of coverage. The methodology has been developed by the Glasgow Media 
Group and applied to a number of different areas of news coverage such as industrial 
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news, war reporting and coverage of public health issues. In the mid 1970s the group 
examined the coverage of British industrial news and in particular focused on the 
differing explanations put forward for Britain's declining industrial performance. 
Whilst business leaders and the Conservative party blamed the decline on the power 
of unions and the prevalence of strike action, the trade unions pointed to low levels of 
investment in plant and machinery which meant that workers in competing countries 
were using more modem and efficient equipment. The group examined the published 
evidence which supported both positions and then examined which perspectives were 
highlighted or downplayed in television news coverage. The group found that while 
there was much coverage which blamed the decline on strike action and the behaviour 
of trade unions, there was none which linked it to low levels of investment or 
management failings. They also suggested that once the explanation that 'strikes were 
to blame' became established in the news this then set the pattern and structure for 
further reporting. Journalists would visit factories and interview workers about strikes, 
but not interview or question management about investment decisions. Thus the 
pattern of coverage could implicitly assume the explanation that strikes were the 
culprit without actually having to state it explicitly. 
In the previous chapters I reviewed how the historical record of the conflict 
has been contested by Israelis and Palestinians. The purpose of this exercise was to 
lay out the range of views which exist on the conflict. In the content analysis, I want 
to examine how journalists have utilised elements of history of the conflict to 
contextualise their coverage, and explain events. I begun by transcribing all news 
coverage of the Wye Accords on all five terrestrial channels. In total 44 bulletins were 
transcribed over six viewing days yielding 1417 lines of text. I then calculated the 
amount of space give to different subject areas. The most prominent area of coverage 
dealt with the latest progress of negotiations and discussion of America's role in 
brokering the conference, accounting for nearly half the coverage. This was followed 
by an examination of the range of explanations offered to viewers in relation to 
various aspects of the conflict. Some explanations related to the history and origins of 
the conflict, others concerned the issues under discussion at the summit and a third 
category dealt with the final status issues, such as Jerusalem, which were at the heart 
of the conflict. This was followed by an analysis of howjournalists evaluated the 
health of the peace process and discussed those who opposed the process. Finally I 
examined the access given to the Palestinian and Israeli sources, the quantity of space 
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given to reported statements from both sides and the language used by j ournalists in 
talking about the conflict. 
Whilst discussing the coverage I also reference audience research which 
examined public understanding of the conflict. This research involved both 
questionnaire and focus group methods. The focus groups consisted of seven to eight 
people on average, who were brought together by a mediator to discuss various 
aspects of the conflict. In total 100 people were involved in the focus groups who 
were selected on the basis of income, age and gender. The questionnaire part of the 
study involved more than 700 students from Britain, America and Germany 
answering questions about various aspects of the conflict. This research can be found 
in Philo and Berry (2004). 
Theme 1: Progress of talks/Movement of dignitaries/Discussion of America's role in 
the Peace Process 
This was by far the largest single aspect of the coverage accounting for 53 percent of 
the total (753 lines out of 1417). Within this category was grouped all news coverage 
that dealt with the movement of important dignitaries, the progress of peace 
negotiations and discussion of America's role in brokering the conference. Any 
references to the issues being discussed or the history or causes of the conflict were 
not included within this category. Much of the coverage consisted of updates on the 
progress of talks, with extensive description of the latest developments. However 
these reports on the progress of the talks were rarely accompanied by any in depth 
discussion of what was being negotiated or the factors underpinning the conflict. Here 
for example is a news bulletin from ITN reproduced in its entirety: 
Newscaster: The West Bank Peace talks in America are on the brink of 
collapse tonight with the Israelis saying they have their engines running and 
are ready to pull out. The negotiations have gone on longer than scheduled. 
President Clinton has been trying to nudge the two sides together. King 
Hussein of Jordan left his sick bed to help. 
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Journalist: The talks in this secluded mansion outside Washington were 
supposed to last two days. That was seven days ago. In that time the 
Palestinian and Israeli leadership have been deadlocked unable to get the 
peace process that began in Oslo five years ago back on schedule. King 
Hussein of Jordan has come from his sick bed in a Minnesota cancer clinic to 
try and achieve a breakthrough, so far to no avail. President Clinton has made 
repeated visits to negotiate with the leaders separately and together but he too 
cannot bridge the gap. Perhaps the most striking thing about these talks is the 
amount of time the President has invested personally he has been here six days 
out of seven. It means that if they succeed they will be seen as a considerable 
personal triumph but if they fail a serious setback for the prestige of American 
diplomacy. And with the Israelis today threatening to pack up and go home 
failure seems the most likely outcome. The State Department spokesman was 
today brutally realistic. 
US State Department Spokesman: We can't hold people here against their will 
and we can't make them make the tough choices. This is their security 
interests that are at stake, for both the Palestinians and the Israelis, their future 
that is at stake and they have to make those decisions. 
Journalist: President Clinton is deciding now whether to make another visit to 
the talks this evening. After seven days patience is running short. There may 
not be much time left. (ITV, Evening News, 21 October 1998) 
Television news because of its format puts a premium on the latest updates 
and breaking news. However this emphasis on immediacy can marginalize 
explanations that are necessary if viewers are to understand stories. There is nothing 
in the above broadcast, except the brief comment from an official US source that 
4 security interests... are at stake' that gives the viewing audience any clues as to what 
was actually under discussion at the talks or what the conflict is about. Here is another 
report this time from an early evening news bulletin on BBC 1: 
Newscaster: King Hussein of Jordan has flown from his hospital bed to join 
President Clinton's attempt to cajole the Middle East talks to some sort of 
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agreement. The talks in Maryland have entered their sixth day with no sign of 
a breakthrough. Meanwhile the armed wing of the militant Islamic movement 
Hamas, has said that it carried out the grenade attack which brought the talks 
to the brink of collapse. And our Washington correspondent Stephen Sackur is 
at the talks in Maryland. Stephen, King Hussein is clearly very ill why is his 
intervention considered necessary? 
Journalist: The Americans believe that King Hussein could make the 
difference between success and failure in this six day long summit. They 
believe that he is the one man who has the ear of both Benjamin Netanyahu, 
the Israeli prime minister, and Yasser Arafat the Palestinian leader. And in 
particular King Hussein is going to express fears, also expressed by President 
Clinton that if no deal is done here in Maryland then the whole Middle East 
could go into a series of conflicts and turmoil which would be very bad for the 
Palestinians, bad for the Israelis and bad for neighbours like King Hussein of 
Jordan. So its going to be a clear message a simple message to both sides that 
a deal must be done and it must be done now. 
Newscaster: Is yesterday's grenade attack still having an effect on the talks? 
Journalist: In a sense not so much. The Israelis yesterday in the immediate 
aftermath of that attack in Beersheba in Israel said that they would talk about 
nothing in these negotiations except security. They suspended all other talks. 
Well today their position has shifted and I understand that is because of 
substantial American pressure. The Americans were frustrated that the Israelis 
were allowing that terror attack to shift the whole nature of these talks there 
were serious words between President Clinton and Benjamin Netanyahu about 
that last night. And now all of the committees are doing their work I've just 
spoken to the State department spokesman who says that very hard bargaining 
is taking place and it does look as though in the words of the Americans we 
are reaching the end game in this long summit. (BBC 1, Early Evening News 
20 October 1998) 
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In this example there is a very brief mention that the Israeli delegation 'would talk 
about nothing in these negotiations except security' but little information about the 
issues at the talks. The pronounced emphasis on the latest events and the role of 
important dignitaries, tends to crowd out explanations for the conflict which might 
help viewers understand the motivations and positions of the Israelis and Palestinians. 
As will be discussed in more detail in the chapter dealing with production factors, this 
appears partly to be a function of the pressure to produce dramatic bulletins which 
will maximise audiences. The former BBC correspondent Tim Llewelyn has spoken 
of the 'intense competitiveness' between news channels. News editors, he suggests, 
4 want stuff that has immediate impact, they don't want somebody explaining 
anything ... the competition, the bang bang aspect, the drama of news has overridden 
everything else' (Interview, 16 April 2004). In the above news bulletins there seems 
to be an attempt by j ournalists to inject drama into the proceedings at the expense of 
producing more analytical coverage. Journalists' talk of the Israelis with their 
4engines running ... ready to pull out', the arrival of the cancer-striken King Hussein 
from his 'sick bed'. the 'striking' personal commitment of Bill Clinton and the danger 
that 'the whole Middle East could go into a series of conflicts and turmoil' is 
dramatic. However other areas of coverage appeared to suggest that what was being 
debated at the Summit was not as significant as the reports above indicated. For 
instance an ITV correspondent later reported that an Israeli source had told him that 
'what has been negotiated over the past week are simply peanuts compared to the 
major issues that have yet to emerge in a final agreement' (ITV, lunchtime news, 23 
October 1998). The essential point is that by devoting more than half of all coverage 
to latest developments, or descriptive accounts of America's role in negotiations this 
leaves less space to provide analysis of the conflict. As will be seen, vital aspects of 
the dispute, necessary for a coherent understanding of the conflict were barely 
mentioned. 
The role of the United States received a great deal of attention in reporting. 
Comments about American diplomacy and in particular President Clinton's role 
accounted for 23 percent of all coverage (328 lines out of 1417). All comments 
regarding the role of the United States were extremely positive, arguing that President 
Clinton had expended a great deal of effort in attempting to bring peace to the Middle 
East and that if the summit failed it would be a 'serious setback' for American 
diplomacy: 
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President Clinton wants a Middle East peace agreement very badly perhaps 
more than the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves. His extraordinary 
investment of time and prestige in this summit continued today, he went to 
Maryland with a familiar message. (BBC I Early Evening News, 22 October 
1998) 
It took 20 hours of non-stop talks away from the TV cameras to clinch the 
deal. President Clinton pressured Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat 
through a series of last minute problems. Just after 3am local time the deal was 
done. The Palestinians get more West Bank land the Israelis receive new 
security commitments, the Americans will oversee the deal. (BBC I Early 
Evening News, 23 October 1998) 
President Clinton has made repeated visits to negotiate with the leaders 
separately and together but he too cannot bridge the gap. Perhaps the most 
striking thing about these talks is the amount of time the President has 
invested personally he has been here six days out of seven. It means that if 
they succeed they will be seen as a considerable personal triumph but if they 
fail a serious setback for the prestige of American diplomacy. (ITV Evening 
News, 21 October 1998) 
Well it is a big deal for President Clinton and I would argue that President 
Clinton needed this deal at this particular time more than either Mr Arafat or 
more than Mr Netanyahu as well. He had invested so much time and prestige 
in this summit and in the effort to get this interim deal together that it would 
have a terrible blow to his prestige and his international credibility if he failed. 
There was a blazing row today I understand between the Israeli Prime Minister 
and Bill Clinton and it looked as though at the very last minute the Israelis 
might withdraw from the deal because of a row over an Israeli spy in an 
American jail. But Bill Clinton stood his ground he got through that and he 
won a standing ovation tonight from all sides for his effort to make this work. 
(BBC2 Newsnight, 23 October 1998) 
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The clear message of the coverage appears to be that President Clinton is acting a 
peace broker, attempting to 'bridge the gap' between two bitter enemies. The 
president is portrayed as having put an 'extraordinary investment of time and prestige' 
into the peace process, having 'stood his ground' in the face of Israeli demands and 
4won a standing ovation tonight from all sides for his effort to make this work'. In one 
exchange between a BBC news anchor and a foreign correspondent it was suggested 
that American pressure on Israel had been so great that it might threaten the 
relationship between the two countries: 
Correspondent: The Israelis say those security proposals are simply not 
enough and that the Palestinians are breaking promises, in this case you've got 
the Palestinians and Americans on one side and the Israelis on the other. It 
may be a situation in which the Israelis feel they have no option but to walk 
out. 
News Anchor: And could we be looking here, briefly Stephen, at the 
breakdown of a relationship between the United States and Israel. 
Correspondent: Its to early to say that Peter, but I've just had James Rubin, the 
state department spokesman, say that this is a key moment in the history of the 
Middle East peace process. (BBC I evening news, 21 October 1998) 
For Newsnight's David Sales the prerequisite for any further moves towards a 
peaceful solution was even more American involvement: 
It will take a miracle for a permanently reluctant Netanyahu and a much 
weakened Arafat to bring about any final agreement on schedule given the 
blood, sweat, tears, and brinkmanship that have plagued even this week's 
modest interim deal. The absolute must for any success will be for Mr Clinton 
to get down there in the trenches as he has done this past week. Without him 
nothing. (BBC2, Newsnight 23 October 1998) 
However a rather different image of the Clinton administration's position in 
the conflict appeared in the Israeli press some time before the summit. Under the title 
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'The Jews who run Clinton's Court' Maariv columnist Avinoam Bar-Yosef, spoke of 
the 'enormous Jewish influence' within the Clinton administration manifested in the 
high proportion of Jews employed in the most senior and sensitive positions within 
the government (2 September 1994). Bar-Yosef noted that 'in the National Security 
Council, 7 out of II top staffers are Jews' whom Clinton had placed 'in the most 
sensitive junctions in the U. S. security and foreign policy administrations'. He further 
maintained that 'the situation is not much different in the president's office, which is 
full of warm [pro-Israel] Jews' and the State Department which has a 'a long list of 
senior Jewish officials' including many members of the pro-Israel lobby. Bar-Yosef 
also noted that two members of the pro-Israel lobby, Dennis Ross and Martin Idnyk 
headed the Clinton administration's Middle East policy team. Martin Idnyk was 
previously a media consultant to the far right Israeli prime ministers Menachem Begin 
and Yitzak Shamir. He later became director of research for the leading pro-Israel 
pressure group, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). AIPAC 
consistently features in Fortune magazine's list of America's most influential lobby 
groups and it's website states that 'the US must stand by its loyal ally, Israel, and not 
subscribe to an unprincipled policy of 'even-handedness" in its dealings with the 
Israel-Palestine conflict (AIPAC, 2004). It has been suggested that AIPAC and the 
wider pro-Israel lobby create such political pressure that it is very difficult for 
American administrations to take an objective stance on the conflict: 
AIPAC has a lot of influence on foreign policy. They work very hard to make 
sure that America endorses pretty much Israel's view of the world and the 
Middle East. They do partly by convincing, partly by implied threats. AIPAC 
does not raise money for candidates but there are Jewish PACs (Political 
Action Committees) that raise campaign funds for candidates. Four or five 
times over the last twenty years, these PACs have gone after members of 
Congress who voted in ways that AIPAC didn't like. They have flooded their 
opponents with money and enabled them to beat the incumbents. Sent a 
message that if you really want to go against AIPAC, you'd better know where 
your next dollar is coming from. So that, as I've been told by a number of 
congressional aides over the last few years, if the congressman doesn't vote 
against Arafat, they'll pay a price. If they do vote against Arafat, there's no 
price to be paid. There's no percentage for the member of Congress to stand 
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up for peace, for compromise. Nobody is going to reward them they'll be 
punished. (A Lobby to Reckon With, BBC Radio 4,7 May 2002, cited in Philo 
& Berry, 2004: 253) 
The Clinton administration provided more than three billion dollars worth of 
annual aid to Israel. Much of the funding was spent on military equipment, which was 
used against Palestinians. Some of the aid was also used for building illegal Israeli 
settlements in the occupied territories (Said, 1996). The Clinton administration had 
also provided diplomatic support for successive Israeli governments' illegal 
settlement building programs. Palestinians believed that the creation of more 
settlements was undercutting the peace process, because once these 'facts on the 
ground', as some Israeli leaders had referred to the settlement blocks, were 
established, it was highly unlikely they would ever be returned in a peace agreement. 
The United Nations had repeatedly criticized Israel's settlement drive, which it 
described as an 'obstacle to peace'. The previous year when the Netanyahu 
government began construction of a 6,500 unit settlement block in occupied East 
Jerusalem, the General Assembly had condemned the move by 130 votes to 2 (Israel 
and the United States). When the issue moved to the Security Council the Clinton 
administration twice vetoed resolutions condemning the settlement activity. It was not 
difficult to find alternative voices which questioned what Clinton was actually 
supporting under the banner of the Oslo process, even in the Israeli press. A week 
before the talks began, Edward Said wrote of the 'bankruptcy' of the Oslo process: 
If the last few years have proved one thing, it is the bankruptcy of the vision 
proclaimed by Oslo, and of the leadership that engineered the whole wretched 
thing. It left huge numbers of Palestinians unrepresented, impoverished and 
forgotten; it allowed Israel to expropriate more land in addition to 
consolidating its hold on Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank 
and Gaza settlements; it validated the notion of what can only be called petty 
Palestinian nationalism, which in reality was little more than a few wom-out 
slogans and the survival of the old PLO leadership ... Oslo, in my view, was a 
clever way for the Labor Party to create a series of Bantustans in which the 
Palestinians would be confined and dominated by Israel, at the same time 
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hinting that a quasi-state for Palestinians would come into being. (Haaretz, II 
October 1998) 
Likewise Robert Fisk writing in the Independent after the talks was very critical of 
what had been agreed and America's role in the process: 
Oslo and Wye destroyed any Palestinian hope for a just peace. Israel was 
allowed to build more Jewish settlements on Palestinian land, confiscate 
Palestinian identity papers, demolish Palestinian homes. And Arafat - for 
perhaps 14 per cent of the land of 'Palestine' - had to promise to protect the 
Israelis who were building the settlements, confiscating the paper and 
demolishing the homes. And they called it peace. (Independent, 16 December 
1998). 
The views presented above represent a very different view of the American 
administration than that presented to viewers. Many Palestinians did not believe that 
the 'absolute must for any success [in the peace process] will be for Mr Clinton to get 
down there in the trenches' (BBC2 Newsnight, 23 October 1998). Instead many 
believed the American president was giving unconditional support to unilateral Israeli 
moves which were undermining any possibility of a just settlement. 
Theme 2: Explanations for the Conflict 
In this section were analysed all references to the history of the conflict and the 
various factors which underpinned the dispute. This area of coverage is important 
because it provides rationale and explanations for the actions and motivations of the 
protagonists. It is difficult for viewers to comprehend why the dispute has been so 
bitter, bloody and protracted without some information regarding the history of the 
conflict and the various issues which still separate the two parties. This area dealing 
with explanations is also the most controversial aspect of reporting because it involves 
a great deal of contested history. For instance, the Israeli and Palestinian perspectives 
on issues such as refugees and settlements are markedly different. Three important 
areas of coverage were identified. The first deals with the origins and historical roots 
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of the conflict, the second deals with explanations of the issues that were actually on 
the table during the Wye Summit and the third deals with the issues which were 
postponed to the final status negotiations. These final status issues, such as the future 
of settlements, Jerusalem, and Palestinian refugees are at the heart of the conflict and 
it is very difficult to understand the conflict without some knowledge of them. 
The Historical Origins of the Conflict 
There were no attempts in the coverage to outline the history of the conflict or explain 
how the protagonists had become involved in such a long running dispute. Out of 
1417 lines of coverage only 4 or 0.28 percent of the total coverage mentioned any 
aspect of the conflict's history: 
And this morning in Israel settlers from the West Bank tried blocking 
Palestinian traffic praying for the talks to fail and urging Benjamin Netanyahu 
to return none of the land captured in 1967 (Channel 5 Lunchtime News, 22 
October 1998) 
In East Jerusalem which Israel has occupied since the 1967 war Palestinians 
were relieved that the deadlock has been broken. (BBC I Early Evening News, 
24 October 1998) 
The Luz family live in the settlement of Beit-El on land Israel captured in the 
1967 war because they feel this is the heartland of the Jewish people (BBC I 
Evening News, 24 October 1998) 
A swap of more Palestinian land occupied by Israel since 1967 in return for 
tougher Palestinian measures against Islamic terrorists. (BBC2 Newsnight, 23 
October 1998) 
These brief allusions to the six day war offer little to those who do not already possess 
a knowledge of the conflict's history. All of the major issues separating the two 
parties, i. e. the settlements, Palestinian statehood, the refugees, the military 
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occupation, the status of Jerusalem, and control of the region's water resources relate 
to key moments in the region's history. For instance, to understand the refugee issue 
requires the knowledge that the refugee problem was created during the birth of the 
state of Israel when approximately three quarter of a million Palestinians were 
displaced from their homes (Gilbert, 1999). Despite many UN resolutions they were 
never allowed to return. To understand the military occupation, the significance of 
Jerusalem, and why Israel has security concerns requires knowledge about the events 
of 1967 when Israel conquered the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and East 
Jerusalem. Israelis and Palestinians, of course, offer different accounts of those two 
pivotal years, but without any knowledge of events in 1948 and 1967 it is very 
difficult to understand the conflict. However with a little historical background it 
becomes easier to understand the significance of the various contentious issues and 
the motivations of the two Parties. 
What is particularly ironic about the lack of historical context presented to 
viewers, is that many of the BBC reports were presented by its chief Middle East 
correspondent, Jeremy Bowen, who has written extensively about how the present 
conflict is in large part a consequence of the events of 1967. In Six Days: How the 
1967 War Shaped the Middle East Bowen argues that in order to understand why the 
conflict is so deep seated one must go back to the events of 1967: 
The six day war swept up a generation of Israelis and Arabs whose children 
still cannot live peacefully in the world the war created. Israelis deserve 
peaceful, safe lives. Palestinians who were dispossessed and exiled if they 
became refugees, humiliated and abused if they stayed, deserve justice. 
Israel's overwhelming victory turned into a curse. It has never been able to 
digest the land it swallowed in 1967. It has poured money in colonising the 
Occupied Territories, defying international law and splitting its own people. 
Thirty six years after six days of fighting with Jordan, Egypt and Syria, after 
thousands more deaths and the failure of six years of negotiations Israelis and 
Palestinians are still fighting over the future of the West Bank and Gaza. It is 
still a low intensity war. But if another full blown Middle East war breaks out, 
its roots will live in those six days in 1967. The Middle East will have no 
peace until Israelis and Palestinians, as equal partners settle the future of the 
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land that was captured in 1967 and unwind the consequences of the war. 
(Bowen, 2004: 3-4) 
An obvious question arises- if the journalist recognises so clearly the 
importance of knowing about key moments in the region's history as a prerequisite 
for understanding the conflict (and how to resolve it), then why doesn't he provide 
any information about those pivotal moments when he's standing in front of a camera 
as a BBC correspondent? Focus group work suggests that the lack of historical 
context has a serious impact on audiences' ability to understand the conflict and the 
motivations of Israelis and Palestinians. However it was found that even providing a 
very brief potted history of the conflict could have a 'dramatic effect' on the 
understanding of viewers: 
The majority [of focus group members] also had no knowledge of the link 
between the wars of 1948 and 1967 - that Palestinians who were displaced 
from what became Israel in 1948 moved to areas such as Gaza, the West Bank 
of the Jordan and East Jerusalem and were then subject to military occupation 
after 1967. In the focus groups, the moderator was sometimes asked by the 
participants about the origins of the conflict. In response they were given a 
very brief account of the events of 1948 and 1967, based on the work of the 
Israeli historian Avi Shlaim (2000), and sometimes helped by the comments of 
journalists who were present. Although the account given was extremely brief 
it could have a very dramatic effect on the understanding of group members. 
(Philo and Berry, 2004: 213) 
The lack of historical context is a particular problem for Palestinians because their 
grievances such as the refugee issue and the military occupation, which are related to 
particular historical events, are occasionally named but never properly explained so as 
to make clear their importance. Conversely, as will be seen, the major issue for 
Israelis, their personal security, received extensive coverage. 
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Interim Issues 
This area of coverage involved what was actually under discussion at the Wye 
Summit. Understandably j ournalists chose to focus far more extensively on these 
interim issues than on the more intractable and important final status issues, which 
had been postponed to a later date. The discussion of interim issues accounted for 15 
percent of total coverage (217 lines out of 1417). 
Land and Security 
One of the ways the interim issues were explained was to group two main issues, the 
return of Palestinian land and the security of Israelis together. This accounted for 2.7 
percent of total coverage (39 lines out of 1417) and approximately a third of all 
coverage of interim issues. Journalists employed phrases such as 'land and security' 
or 'land for peace' as a form of shorthand for the central focus of the summit 
The two sides have been talking for eight days trying to reach a deal over land 
and security in the West Bank (BBC I Evening News, 22 October 1998) 
Negotiators have been working through the night to draw up a new deal over 
land and security issues and President Clinton is expected to return later today 
to add his weight to any agreement (ITV Lunchtime News, 22 October 1998) 
And its an interim deal based on the exchange land for security (Channel 4 
News, 23 October 1998) 
Back in America President Clinton who has already spent 57 hours at the talks 
waits in Washington, hoping to be called back to the talks if the two sides can 
conclude a deal on land and terrorism (Channel 5 Lunchtime News, 22 
October 1998) 
Journalists are expected to point out what was actually being debated at the 
summit but explanations presented in this format are not very informative to viewers 
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who lack detailed background knowledge of the conflict. With virtually no historical 
background provided in coverage it maybe difficult for viewers to understand what 
'land' in this context means. Is it Israeli land that is being given up as a compromise 
for peace? or is it land that was conquered by Israel and is being returned to its legal 
owners? In coverage the status of the 'land' is unclear. Focus group research suggests 
that viewers' understanding of the territorial dimensions of the conflict are confused 
and contradictory, with many viewers believing that the conflict involved two states 
fighting over a coveted piece of land, as in a border dispute (Philo & Berry, 2004). 
The occupied territories are regarded under international law as Palestinian territory, 
and j ournalists could have made this clear by stating that Israel was returning land that 
it had captured during the six day war in 1967. On some occasions this was made 
clear. For instance on one Channel 5 bulletin (Lunchtime, 22 October 1998) a 
journalist reports that settlers were urging the Israeli Prime Minister 'to return none of 
the land captured in 1967'. However on nearly 90 percent of occasions (28/32 
references, 87.5 percent of the total) journalists used neutral phrases such as transfer, 
pullback, withdrawal, or phrases which suggested Israel was transferring territory it 
owned such as 'giving up', 'giving away', or 'making concessions'. On only four 
occasions out of 32 was it made clear that Israel was 'returning' or 'handing back' 
territory. 
Israel's Security 
The single issue which received the bulk of coverage was the subject of 
Israel's security presented on its own. In total this accounted for 9 percent of all 
coverage (129 lines out of 1417) and approximately 60 percent of the coverage of all 
interim issues (129 lines out of 217). This theme became particularly pronounced 
after a grenade attack on Israeli soldiers by a Palestinian at a bus station in Southern 
Israel on the I 9th October 1998, which was frequently cited as a justification for 
Israel's hard stance on security issues at the negotiations. Security was often 
presented as the central issue dividing the two parties and the 'stumbling block' to any 
further progress: 
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A spokesman for Mr. Netanyahu said that it [the grenade attack in Southern 
Israel] really reinforced the need for Israel to get strong and complete 
guarantees both in word and deed from the Palestinian side that they could 
control terrorism and they could provide security on the West Bank (BBC I 
Lunchtime News, 19 October 98) 
What you have now is an Israeli decision to talk about nothing at this summit 
conference except security. The Palestinians are furious about that, they are 
saying it's a form of blackmail but as far as the Israelis are concerned they are 
saying look no troop withdrawals can happen no meaningful negotiations can 
take place unless we feel that the Palestinians are doing all within their power 
to ensure there are not attacks on Israelis and according to the Netanyahu 
government the Palestinians simply cannot and will not deliver on that 
security pledge (BBC I Evening News, 19 October 98) 
It is perfectly legitimate to highlight the security concerns of Israelis. However 
there are a number of problems with this coverage. Firstly without any information 
regarding the causes of the conflict it may be difficult for viewers without a deep 
knowledge of the dispute to understand why Israel has security concerns. The term 
needs to be elaborated to make more explicit its meaning or meanings for audiences, 
because for Israelis and Palestinians the word has different connotations. The Israeli 
government argues that Israel has a security problem because the Palestinian 
Authority cannot or will not control 'terrorists' intent on killing Israelis. This was the 
perspective of the security issue provided by j ournalists especially on BBC, as in the 
following examples: 
Yes even before this bomb attack this was always going to be the stumbling 
block the reluctance of Israel to pull out of the West Bank, the 13 percent they 
are negotiating about until the Palestinian Authority can provide guarantees 
that they can control the terrorists (BBC lunchtime news, 19 October 1998) 
Security is the central sticking point. Yesterday's grenade attack at a bus stop 
in Beersheba injured 64 Israelis and while the Palestinians insist it was an 
isolated incident to the Israelis it was further evidence that Yasser Arafat 
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cannot control Islamic militants. The Palestinian leader has instructed his 
police force to clampdown on Hamas and other extremist groups. Mr. Arafat 
says he gives the issue 100 percent commitment but admits he cannot promise 
100 percent results. The talks will resume later today the Palestinians say it's 
time for the Israelis to make a brave decision for peace. The Israelis will once 
again insist that their people must be safe from terrorist attack (BBC 1, 
Lunchtime News, 20 October 1998) 
An obvious unanswered question arises here: why are Palestinians risking 
their lives to attack Israelis? Since there is no historical background provided to 
viewers it may be difficult for them to understand Palestinian motivations. Focus 
group work in this area suggests that many viewers are confused about the 
motivations of the parties. Whilst most participants had absorbed the message that 
Israel-Palestine was a place of bloodshed, suffering and death, far fewer participants 
were able to provide cogent explanations as to why the two sides were fighting. Some 
viewers linked this lack of understanding to the structure of television news and a lack 
of explanation in this area: 
First speaker: There's too many gaps, if you are being shown a partial picture, 
you are obviously not being shown a whole picture ... they are showing you 
what they want you to see, and it shows, what we are seeing is what we are 
being fed. 
Second speaker: They never really tell you the in-depth reasons about it- 'This 
guy went into bomb a pizza restaurant'- why? 'The Israelis are going to 
attack' - why? 
First speaker: What pushes them to that extreme? (Low income male group, 
London, cited in Philo & Berry, 2004: 211-212) 
There is a recognition here that bombing a pizza restaurant is an 'extreme' 
action which requires some kind of explanation. People, unless they are mentally ill, 
generally don't behave in such ways unless they have some motive. Amnesty 
International, for instance, have repeatedly stressed that Israeli security concerns are a 
consequence of human rights violations carried out against Palestinians by the Israeli 
army and armed settlers: 
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Without human rights there can be no genuine security and no sustainable 
peace. Amnesty International requests the Commission to call on the Israeli 
government to immediately cease violations of basic human rights and to 
apply fully United Nation human rights treaties, as well as the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949, in the Occupied Territories (Amnesty International, 
1999a) 
However there were no attempts in coverage to link the conditions created by 
the occupation to Israel's security concerns and in one bulletin a BBC I journalist 
reports that the Israeli 'government here rejects emphatically all Palestinian 
suggestions that its actions provoke attacks like this morning's' (BBC 1, Evening 
News, 19 October 1998) There is no explanation of what these Israeli actions might 
be, because the nature of the occupation and its social consequences for Palestinians 
are not discussed in coverage. One aspect of the occupation which has been linked to 
Israeli security concerns involves the extensive use of torture by the Israeli security 
services: 
A similar cycle of humiliation and mistreatment fomenting hatred has been 
observed by the Palestinian psychiatrist Dr Eyad el-Sarraj, who studied suicide 
bombers. 'Most of them had suffered serious trauma when young, often that 
involved close relatives being tortured by the Israelis. ' he said. 'Children grow 
up wanting to take revenge for their trauma. Torture is an integral part of that 
cycle of violence. More oppression is making people more violent, in the way 
that abused children become abusive fathers. ' (Guardian, 24 January 2003) 
There was also the question of what the security provisions of the agreement 
would actually entail. Journalists here spoke of arresting 'terrorists', collecting 
weapons held by Palestinians and instituting a 'security clampdown': 
The specifics of a Palestinian crackdown on Islamic militants in the West 
Bank and Gaza are still being worked out. Imprisonment of radicals and 
confiscation of illegal weapons and key components. (BBC 1, early evening 
news, 22 October 1998) 
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The Palestinian charter, their constitution, will abandon its demand for the 
destruction of Israel and the CIA will help with a new security clampdown by 
the Palestinians involving the arrest of 30 top Arab extremists (ITV, evening 
news, 23 October 1998) 
The nib of the agreement is that the Palestinians will curb violent extremism 
(Channel 4 news, 23 October 1998) 
However human rights groups and some print j ournalists had pointed out at 
the time, that the security measures were rather more controversial than they appeared 
in the television news coverage. Robert Fisk noted that security provisions would 
mean more 'prison, hatred and (let's not be squeamish) torture' (Independent, 24 
October 1998) The day before the agreement was signed on the 22 October 1998 
Human Rights Watch released a statement in Washington which urged the United 
States and Israel not to pressure the Palestinian Authority to -implement the security 
provisions of the agreement without all sides making a clear commitment to safeguard 
human rights. Hanny Megally, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Middle 
East and North Africa Division, noted that the 'Palestinian Authority's human rights 
record is already deplorable, ' and that the 'U. S. doesn't condemn these violations now 
-- will the U. S. condemn violations once it is formally part of the process that creates 
them? ' The Israeli human rights group B'Tselem published a report a month after the 
signing of the Accords titled The Human Rights Fruits of the Wye Memorandum 
noting that the two weeks after the signing the fruits are already apparent: 'mass 
arbitrary arrests by both the Palestinian Authority and Israel'. The report further noted 
that 'the agreement merely pays lip service to human rights, with no intention by any 
of the parties - Israel, the Palestinian National Authority or the United States - to hold 
the sides accountable for human rights violations. ' The television news coverage 
made no mention of the fact that the security provisions of the agreement might lead 
to an increase in human rights abuses including torture. 
It was also argued that the security issue was that it was being used as a way 
of extending military control over Palestinians and undermining any prospect of land 
transfers during the Oslo process. Prime Minister Netanyahu had consistently 
campaigned against the 'peace process' before becoming Prime Minister and Avi 
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Shlaim has argued that Netanyahu by increasing house demolitions and settlement 
building whilst cancelling the scheduled IDF redeployments was adopting a "work- 
to-rule' approach designed to undermine the Oslo process' (2000: 576). Similarly, 
Professor Ian Lustick has argued that the Netanyahu government: 
favored offering lip-service to the peace process in deference to the opinions 
of the majority of Israelis, while in fact using a 'work-to-rule' approach to the 
Oslo Accords-treating them not as a basis for an evolving partnership, but as 
an array of legalist and public relations weapons that can free Israel of its 
commitments, prevent further transfers of territory to Palestinian control, and 
delegitimize Arafat and the idea of a Palestinian state in the mind of Israeli 
public opinion. (1997: 87) 
When Palestinian spokespersons were given the opportunity to speak this 
scepticism towards negotiations was made explicit: 
These incidents should not be used as an excuse to run away from negotiations 
about the real problems in this area. And the real problem is the fact that the 
Israelis are still occupying most of the Palestinian lands and the Palestinians 
are in need of self-determination. (BBC I, Lunchtime news, 19 October 1998) 
From my experience and assessment of the extremist ideological right wing 
fundamentalist stance of Netanyahu and the settlers and his cabinet it is very 
clear there is no commitment to a genuine peace and that the process is being 
manipulated to continue Israeli control and to undermine Palestinian rights. 
(BBC 1, Evening News, 19 October 1998) 
The Palestinian people are certainly much more sceptical they do not look at 
this as a serious breakthrough or as an earth-shattering agreement it's like 
pulling teeth and there's certainly is no confidence in the Israeli government or 
in the follow up steps (Channel 4 News, 23 October 1998) 
However when journalists provided commentary on the peace negotiations 
they reproduced only the official Israeli perspective. In many bulletins, and 
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particularly on BBC 1 which featured the majority of explanations for the conflict, the 
Israeli security perspective was given such overwhelming prominence that it 
overshadowed all other questions appearing to be virtually the only issue, or at least in 
the words of the BBC's Stephen Sackar 'the key issue'. Here are some exchanges 
between journalists illustrating this: 
Newscaster: But Stephen what are the main obstacles to peace? 
Journalist: Well I just mentioned security arrangements Moira, and those are 
the key issues and in a sense the key obstacles. It's quite clear now that the 
Israelis are committed to pulling back from a further 13 percent of the West 
bank but only if the Palestinians can convince them that they are able to offer 
new written cast-iron security commitments, better than anything they have 
offered in the past. There are key issues like the Israelis wanting the 
extradition of more than 30 Palestinian Islamic militants to Israel for trial. For 
example they want to make sure that illegal weapons held by Palestinians in 
the West Bank and Gaza are confiscated. Those are specific detailed issues the 
Israelis want the Palestinians to deliver and they want American intelligence 
to be involved to verify Palestinian compliance. (BBC I, Early Evening News, 
18 October 1998) 
Newscaster: Joining me now is our Washington correspondent Tom Carver. 
Tom its early morning there, I know, but has there been any reaction yet to 
this attack in Israel. 
Journalist: Yes officials from both sides have said that they will not leave the 
negotiating table that they will continue to stay here despite the attack. A 
spokesman for Mr. Netanyahu said that it really reinforced the need for Israel 
to get strong and complete guarantees both in word and deed from the 
Palestinian side that they could control terrorism and they could provide 
security on the West Bank. So this clearly will have played into the hands of 
the hard-liners in Netanyahu's government and will make it very hard for him, 
I think, to convince his hard-liners back home that he can get those sort of 
guarantees from the Palestinians. 
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Newscaster: And it is those security issues that are proving the most difficult 
to overcome in the talks is it? 
Journalist- Yes even before this bomb attack this was always going to be the 
stumbling block the reluctance of Israel to pull out of the West Bank, the 13 
percent that they are negotiating about until the Palestinian Authority can 
provide guarantees that they can control the terrorists and it seems that this is 
exactly the sort of thing that Israel is dreading this sort of attack. And, of 
course, the Palestinians will say we can provide the security but we must also 
negotiate about other things about Israel's continued occupation of the 
territories. (BBC I, Lunchtime news, 19 October 1998) 
In one of the above examples aj ournalist argues that 'It's quite clear now that 
the Israelis are committed to pulling back from a further 13 percent of the West bank' 
if they can get the required 'security guarantees'. However as already noted 
Palestinians regarded this as far from 'clear' which is why Palestinian spokespersons 
had expressed 'no confidence in the Israeli government or in the follow up steps'. 
Prime Minister Netanyahu had repeatedly suspended previous scheduled troop re- 
deployments and six weeks after Wye again cancelled the scheduled troop 
redeployments unless the Palestinians fulfilled five conditions most of which were 
new and according to Avi Shlaim 'designed to torpedo the peace process and put the 
responsibility on the Palestinians' (2000: 605). However there was no attempt by 
journalists on any channel to articulate the Palestinian position that the arguments 
around security were being employed as an excuse to avoid land transfers and extend 
Israeli control over the occupied territories. It would not have been difficult for 
journalists to provide the Palestinian perspective along with the Israeli viewpoint: 
Yes officials from both sides have said that they will not leave the negotiating 
table that they will continue to stay here despite the attack. A spokesman for 
Mr. Netanyahu. said that it really reinforced the need for Israel to get strong 
and complete guarantees both in word and deed from the Palestinian side that 
they could control terrorism and they could provide security on the West 
Bank. However Palestinians argue that the Israelis government, which is 
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composed ofparties opposed to the peace process, are using arguments about 
security to avoid the return of occupied Palestinian land and instead 
strengthen their hold on the Palestinian territories. 
One reason why there was so much coverage dealing with the security 
provisions of the agreement was that j oumalists used this element of the accords as a 
point of linkage to the concerns of Israeli settlers living in the occupied territories. 
This made specific connections between the security provisions of Wye and the 
dangers faced by individual settlers. Here are some exchanges between j oumalists and 
settlers: 
Journalist Less than a mile away rabbi Benny Alon, one of the leaders of the 
religious right in Israel's parliament is getting ready for the Jewish Sabbath at 
a synagogue in an otherwise Palestinian area that his supporters have just re- 
occupied. Rabbi Alon says the right will try to bring the government down 
because he believes Benjamin, BB, Netanyahu has put Israel in danger. 
Israeli Settler: BB Netanyahu established in this summit the Palestinian state 
and by this he risks not only the Jewish revival he risks the Jewish state of 
Israel's survival. (BBC 1, Evening News, 23 October 1998) 
Journalist: Mecaby Luz is worried about his children's safety. The Luz family 
live in the settlement of Beit-El on land Israel captured in the 1967 war 
because they feel this is the heartland of the Jewish people. Now they're 
disgusted that the prime minister they voted for is transferring more territory 
to the Palestinians. 
Israeli Settler: This agreement endangers us more than we were endangered 
before. We're worried because we've seen friends of ours killed and the 
murders run away it takes them two minutes to flee into the autonomy areas 
and now there's going to be more of these areas and we are very scared and 
we are very disappointed. (BBC 1, Evening News, 24 October 1998) 
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Journalist: At the Israeli West Bank settlement of Beit-El hardline settlers 
followed the news on car radios as they hurried home before the sabbath 
shutdown. The settlement is already close to Palestinian homes and maybe 
virtually surrounded by Palestinian territory under the new agreement. Many 
of the settlers are bitterly disappointed and planning protest action. 
Israeli Settler: We believe that we are going to be subject to firebombs to arms 
to bombings to you name it. (ITV Evening News, 23 October 1998) 
It is perfectly legitimate forjoumalists to highlight the security concems of 
Israeli settlers and how the provisions of Wye will affect them. However there was 
little attempt to show or discuss how the security provisions, or as many Palestinians 
saw it - the extension of military rule, had affected the lives of ordinary Palestinians. 
The closest any broadcaster came to this was this single brief mention in one BBC I 
bulletin: 
Journalist: At the Palestinian house restaurant in Ramallah, one of the biggest 
towns controlled by Yasser Arafat on the West Bank, they were getting ready 
for a birthday party. They didn't see any point in celebrating the peace process 
though when Israel still controls Palestinian lives. 
Palestinian civilian: You need pennission to go to Jerusalem first of all, 
Jerusalem is closed always. If you have a West Bank ID there's no way you 
can get in. If you want to go to Nabulus if there's a closure you can't even 
reach Nabulus. If you want to go anywhere you can't, it's ridiculous I think 
it's a joke. 
This was a very important facet of the military occupation which wasn't 
highlighted anywhere else in coverage. The reason why Israel still controls Palestinian 
lives' is that during the Oslo process Israel had built a matrix of military checkpoints 
across the occupied territories which meant that Palestinians found it difficult to travel 
anywhere in the West Bank. This building programme which had drastically altered 
the geography of the West Bank and would have been difficult for j ournalists to miss. 
The enforcement by Israel, of what the United Nations had condemned as illegal 
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closures and 'flagrant violations of international law', had a serious impact on the 
Palestinian economy which had been severely damaged, and all other aspects of social 
life: 
During years of waiting for promised benefits, Palestinians have seen their 
standard of living steadily decline. In the seven years between the signing of 
the Oslo Accords and the start of the uprising in September 2000, Israeli 
policies -- including border controls, retention of Palestinian funds, and 
restrictions on trade, investment, and access to water resources -- resulted in 
growing trade and budget deficits for the Palestinians. Unemployment was 
hovering at 50 percent, poverty rates increased, health standards deteriorated, 
and any sense of opportunity among Palestinian youth began to fade (Yackley 
& Zunes, 2002) 
This was the only time that i ournalists mentioned the social impact of the 
demographic changes initiated by the Israelis during the peace process. 
The Military Occupation 
In total mentions of the occupation accounted for 15 lines or I percent of coverage. 
On each occasion the issue was merely named. The fact that it was military in nature 
and had serious social consequences for Palestinians wasn't mentioned: 
And, of course, the Palestinians will say we can provide the security but we 
must also negotiate about other things about Israel's continued occupation of 
the territories. (BBC 1, Lunchtime News, 19 October 1998) 
In East Jerusalem which Israel has occupied since the 1967 war Palestinians 
were relieved that the deadlock has been broken. (BBC 1, Early Evening News, 
24 October 1998) 
He comes from the occupied West Bank and is said by the Israeli authorities to 
have deliberately targeted soldiers. (ITV, Lunchtime News, 19 October 1998) 
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A swap of more Palestinian land occupied by Israel since 1967 in return for 
tougher Palestinian measures against Islamic terrorists. (BBC2, Newsnight, 23 
October 1998) 
However, human rights groups have been less reticent in documenting the social 
consequences of living under the military occupation: 
Amnesty International has for many years documented and condemned 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by Israel 
directed against the Palestinian population of the Occupied Territories. They 
include unlawful killings; torture and ill-treatment; arbitrary detention; unfair 
trials; collective punishments such as punitive closures of areas and 
destruction of homes; extensive and wanton destruction of property; 
deportations; and discriminatory treatment as compared to Israeli settlers. 
Most of these violations are grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
and are therefore war crimes. Many have also been committed in a widespread 
and systematic manner, and in pursuit of government policy; such violations 
meet the definition of crimes against humanity under international law. 
(Amnesty International, 2002) 
If the nature and consequences of the military occupation are not explained by 
journalists it is unlikely that viewers will be aware of them. Focus group work 
suggests that many participants did not understand that the Palestinians had been 
subject to a military occupation since 1967. They also found that few viewers were 
aware that human rights abuses were a part of the occupation. They related this 
ignorance to omissions in news coverage: 
There was little understanding of areas such as human rights- only two people 
in all the focus groups raised these as an issue. Even in groups that tended to 
be sympathetic with the Palestinians (such as low-income males in London) 
there was some surprise that there were pass laws and identity cards which 
restricted movement. There was no almost no knowledge of the large number 
of UN resolutions which have been passed, either those relation to the legality 
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of the occupation or those relating to human rights abuses in the occupied 
territories. (Philo & Berry, 2004: 218) 
Coverage of the interim issues was dominated by the issue of Israeli security 
concerns, which was the only aspect of the agreement which was explained in a 
detailed manner. Most other issues like the land issue and the military occupation 
were named without being explained. Journalists spoke in a kind of shorthand which 
assumed a level of background knowledge, which focus group research suggests is 
lacking in most viewers. There were three other issues referred to: 
" The release of Palestinian Prisoners (0.8 percent of total coverage, II lines) 
" The rewriting of PLO charter (0.3 percent of coverage, 4 lines) 
" Economic development in occupied territories - land links, port, airport (0.1 
percent of coverage, 2 lines) 
Final Status Issues 
Coverage of final status issues accounted for 4 percent of coverage (63 lines 
out of 1417). More than two thirds of this (42 lines out of 63) dealt with Israeli 
settlements and settlers' anger and concerns. The other primary issues of concern to 
Palestinians: statehood, refugees, water and Jerusalem accounted in total for 1.5 
percent of coverage (21 lines out of 1417). The final status issues were only 
mentioned in the final two days coverage of the talks, when j ournalists switched their 
attention to the issues that hadn't been part of the negotiations. Reporters stressed the 
limited aspect of what being signed at Wye, and then named without explaining the 
final status issues still to be resolved. 
Settlements 
The issue of Jewish settlements is one of the most contentious issues in the conflict. 
There are a number of different ways for journalists to approach the issue of 
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settlements and their significance in the conflict. Journalists can present the Israeli 
settler's perspective which maintains that Israeli Jews have a right to construct 
settlements anywhere in the occupied territories because the land was given to them 
by God. The Israeli government has also argued that the settlement blocks close to the 
Green Line have a security function because they act as a bulwark preventing 
Palestinians from entering Israel. For the Israeli government and settler groups the 
two primary issues in relation to the settlement question are whether any of the 
settlements will have to be removed in the course of the peace process and the safety 
of Israelis living in settlements, who have come into conflict with Palestinians. There 
is also the question of the political muscle of settler groups who have a powerful 
voice within Israeli political life, and formed a significant part of Prime Minister 
Netanyahu's ruling coalition. They have been strongly opposed to the peace process 
and any return of Palestinian land captured in 1967. The perspective on settlements 
held by Palestinians and the international community is at odds with the Israeli 
perspective. Palestinians see settlements as a form of colonisation whereby the settler 
population has been stealing Palestinian land and dispossessing the local Population. 
The settlements close to the Green line were designed to have a strategic function in 
that they allowed the Israeli state to gain control of West Bank land and the region's 
water supply (Shlaim, 2000). This is a serious issue for Palestinians because their 
economy is largely agricultural and so access to water is vital. Palestinians also point 
out that all settlers are armed with automatic weapons and mount attacks against the 
Palestinian population who are not legally allowed to own weapons. A report by the 
Israeli human rights group B'Tselem argued that armed intimidation was used as a 
tactic to force Palestinians off their land: 
Actions initiated by settlers against Palestinians and their property are carried 
out by individuals or organized groups to intimidate, deter, or punish, using 
firearms and ammunition provided to them by the IDF. Such action may be a 
reprisal operation following Palestinian violence, or it may be unrelated to any 
specific previous incident. Among the settlers' actions against Palestinians are 
setting up roadblocks to disrupt normal Palestinian life, shooting at roof-top 
water heaters burning cars, smashing windows, destroying crops and 
uprooting trees, and harassing merchants and owners of stalls in the market. 
Some of the settlers' violence against Palestinians is intended to force 
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Palestinians to leave their homes or land, so that the perpetrators can take 
control over Palestinian land. (B'Tselem, 1998) 
The friction between Palestinians and Israeli settlers has worsened during the 
peace process because of the large rise in the settler population, and the fact that 
settlers are rarely prosecuted when they attack or kill Palestinians (Amnesty 
International, 200 1 a). Between the start of the peace process in 1991 and the Wye 
Accords the settler population in the occupied territories (excluding East Jerusalem) 
rose by 80 percent from 94,100 in 1991 to 169,400 in 1998 . Running concurrently 
with this rise has been an increasing expropriation of West Bank land for settlement 
purposes. It is widely argued that the settlements are illegal under international law 
because they breach the Fourth Geneva Convention, article 49 of which stipulates the 
occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own population into the 
territories it occupies. ' The United Nations has been extremely critical of the 
settlement program in the occupied territories passing annual resolutions that have 
deemed the settlements illegal and in need of removal. These resolutions have been 
passed with large majorities at the General Assembly with one passed ten months 
prior to Wye by 149 votes to 2 (Israel, United States). The European Parliament has 
also issued statements condemning settlement building. 41 
In coverage j oumalists highlighted only three aspects of the settlement question: 
what would be the future of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the security 
of settlers living in the occupied territories and settler opposition to the Wye Accords: 
They haven't even started to tackle the most serious issues yet those include 
the future of Jewish settlements like this one, the future of Jerusalem, of 
Palestinian refugees and the shape of Israel's final borders. (BBC I Evening 
News, 23 October 98) 
... these are small measures of Progress compared 
to the really big issues 
which remain to be addressed in any kind of final settlement. That's for 
example the fate of Jerusalem, the fate of the Israeli settlements on the West 
Bank, and whether or not the Palestinians get a state. Those are the ones that 
they'll really have to try for (ITV Early Evening News, 23 October 1998) 
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I was just at an Israeli settlement on the West Bank called Betel, they run the 
risk of being virtually isolated, virtually cut off under this agreement. Not 
surprisingly they are bitterly against it (ITV Early Evening News, 23 October 
1998) 
Jewish settlers mounted protests on West Bank roads. There is a feeling that 
Mr. Netanyahu's decision to pull back from the brink of a walk out yesterday 
makes an agreement and a 13 percent Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank 
more likely (BBC I Early Evening News, 22 October 1998) 
This is a rather incomplete and partial treatment of the settlement issue. There 
is no discussion of what a settlement is or its strategic role in controlling the land and 
water resources of the occupied territories. There is also no mention of the fact that 
settlers are heavily armed and have been repeatedly censured by the United Nations 
and human rights groups for taking land and attacking Palestinians. From the 
coverage it could appear as if they are civilians who are being attacked for no obvious 
reason. Focus group work suggests that some viewers had internalised this view of 
settlements as vulnerable communities, subject to violent attacks for no clearly 
discernable reason (Philo & Berry, 2004). On the issue of the legitimacy of the 
settlements viewers are only presented with the settlers' perspective: 
Jewish settlers who held prayer demonstrations believe this land was given to 
them by God and their homes and their families already heavily guarded will 
be in danger if any more of it is turned over to the Palestinians (BBC I 
Evening News 23 October 1998) 
The Luz family live in the settlement of Beit-El on land Israel captured in the 
1967 war because they feel this is the heartland of the Jewish people. Now 
they're disgusted that the prime minister they voted for is transferring more 
territory to the Palestinians. (BBC I Evening News, 24 October 1998) 
Israel will stay quiet until the Jewish Sabbath ends at sunset this evening. Only 
then will the religious nationalistic right start the campaign which it promises 
will bring down the Netanyahu government to try to stop the handover to the 
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Palestinians of more of the land that religious Israelis believe God gave to the 
Jews (BBC I Early Evening News, 24 October 1998) 
There is no attempt to balance the claim of divine right to the land held by 
settlers with the view that most governments regard the settlements as being illegal 
and a violation of the Geneva Convention. It is also noteworthy that in the above 
example that the journalist presents the settlers' perspective that they 'will be in 
danger if any more of it is turned over to the Palestinians'. In another broadcast on 
ITV a reporter states that: 
At the Israeli West Bank settlement of Beit-El hardline settlers followed the 
news on car radios as they hurried home before the Sabbath shutdown. The 
settlement is already close to Palestinian homes and maybe virtually 
surrounded by Palestinian territory under the new agreement. Many of the 
settlers are bitterly disappointed and planning protest action. (ITV Evening 
News, 23 October 1998) 
Palestinians and independent human rights groups have argued that the settlers 
are putting themselves in danger not because of an agreement to hand back territory, 
but because they have been forcing Palestinians off their land and constructing illegal 
settlements. However this perspective is absent. The above example from ITV is 
particularly confused arguing that the settlements 'maybe surrounded by Palestinian 
territory' which misses the obvious point that the settlements were actually built on 
what the international community regards as Palestinian territory, which is why they 
are so bitterly resented by Palestinians. Out of the 42 lines of coverage which dealt 
with the settlement issue only one referenced the Palestinian perspective (though 
without actually interviewing any Palestinians): 
Israeli peace campaigners went to help Palestinians on the West Bank with the 
olive harvest. The Palestinians here say Jewish settlers are trying to take their 
land. These Israeli leftists believe their country will never have peace until the 
Palestinians have justice. (BBC I Evening News, 24 October 1998) 
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There is no indication as to whether the Palestinian claim that settlers 'are 
trying to take their land' is true, it is reported as an unsubstantiated claim. The 
journalist then tells viewers that 'these Israeli leftists believe their country will never 
have peace until the Palestinians have justice', but it is far from obvious to viewers, 
who lack a detailed knowledge of the conflict, how the existence of settlements 
affects Palestinian 'justice', or even for that matter what 'justice' in this context 
means. Without providing any information on the pivotal role of settlements in the 
struggle to control the region's land and water, statements such as these are unlikely 
to be comprehensible to most viewers. 
Jerusalem 
Jerusalem is the centre of the religious, cultural, social and economic existence of 
Israelis and Palestinians. The city has particular significance to the Judean, Christian 
and Muslim faiths due to the presence of important holy sites. Israel argues the city is 
its 'eternal and undivided capital' because of its religious significance and the fact 
that the city has always had a significant Jewish population. Palestinians want Arab 
East Jerusalem as the capital of any prospective Palestinian state, and have been 
angered by Israeli moves to alter the demographic composition of the city. Arab East 
Jerusalem has been under military occupation since 1967 and in the interim period 
human rights groups note that Israel has carried out sustained illegal settlement 
programs and has been expelling Palestinians and destroying their homes at an 
increasing rate. According to Amnesty International the purpose of these practices in 
East Jerusalem has been 'to transform the ethnic character of the annexed area from 
Arab to Jewish' by the restriction and confiscation of residency documents, and the 
destruction of Palestinian homeS42 . At present Amnesty estimates that about 
35 
perecnt of East Jerusalem has been confiscated, more than 90 percent of which had 
been owned by Palestinians and used for grazing or cultivation. Of the current 
estimate of 28,000 Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem, Amnesty reports that 
approximately 12,000 or 43 percent of the total are under demolition orders from the 
Israeli authorities. The UN has also been heavily critical of these Israeli Practices in 
Arab East Jerusalem. Ten months prior to the Wye Accords a UN resolution 
condemning the expulsions and house demolitions was passed by 148 votes to one 
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(Israel) with nine abstentions. It has also passed numerous General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions asking Governments not to move their embassies to 
Jerusalem and declaring all moves by Israel to alter the demographic character of the 
city as invalid. In this coverage, the future of Jerusalem accounted for 0.6 percent of 
total coverage (9 lines out of 1417). None of the references to the issue extended 
beyond a single sentence, and none explained the significance of the issue: 
The big issues, the future of Jerusalem and the Palestinian demand for 
statehood must now be faced. (BBC 1: 21: 00,23 October 98) 
And the really tough stuff lies ahead, the so called permanent status issues 
which should by rights be decided within the next six months, can Jerusalem 
be shared? The Palestinians want a part of it as their capital. (BBC2: 22: 30,23 
October 98) 
.. these are small measures of progress compared to the really big issues which 
remain to be addressed in any kind of final settlement. That's for example the 
fate of Jerusalem, the fate of the Israeli settlements on the West Bank (ITV: 
17: 45,23 October 98) 
There is an acknowledgement by j ournalists that the future of Jerusalem is a 
'big issue' but no explanations as to why. This is significant because another major 
Palestinian grievance that is driving the conflict is left unexamined. Focus group 
research suggests that most viewers who rely on television news as their main source 
of information are very confused about what the two sides are fighting over (Philo & 
Berry, 2004). Some viewers believed that the conflict involved neighbours who 
couldn't get along, or fanatics who harboured inexplicable and irrational hatreds. This 
is to be expected, if there is little explanation of the political and territorial dimensions 
of the dispute. 
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Palestinian Refugees 
The fate of Palestinian refugees is one of the most intractable issues separating the 
two sides. It is so important that many on both sides regard it as a 'deal breaker' with 
the potential to scupper any attempts to reach a final settlement. The bulk of the 
refugees were created in 1948 when approximately 750,000 Palestinians were 
displaced during the creation of the Israeli state (Gilbert, 1999). A further 320,000 
Palestinian refugees (and 90,000 Syrian refugees) were created in 1967 when Israel 
invaded the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights (Harris, 1980). The refugees 
and their descendents now number more than five million according to the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) and are 
concentrated primarily in the occupied territories, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, with 
1.2 million living permanently in very poor social conditions in refugee camps. A 
report published in the British Medical Journal by the British charity Medical Aid for 
Palestinians catalogued the severe health problems experienced by people living in 
camps including infectious diseases linked to poor sanitation; mental health problems 
associated with displacement and with experiencing prolonged bombardment; 
intellectual and physical disability among children; poor health among pregnant 
women and infants; and chronic diseases such as diabetes. (17 March 1999). 
All Israeli political parties (excluding the Arab and Communist parties) are 
opposed to the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel because they argue that it would 
threaten both the security and the Jewish character of the State. 43 For Palestinians the 
right of return for refugees lies at the heart of the conflict. The expulsion of the 
refugees in 1948 is remembered by Palestinians as Al Nakba, the catastrophe, and 
possible solutions to the refugee problem have generated much debate amongst 
PalestinianS44 . The United Nations 
has been supportive of the right to return. On the 
I Ith December 1948 the United Nations General Assembly passed UN resolution 194 
which established the right of return for all Palestinian refugees displaced in the 1948 
War: 
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace 
with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable 
date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing 
not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of 
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international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or 
authorities responsible 
Ten months prior to Wye the 'right of return' was re-affirmed by the United 
Nations by the margin of 159 votes to two (Israel, United States) with one abstention. 
There has also been support for the right to return from the European Union. 45 
Although both sides admit the absolute centrality of the issue to any resolution of the 
conflict it received scant mention in coverage. References to the refugee question 
accounted for 0.2 percent of coverage (3 lines out of 1417). On each occasion the 
issue was named but not explained: 
They haven't even started to tackle the most serious issues yet those include 
the future of Jewish settlements like this one, the future of Jerusalem, of 
Palestinian refugees and the shape of Israel's final borders. (BBC I Evening 
News, 23 October 98) 
Is there to be a right of return for Arab refugees? How many will be permitted 
to come in from exile, and when? (BBC2 Newsnight, 23 October 98) 
Ahis really only takes us through till the final settlement which will involve 
the most difficult problems of all, questions like the final settlement of 
Jerusalem, the return of refugees (ITV Lunchtime News, 23 October 98) 
Control of Water Resources 
Another key final status issue concerns the water supplies of the occupied 
territories. As previously noted the construction of Jewish settlements in the occupied 
territories was linked to the struggle over the water supplies of the region. This has 
meant that Israel has taken control of the water supply of the occupied territories most 
of which is diverted for the use of settlements and Israeli industry. The Israeli human 
rights organisation B'Tselem has noted that Israeli water practices breach 
international law and have a highly negative impact on all aspects of life in the 
occupied territories: 
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Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians suffer from a severe water shortage 
throughout the summer. This shortage of water affects every function that 
water plays in human life: drinking, bathing, cleaning, and watering of crops 
and animals The shortage drastically affects the residents' health and economic 
well-being. The shortage of drinking water can cause dehydration and the 
inability to maintain proper hygiene and thus lead to illness. Failure to water 
crops and animals affects the livelihood of the residents. The water shortage 
violates the basic human rights of Palestinian residents of the Occupied 
Territories such as the right to health, to adequate housing, to equality, and to 
benefit from their natural resources. This harin results from Israeli policy, in 
effect since 1967, based on an unfair division of resources shared by Israel and 
the Palestinians. (B'Tselem, 1998, The Water Crisis in the Occupied 
Territories) 
The United Nations has been critical of the Israeli policy on West Bank water 
noting that it breaches international law. It has passed numerous resolutions pointing 
out that Israel must not exploit the water resources of the occupied territories. 46 The 
issue of water is of central importance to the conflict yet it accounted for only 0.07 
percent of total coverage (I line out of 1417). The single reference to the issue 
appeared during BBC2's Newsnight, rather than during the mass audience bulletins 
on BBC I or ITV: 
How is water to be shared an eternal and crucial problem in the Middle East 
(BBC2: 22: 30,23 October 1998) 
This reference is rather brief and requires explaining so as to make clear the 
importance of water in the context of the conflict. Sometimes j ournalists grouped a 
number of interim issues together in their discussion of what was still to be negotiated 
as in the following examples: 
They haven't even started to tackle the most serious issue yet. Those include 
the future of Jewish settlements like this one, the future of Jerusalem, of 
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Palestinian refugees and the shape of Israel's final borders (BBC I evening 
news, 23 October 1998) 
We have to recognise above all that this is an interim deal that really only 
takes us through to the final settlement which will involve the most difficult 
problems of all, questions like the final settlement of Jerusalem, the return of 
refugees and for example the final borders of a Palestinian state. (ITV, 
lunchtime news, 23 October 1998) 
Well if so they're going to get there by inches because these are small 
measures of progress compared to the really big issues which remain to be 
addressed in any kind of final settlement. That's for example the fate of 
Jerusalem, the fate of the Israeli settlements on the West Bank, and whether or 
not the Palestinians get a state. Those are the ones that they'll really have to 
try for. (ITV, early evening news, 23 October 1998) 
Just naming the major issues is unlikely to be helpful to most viewers. Each 
issue must be individually explained by j ournalists so as to make clear its relevance 
and importance. 
Theme 3: The Peace Process: Effects and Implications 
This area involved Israeli and Palestinian perspectives on whether the process 
was achieving its objectives. Under the terms of the Oslo Accords by the time of 
Wye, Israel was due to have withdrawn its troops from most of the West Bank, and 
pennanent status negotiations should have been underway for more than a year, with 
their completion scheduled for May 1999. However when the Wye Accords took 
place Palestinians had total control over only 3 percent of the West Bank and the final 
status talks had not even begun, with each side accusing the other of bad faith in 
failing to implement their obligations under the agreements. Discussion of the peace 
process accounted for 2 percent of total coverage (30 lines out of 1417). All of this 
coverage merely stated that the peace process has been stalled for approximately 18 
months or that the Accords have brought 19 months of deadlock to an end: 
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Tonight the summit is in deep trouble it was supposed to revive the peace 
process which effectively collapsed 19 months ago. Because the gap between 
the two sides is so wide the Summit was never going to produce anything 
more than a limited and fragile agreement. (BBC I, Evening News, 19 October 
98) 
A clearly elated Yasser Arafat has been in Austria today taking the plaudits 
from European ministers for his part in the settlement which has broken the 
deadlock in the Middle East. (ITV, Early Evening, 24 October 98) 
After nine days of titanic negotiations it seemed the Americans had managed 
to broker a deal on a land for peace settlement that would break 19 months of 
deadlock. (Channel 4, News, 23 October 98) 
Here is a discussion on the subject between a Channel 4 news anchor and a 
journalist on the state of the 'peace process' and its prospects: 
Newscaster: And what is the Armageddon scenario? In other words if it does 
go wrong and people are saying it's pretty serious? 
Journalist: It's serious. It just drags on. It seems to go on forever. These talks 
have been stalled for the last 18 months. They're going nowhere. 
Newscaster: But on the ground people are saying it could be disastrous. 
Journalist: On the ground people are getting angry, Palestinians are getting 
angry, Israelis are getting angry. Both sides are getting extremely angry, it 
never seems to quite boil up and boil over. But I think that this is extremely 
serious because what it means is that all the accords that were signed in Oslo, 
all those years ago, they really are going absolutely nowhere. (Channel 4 
News, 21 October 1998) 
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This exchange offers a descriptive account letting viewers know that there are 
serious problems with the peace process and that this is intensifying anger on both 
sides. However it offers viewers no explanations. As previously noted, the Israeli 
argument that the breakdown in the peace process were caused by the failure of the 
Palestinian Authority to halt attacks by Palestinians was extensively reported by 
journalists. The Palestinian position that the Israelis had used the Oslo process to take 
more land and water and build settlements wasn't provided by j ournalists. There were 
four references claiming that the Oslo process hasn't achieved its objectives for either 
Palestinians or Israelis: 
The peace process has been in a state of collapse for 19 months. Even if the 
Summit does produce an agreement it will be limited and fragile. It's almost 
impossible these days to find anybody Israeli or Palestinian who still has faith 
in the peace process. After four years it hasn't delivered peace or security for 
Israelis, or the land, dignity and self-determination that the Palestinians want. 
(BBC I, lunchtime & early evening news, 19 October 1998) 
The previous Oslo deal was signed amid euphoria but then failed to deliver 
much freedom for the Palestinians or security to the Israelis. (ITV: 13: 00,23 
October 98) 
We'll have to see whether this is a turning point reviving the peace process or 
whether this is one good day in a process which for so long has been deeply 
wretched and has delivered nothing either to the people of Israel or the 
Palestinians. (BBC2: 22: 30,23 October 98) 
These statements may be difficult for viewers, who lack detailed knowledge of 
the conflict, to understand. The journalists speak in a shorthand which assumes a high 
level of background knowledge that focus groups research suggests most audience 
members don't possess (Philo & Berry, 2004). Words like 'security', 'freedom', and 
'self-determination' which are employed without explanation are only really 
comprehensible if you understand the history of the conflict and the ramifications of 
the military occupation. One of the reports above argues that the process 'has 
delivered nothing either to the people of Israel or the Palestinians'. This is a 
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questionable statement which ignores some of the central factors driving the 
continuance of the occupation. Although the Oslo process had failed to deliver 
security to ordinary Israelis it had allowed the Israeli state to appropriate more West 
Bank land, expand settlements in Jerusalem and across the occupied territories, 
nionopolise the regions water resources on which Israeli industry is heavily reliant, 
and open up Arab markets to Israeli goods and services. There was one reference on 
Channel 4 that Israel at this summit may finally 'sign up properly to the Oslo 
Accords' (19: 00,23 October 98) and one reference on Channel 5 that 'Palestinians 
argue that peace is fragile because Israel hasn't even enforced what's already been 
agreed' (12: 00,22 1998). However these brief and cryptic comments needed to be 
expanded and explained. Journalists appear to be shying away from providing 
explanations as to why Palestinians had lost faith in the peace process. 
Theme 4: ODDosition/Attitudes to the Wve Accords 
Coverage of opposition to the Wye Accords accounted for 10 percent of all coverage 
(138 lines out of 1417). Two thirds of this coverage (93 lines out of 138) dealt with 
the issue of Israeli settler opposition to the Accords, a fifth (29 lines out of 138) dealt 
with Palestinian opposition and approximately a tenth (16 lines out of 13 8) lumped 
Palestinian and Israeli opposition together as in the examples below: 
They [delegates at the summit] all radiated optimism but they also warned that 
opponents of peace Israeli and Arab might use violence to try to destroy what 
they had achieved. (BBC I, Early Evening News, 24 October 1998) 
In both camps zealots will do their damnedest to bring down the peace process 
as it continues to unfold. Islamic terrorists on the one side fighting what they 
call a holy war, nationalists bigots and ultra-religious fundamentalists in 
Israel's midst. (BBC2, Newsnight, 23 October 1998) 
Israel's security forces will now be braced for attacks from either hardline 
Jews or Palestinian extremists who will both seek to destroy the deal by 
protest or violence even as it's born. (ITV, Lunchtime News, 23 October 98) 
165 
Israeli settlers had opposed the Oslo Accords for two reasons. The first involved 
the claim that Israeli Jews had the right to settle anywhere in the occupied territories 
because the land were promised to their ancestors thousands of years ago by God. The 
second maintained that any return of land captured by Israel in the 1967 war would 
threaten both their personal security and the security of the entire Israeli state. Both of 
these arguments were represented in coverage. Journalists also discussed the power of 
settler groups, their political opposition to the Oslo process and their attempts to 
pressurise Netanyahu into not handing back any of the occupied territories. The 
potential threats to the security of Israeli settlers was emphasised by journalists 
visiting the homes of settlers and discussing their fears. Settlers were also permitted to 
make very contentious statements without being challenged by j ournalists as in two of 
the examples below: 
Michael Kleiner- Knesset Member: I believe its a black day for Israel, a black 
day for the Jewish people if one knows history it reminds me of the days of the 
Munich agreement when Chamberlain came very happy with a piece of paper 
signed with Mr Hitler and later on everyone found out it was a terrible 
mistake. (Channel 4 News, 23 October 1998) 
Benny Alon- Israeli Settler: BB Netanyahu established in this summit the 
Palestinian state and by this he risks not only the Jewish revival he risks the 
Jewish state of Israel's survival. (BBC I Evening News, 23 October 1998) 
Jewish settlers who held prayer demonstrations believe this land was given to 
them by God and their homes and their families already heavily guarded will 
be in danger if any more of it is turned over to the Palestinians. (BBC I 
Evening News, 23 October 1998) 
I was just at an Israeli settlement on the West Bank called Betel, they run the 
risk of being virtually isolated, virtually cut off under this agreement. Not 
surprisingly they are bitterly against it. (ITV Early Evening News, 23 October 
1998) 
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Palestinian opposition to the Accords was motivated by many factors. 
Professor Khalil Shikaki (1999), the fon-ner director of the Centre for Palestine 
Research and Studies in the West Bank city of Nablus has argued that the 
demographic transformation of the occupied territories had led to a substantial shift in 
Palestinian public opinion during the five years between Oslo and Wye. Shikaki 
reports that when the Oslo process began in 1993 support for the process stood at 
approximately two thirds of the population but that 'uncertainty about Israel's 
intentions and prospects for establishing a Palestinian state led most Palestinians to 
support both continued negotiations and violence against Israelis'. By early 1996 in 
the wake of troop withdrawals support for the peace process had risen to 80 percent 
whilst support for attacks on Israelis had fallen dramatically to about 20 percent of the 
population. Support for militant Islamic and nationalist groups also slumped by half to 
less than 20 percent of the population. However the election of Netanyahu as Prime 
Minister which led to a further expansion in settlement activity resulted in a 
deterioration in all peace indicators by the time of Wye. Palestinian faith that the Oslo 
process would lead to the creation of a Palestinian state slumped to only 37 percent of 
the population, whilst only 31 percent of the population believed that the two sides 
would reach an agreement on final status issues. Support for violence against Israelis 
increased dramatically to approximately 50 percent of the population and this support 
was 'equally widespread among men and women of all age groups and educational 
levels, and among residents of cities, villages, towns, and refugee camps, reflecting 
deep anger about Israel's failure to honour its peace commitments'. Shikaki explains 
that support for armed violence against Israelis was not seen as an alternative to the 
peace process but as tactic designed to prevent further Israeli land appropriations and 
settlement building which in Palestinian eyes was making the proposed final status 
negotiations largely irrelevant: 
Palestinian public opinion approved of diplomacy as a strategic choice while it 
supported armed attacks as a tactical response to perceived Israeli 
intransigence and broken promises... rather than viewing violence as an 
alternative to diplomacy, some Palestinians regard[ed] violence as a 
supporting tactic to improve the Palestinian negotiating position and to force 
Israel to stop creating facts on the ground that prejudge[d] the outcome of 
negotiations. (Shikaki, 1999) 
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In news coverage Palestinians who opposed the Oslo process were described as 
4extremists', 'militants' or 'terrorists': 
In Gaza the extremist group Islamic Rhad demonstrated against any 
compromise with Israel. They burnt a coffin meant to symbolise the peace 
process. The Palestinian Authority which controls Gaza has promised Israel 
they will stop demonstrations like this and arrest people who attack Jews. 
Sheik Ahmed Yassem the leader of Hamas, the other hard-line Islamic group, 
said the new agreement might obstruct them for a while but they would fight 
Israel until freedom or martyrdom (BBC I Evening News, 23 October 1998) 
So far its the extremists on both sides who've done most to make their views 
on this agreement known. On the Gaza Strip Palestinian supporters of Islamic 
Jihad marched in the white shrouds of suicide bombers. A speaker declared 
that the struggle against Israel will continue. (ITV Evening News, 23 October 
1998) 
Yasser Arafat also has to overcome his normal opponents. Sheik Yaseem the 
leader of the militant group Hamas said he would just ignore today's accord. 
Anti-agreement demonstrators were out in Gaza expressing their habitual 
disapproval for the benefit of the cameras. But there is more than that 
profound despair amongst most Palestinians who believe that after two years 
of foot dragging president Netanyahu can't be trusted. (Channel 4 News, 23 
October 1998) 
It might be asked whether it is appropriate top use a term like 'extremist' if half 
the population supports such groups. The Channel Four journalist appears aware of 
this, when she adds that there is 'profound despair amongst most Palestinians who 
believe that after two years of foot dragging president Netanyahu can't be trusted' but 
this brief reference to the fact that scepticism to the peace process was widespread 
amongst Palestinians isn't developed. Many of the Palestinian grievances were not 
complicated or difficult to present. It viewed the Israeli settlement building programs, 
human rights abuses and the removal of the Palestinian population from East 
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Jerusalem as the opposite of what the Oslo process was supposed to achieve. Many 
Palestinians and some Israelis believed that the end of the Oslo process would not 
result in a viable sovereign Palestinian state but in the creation of Bantustans as used 
to exist in South Africa, a prediction that Hamas, Islamic Jihad the PFLP, and some 
Palestinian intellectuals, such as Edward Said, had made at the outset of the Oslo 
process in 1993 (see p. 113 -4). Shortly before the Wye Summit, Shlomo Ben-Ami, the 
Israeli historian and Ehud Barak's chief negotiator at the 2000 Camp David talks, 
wrote that 'in practice, the Oslo agreements were founded on a neo-colonialist basis, 
on a life of dependence of one on the other forever. ' The peace agreements were 
designed to impose on the Palestinians 'almost total dependence on Israel, ' creating 
4 an extended colonial situation. ' which is expected to be the 'permanent basis' for 'a 
situation of dependence. ' (Ben-Ami, 1998, cited in Carey, 2000: ). In this context 
journalists' descriptions of Palestinians who opposed what was occurring as 'devoted 
to wrecking the peace process' (BBC 1, evening news, 20 October 1998) or 'the 
enemies of peace' (BBC 1, lunchtime news, 24 October 1998) could sound 
incongruous. It highlights the lack of a critical informed edge in reporting, and the 
tendency ofjournalists to accept at face value the American perspective on the 
integrity of the peace process. Alternative perspectives which questioned both the 
legitimacy and trajectory of the peace process were not present in coverage. 
Sourcing and Reported Statements 
Here I was interested in ascertaining whether there was an equivalence in the level of 
coverage offered to Israeli and Palestinian sources, and whether journalists proffered 
the perspectives of all sides equally when they reported statements from the different 
parties. To do this I tallied up the total space given to direct and reported statements 
from both sides. Three lines of direct statements would look like this: 
Uzi Landau- Government MP: I believe that the minister has to halt these talks, go 
back home and make it clear to the Palestinians that we are prepared to negotiate with 
them but only on condition that they are negotiating really for peace above the table, 
and not standing behind terrorism under the table. 
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Whilst three lines of reported statements would look like this: 
Journalist: A spokesman for Mr. Netanyahu said that it really reinforced the need for 
Israel to get strong and complete guarantees both in word and deed from the 
Palestinian side that they could control terrorism and they could provide security on 
the West Bank. 
Figure 1. Lines of direct statements Provided by Israeli, Palestinian and American 
sources.. 
Figure 1. Lines of direct statements from different parties. 
BBC1 BBC2 ITV Channel 4 Channel 5 Total 
Israeli 18 4 9 11 13 55 
Palestinian 22 2 5 5 3 37 
American 37 7 13 8 3 68 
Overall Israeli sources were given fifty per cent more space than Palestinians, though 
both were eclipsed by American sources who were the most accessed particularly on 
the mass audience bulletins on BBC I and ITV. Since the American representatives 
tended to support the Israeli positions this served to reinforce the imbalance in Israel's 
favour. 
Figure 2. Reported statements from different parties 
BBC1 BBC2 ITV Channel 4 Channel 5 Total 
Israeli 26 4 5 5 5 45 
Palestinian 19 2 1 2 1 25 
American 9 7 0 6 0 23 
The reported statements shown in Figure 2 again show that Israeli statements are 
overall reported almost twice as much as statements by Palestinians, which are given 
approximately as much space as American ones. 
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'Terrorism' and Descriptions of Violence 
The choice of language is extremely important in indicating the social legitimacy, or 
lack of thereof , of different groups or positions. Terms used in conflicts, such as 
4soldier', 'rebel', 'militant', 'insurgent', 'freedom fighter', 'resistance fighter', 
ýguerrilla' and 'terrorist' all imply different levels of social legitimacy and are likely 
to have important consequences for how viewers see those involved. In coverage 
important differences were evident in the terms employed to describe Palestinians and 
Israelis. Israelis were described as 'soldiers', 'civilians', 'settlers', 'right wing 
settlers', 'hardliners' and on one occasion, during a Newsnight broadcast, 'nationalist 
bigots and ultra-religious fundamentalists'. Palestinians were described as 'terrorists', 
41slarnic terrorists', 'militants'. 'Islamic militants', 'zealots', and 'hardliners'. 
Journalists from all channels except Channel Four described the Palestinians fighters 
opposing the occupation as 'terrorists'. This trend was Particularly noticeable on the 
BBC: 
Yes even before this bomb attack this was always going to be the stumbling 
block the reluctance of Israel to pull out of the West Bank, the 13 percent that 
they are negotiating about until the Palestinian Authority can provide 
guarantees that they can control the terrorists and it seems that this is exactly 
the sort of thing that Israel is dreading this sort of attack (BBC 1, Lunchtime 
News, 19 October 1998) 
The Middle East peace talks are in deep trouble tonight after a Palestinian 
terrorist hurled two grenades into a bus queue in Israel. (BBC 1, Evening News 
19 October 1998) 
The Americans were frustrated that the Israelis were allowing that terror attack 
to shift the whole nature of these talks there were serious words between 
President Clinton and Benjamin Netanyahu about that last night. (BBC 1, Early 
evening, 20 October 1998) 
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The Israelis will withdraw troops from a further 13 percent of the West Bank. 
They'll also release hundreds of Palestinians from Israeli jails. In return the 
Palestinians will adopt a security plan to arrest terrorists and crack down on 
anti-Israeli violence. (BBC I, Evening News, 23 October 1998) 
The Middle East Peace talks are in serious difficulties tonight after a 
Palestinian terrorist hurled two grenades into a bus queue in Israel. (BBC2, 
Newsnight, 19 October 1998) 
A swap of more Palestinian land occupied by Israel since 1967 in return for 
tougher Palestinian measures against Islamic terrorists ... In 
both camps zealots 
will do their damndest to bring down the peace process as it continues to 
unfold. Islamic terrorists on the one side fighting what they call a holy war, 
nationalists bigots and ultra-religious fundamentalists in Israel's midst. 
(BBC2 Newsnight, 23 October 1998) 
Meanwhile Israeli officials have seized on this latest terrorist attack as support 
for the tough line Israel has so far taken at the peace summit in the United 
States. (19 October 198 8, ITV Lunchtime & Early Evening News) 
Last minute negotiations are taking place in Maryland in America this evening 
to hammer out the final details of a Middle East peace deal. Here are the main 
points of the proposed agreement. A 13 percent Israeli troop withdrawal from 
the West Bank. The release of 750 jailed Palestinians by the Israelis and a 
timetable for Palestinians to arrest suspected terrorists (ITV, Early Evening 
News 23 October 1998) 
The latest victims of the latest bloody effusion of Arab anger. Over 50 
wounded were rushed to hospital after a callous terrorist grenade attack upon a 
crowded bus station ... As the southern Israeli city of Beesheba reached its 
morning rush hour peak, a lone terrorist leapt from a car and hurled two hand 
grenades into the main bus station ... The atrocity has cast a long shadow over 
the latest Middle East peace talks half a world away in Maryland ... Bus 
stations have in the past been favourite targets for Hamas and other terror 
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groups opposed to deal making with Israel. (Channel 5, Lunchtime News, 19 
October 1998) 
Back in America President Clinton who has already spent 57 hours at the talks 
waits in Washinton, hoping to be called back to the talks if the two sides can 
conclude a deal on land and terrorism (Channel 5 Lunchtime News, 20 
October 1998) 
There are a number of problems with j ournalists using the label terrorist. Firstly it is 
so emotive that it can serve to demonise the accused to such an extent, that it can 
obscure both motives and possible resolutions. The conflict clearly has underlying 
political dimensions that have to be resolved if there is to be a settlement. However if 
journalists use words like 'terrorist' the danger is that these can be lost and the 
solution to the conflict get reduced to 'controlling the terrorists'. Amnesty 
International never use the words 'terrorism' or 'terrorist' in their literature (unless it 
is in inverted commas). Marie-Anne Ventoura an information officer for Amnesty 
International explained that this was partly because there was 'no internationally 
agreed definition of the term' (Email, 22 September 2004). She also claimed that 
Amnesty adopted the same reasoning as been taken by Ms Kalliopi Koufa, the Special 
Rapporteur of United Nations Sub Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, who noted in 2001 
that the issue of 'terrorism' has been 'approached from such different 
perspectives and in such different contexts that it has been impossible for the 
international community to arrive at a generally acceptable definition to this 
very day' The Special Rapporteur also points out that 'the term terrorism is 
emotive and highly loaded politically. It is habitually accompanied by an 
implicit negative judgement and is used selectively. ' The Special Rapporteur 
underscores the risk of mixing definitions with value judgements, which often 
leads commentators to qualify as 'terrorist' those acts they are opposed to, or 
to reject the use of the term when it relates to activities they support. (Email, 
22 September 2004) 
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Instead of using the words 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' Amnesty specify when 
international human rights law has been violated and by whom. This is also more 
impartial because it means that both state and non-state actors can be held to account 
without prejudice. This is perhaps a tactic thatjournalists could adopt. This points to 
another problem in that there is a certain double standard in the way that human rights 
violations are reported by the media. Whilstiournalists described Palestinian violence 
as 'terrorism'. Israeli 'security measures', at the this time being largely carried out by 
the Palestinian Authority were described in very euphemistic language. However 
many Palestinians regarded these measures as 'state terrorism' and some 
commentators and human rights groups suggested that the Wye Memorandum would 
make them worse: 
The most significant and innovative aspect of the Memorandum is its barely 
concealed call for state terror to achieve the goals of the US led program. That 
breaks new ground for international agreements. The memorandum emphasizes 
that the Palestinian security forces, which have a shocking record of torture and 
terror, must act to ensure the safety of Israelis. The CIA will supervise them as 
they carry out arrests, hold mock trials, collect arms, and 'criminalise' incitement 
against the agreements. (Chomsky, 1999: xvii) 
Chomsky points to an Amnesty International reports on a history of major human 
rights violations committed by security forces (both Palestinian and Israeli) during the 
Oslo process: 
Amnesty International published an assessment of the human rights situation 
since Oslo as the Wye Agreement was signed. Al estimates 1600 Palestinians 
routinely arrested by Israeli forces every year, half 'systematically tortured'. AI 
notes again as other major human rights organisations regularly have, that Israel 
is alone in having 'effectively legalised the use of torture' (with the Supreme 
Court's approval), determining that in pursuit of Israel's perceived needs 'all 
international rules of conduct could be broken' AI reports similar practices on the 
part of the Palestinian Authority, including execution of two Palestinians for 
'incitement against the peace process'. The State Security Courts which conduct 
such abuses have been endorsed by the US State Department as demonstrating 
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'Arafat's commitment to the security concerns of Israel' with the support of Al 
Gore. (1999: xvii) 
This appears to be a persistent feature of coverage. In their examination of 
coverage of the Intifada, some two years later, Philo and Berry (2004) also found that 
news media sometimes used very different language when describing the activities of 
the two parties. Whilst the killing of two Israeli soldiers by Palestinians was 
describing using emotive language such as 'lynch mob' and 'murder', Israel 
launching rocket attacks from helicopter gunships on crowds of demonstrators was 
reported as 'Israel still wielded a big stick' (BBC 1,18: 00,4 October 2000). Some 
print journalists have also accused the news media of using more euphemistic 
language when referring to Israeli behaviour. Robert Fisk writing in the Independent 
noted that when Israel captures Palestinian fighters they are often taken away by the 
army and killed (17 April 2002). He points out that j ournalists, who are well aware of 
what is occurring, often refer to these actions as 'mopping up' exercises. 
Another issue in relation to the use of language involved j ournalist's descriptions 
of the legal status of the West Bank and Gaza. In most instances journalists did 
describe the territories as being 'occupied'. However in three bulletins a BBC I 
reporter refers to the West Bank as being 'disputed' territory (BBC I Lunchtime, Early 
Evening & Evening News 19 October 1998). Channel Five journalists also referred to 
the territories as 'disputed' on two occasions (Channel 5 Evening News, 23 October 
1998 & 24 October 1998). The distinction here is important, 'disputed' territory 
implies that the legal ownership of the West bank and Gaza strip is unclear, whilst 
'occupied' indicates that the territory is Palestinian and the Israeli presence there is 
illegal. This seems strange since the official British government position (like almost 
all other governments) is that the territories are 'occupied', not 'disputed'. 
This content analysis has pointed to a situation where j ournalists seem able to more 
easily present the Israeli perspective on most aspects of the conflict than the 
Palestinian perspective. In the next chapter I will examine why this might be so. 
175 
Chapter 4 
Productions Factors in the Reporting of the Israel-Palestine Conflict 
Years of experience have taught me that one should never venture an opinion, 
favourable or unfavourable, on events concerned in any way with Israel. Any attempt 
at a detached view opens the wayfor letters, telegrams, personal exasperations and, 
above all, telephone calls on what the late Sir Lewis Namier called 'the terror by 
telephone. ' The only safe course is never, never, never to have any opinion 
whatsoever on the Middle East. 
AJP Taylor, London Review ofBooks, 17 November 1982. 
Here I will relate the theoretical issues discussed in chapter one to the specific 
problems encountered by j ournalists reporting on the conflict. 
Time Constraints, New Technologies and Commercial Pressures 
Journalists operate in a commercial and highly competitive environment in which 
there are time constraints, which can make it a challenge to provide the necessary 
level of context or historical background. This is made all the more difficult for 
journalists when they are dealing with an area like the Israel-Palestine conflict which 
is uniquely controversial. Journalists have commented that it a challenge to provide 
context and background when time is short, and the historical record is fiercely 
contested by the different Parties. The Channel 4j oumalist Lindsey Hilsum has 
suggested that: 
There are two problems ... how far back do you go is one and the other is with 
a conflict like this, nearly every single fact is disputed ... I think, I Oh God the 
Palestinians say this and the Israelis say that' and I have to, as a journalist- 
make a judgement and I say this is what happened and it's quite clear and 
there are other things where I wasn't there and I didn't see it with my own 
eyes. I know it's a question of interpretation so I have to say what both sides 
think and I think sometimes that stops us from giving the background we 
should be giving, because I think well, bloody hell, I've only three minutes to 
do this piece in and I'm going to spent a minute going through the arguments. 
(cited in Philo & Berry, 2004: 245) 
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The emergence of new technologies and television formats also seems to have 
had important repercussions. The proliferation of new digital channels and in 
particular the arrival of 24 hour news channels have been cited as important changes 
affecting the way journalistic operate. Some have argued that the proliferation of new 
channels have meant that j ournalists now spread themselves more thinly, further 
reducing the time available for researching stories and providing context: 
Part of the problem is just the way the news medium works nowadays - where 
you are geared up to having constant twenty-four hour news and you get the 
feeling that some of the journalists on the spot are spending more time in front 
of a camera because they have to do fifteen different TV news programmes 
and four different radio programmes, than they are actually finding out what's 
happening in the story, and that means we do not get as much analysis, as 
much colour, as much depth in what's going on. You get moment by moment 
repetition. (Photographer, cited in Philo & Berry, 2004: 244) 
Others have suggested that the advent of 24 hour news has meant that 
controversial views can be shunted to the margins of programme schedules where 
they are unlikely to reach many viewers. The former BBC correspondent Tim 
Llewelyn has suggested that the BBC has marginalized the Palestinian perspective in 
this manner: 
The BBC can banish the awkward squads who might raise (or answer) real 
questions about the Middle East to the watches that end the night. Critics who 
say that the Palestinian or Arab view has not be aired can be referred to the 
World Service at 3.00am, or News 24 at 6: 00am, and so on. (Llewelyn, 2004: 
227) 
Others have pointed to how the progressive relaxation of media regulation 
over the last two decades has affected the climate journalists operate in. Greg 
Lanning, an experienced documentary producer, has argued that such regulatory 
changes have led to the creation of a more competitive and rating driven broadcast 
culture, and that extended into all aspects of the schedule including news, current 
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affairs and documentaries. Lanning maintains that even the BBC, which is supposed 
to be isolated from such commercial strictures, was under pressure to maintain at least 
a 30 percent audience share in order to justify the licence fee, and this inevitably led 
programmers to seek material that was immediate and dramatic, at the expense of 
providing context or analysis. Lanning also pointed to the effects of new media 
monitoring technologies which allow broadcasters to ascertain the exact point in 
programmes when viewers switch channels: 
We are coming under tremendous pressure to make the first five minutes of 
programmes quick, irresistible ... We always used to have hooks but now you 
can't let the pace drop until you are well into the programme because they are 
really scared that people will change channel. You should ask Channel 4 to 
show you their meters. They can tell you where people leave the programme 
and where they go, and they do that for every program now. So they can tell 
you that after 90 seconds you mentioned the Bosnian war and everyone went 
to Delia Smith or something. That's what is driving it [programme production] 
(Interview, Greg Lanning, 2 November 1999) 
The BBC's George Alagiah has also spoken of the effects that such monitoring 
equipment has had at the Corporation's news service. Alagiah claims that according 
to the BBC's meters, approximately three million viewers change channel during the 
first minute of BBC I's early evening bulletin. This he suggests is why editors are 
4constantly' telling journalists that 'the attention span of our average viewer is about 
twenty seconds' and that broadcasters must seek to 'grab' them with arresting 
material (cited in Philo & Berry, 2004: 211). This in part explains the tendency for 
broadcasters to emphasise the dramatic at the expense of the analytical. 
Cultural Preference, Sourciniz and Public Relations 
Most international journalists covering the Israel-Palestine conflict are stationed in 
West Jerusalem and have close links with the Israeli public relations machine. In 
contrast, there are very few j ournalists stationed in the occupied territories. Tim 
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Llewelyn suggests that makes it more difficult for reporters to understand the reality 
of military occupation and hence the Palestinian perspective: 
The news people should move people out of West Jerusalem. It should base a 
news team in the West Bank- not just some luckless stringer but a senior, 
known correspondent who can force his or her way onto the main bulletins 
(what the BBC likes to call a 'brand' reporter). Here the reporters will get to 
feel what daily life under occupation is like, live it and empathise with the 
people crushed under it, as news crews lived the invasion of Baghdad or as we 
experienced the Israeli invasions and occupation of Lebanon- from the inside, 
not just down there on a visit. (2004: 229-23 0) 
He also argues that the inability of journalists to cover the Palestinian 
perspective is partly a function of a cultural preference in that Israelis are seen as 
closer culturally to Europeans, and partly because state actors with their attendant 
prestige and trappings are seen as more important and credible sources than the 
spokespersons of what is still a resistance movement: 
To a westerner sitting at a screen in London a dead or suffering Arab in the 
rubble of a bazaar is more remote than a dead or suffering Israeli in a shopping 
mall with a Wal-Mart in shot; studios favour good English-speakers rather 
than men with heavy accents; producers like quality sound and vision. It is a 
presenter's inclination, in many cases, to take more seriously a representative 
of a state and an authority, a uniform or a dark suit, than a denizen of what is, 
after all, not quite a state but still a national revolutionary and resistance 
movement, a man perhaps in a keffiyeh or a militia uniform, speaking in poor 
English or being translated or subtitled. (2004: 229) 
A current senior BBC executive has also suggested that cultural preference plays a 
strong role in how 'London-based British j ournalists who are not themselves Middle 
East specialists' see the conflict. Their 'mind-set' he suggested could be: 
Summed up like this: (i) Israel is a liberal democracy, like the UK, with a free 
press, freedom of speech and frequent elections in which governments are 
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defeated; (ii) the Palestinians say their want their own state, they were offered 
it at Camp David and rejected it; (iii) throwing stones at tanks is one thing, but 
suicide bombs on buses and in cafes is something else and places them beyond 
the pale. (Letter, 9 July 2004) 
Some might question the characterisation of Israel as a 'liberal democracy like the 
UK' in light of reports produced by human rights groups and the United Nations. It is 
also interesting that the executive claims that j ournalists were likely to blame the 
Palestinians for not accepting what was offered at Camp David. The events of Camp 
David are highly contested (see Philo & Berry, 2004: 83-86), but London based 
journalists, according to the BBC executive, appeared far more likely to accept the 
Israeli perspective. Similarly the perspective on the use of violence is revealing. 
Human rights groups have pointed to serious breaches of international law (including 
war crimes and crimes against humanity) committed by both sides in the conflict but 
it seems that violence committed by Palestinians is viewed in a different light than 
that committed by Israelis. 
Israel also appears to have a most more developed public relations operation. 
A number of journalists have commented on the professionalism and effectiveness of 
the Israeli PR machine. Jim Hollander, chief photographer for Reuters in Jerusalem 
has remarked on how 'savvy' Israeli officials are in getting their side of the story 
across to the foreign press corps: 'The Israeli officials are very literate and very 
professional in presenting their points of view and availing themselves to the media' 
(cited in el-Nawawy & Kelly, 2001: 102). Some journalists have also commented that 
the Israeli PR machine operated by the Netanyahu administration was especially 
forceful in getting its views across. Lyse Doucet, a Canadian reporter for the BBC, 
notes that the Israeli public relations machine is unrivalled in the Middle East and that 
Binyamin Netanyahu, whose background is in PR, is the 'ultimate spin-doctor' (cited 
in el-Nawawy & Kelly, 2001: 102). Likewise, Nicolas Tatro, the bureau chief for 
Associated Press in Jerusalem, has commented that: 
Each Israeli government is different; they all flood us with information, but 
this current government [the Netanyahu administration] has been more 
aggressive in presenting its point of view. It very much has an edge to it. The 
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rhetorical factor is much higher than it has been since the early days of the 
Begin govenunent. (cited in el-Nawawy & Kelly, 2001: 102) 
This proactive approach involving 'flooding' journalists with infonnation 
emphasising your perspective, is not matched by anything comparable on the 
Palestinian side. Edward Said claims that during the Al-Aqsa intifada the Israeli 
public relations operation was employing numerous proactive strategies to get the 
Israeli message across, helped by many pro-Israel supporters in publishing and the 
wider media: 
Never have the media been so influential in determining the course of war as 
during the Al-Aqsa Intifada ... Israel has already poured hundreds of millions of 
dollars into what in Hebrew is called hasbara, or information for the outside 
world (hence, propaganda). This has included ... lunches and free trips for 
influential journalists ... bombarding congressmen- and women with invitations 
and visits; pamphlets and most important, money for election campaigns; 
directing (or, as the case requires harassing) photographers of the current 
intifada into producing certain images and not others ... training commentators 
to make frequent references to the Holocaust and Israel's predicament today; 
many advertisements in the newspapers attacking Arabs and praising 
Israel ... Because so many powerful people in the media and publishing 
business are strong supporters of Israel, the task is made vastly easier. (Said, 
2001) 
The Independent's journalist Robert Fisk has also commented on how the 
proactive approach involving a constant flow of information from PR professionals to 
journalists can help to set news agendas: 
The journalists' narrative of events is built around the last thing someone has 
said and the last thing, given the constraints of time and the rolling news 
machine, that they have heard on the agency wire. So what you would find on 
television in the last few weeks is that every time an Israeli statement was 
made, it was pushed across at the Palestinians. So the Israelis would say: 'Can 
Arafat control the violence? ' and instead of the television reporters saying: 
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'Well that's interesting, but can the Israelis control their own People? ' the 
question was simply taken up as an Israeli question and became part of the 
news agenda. There seemed to be no real understanding that the job of the 
reporter is to analyse what's really happening, not simply to pick up on the 
rolling news machine, the last statement by one of the sides. And given the 
fact that the Israelis have a very smooth machine operating for the media, 
invariably what happened is, it was Israel's voice that came across through the 
mouths of the reporters, rather than [having] people who were really making 
enquiries into both sides and what both people were doing. (The Message 
BBC Radio Four, 20 October 2000, cited in Philo & Berry, 2004: 247) 
In Britain the Israeli embassy has been a significant player in setting the media 
agenda. The Independent has reported that the 'Israeli embassy in London has 
mounted a huge drive to influence the British media', and cited comments from the 
embassy's press secretary that 
London is a world centre of media and the embassy here works night and day 
to influence that media. And in many subtle ways, I think we don't do a half 
bad job, if I may say so ... We have newspapers that write consistently in a 
manner that supports and understands Israel's situation and its challenges. And 
we have had influence on the BBC as well. (Independent, 21 September 2001, 
cited in Philo & Berry, 2004: 248) 
In contrast some Zionists have argued that there are problems with Israeli public 
relations. For instance Joy Wolfe of the Women's International Zionist Organisation 
has commented on the 'inexperience' of representatives from the IDF who have 'very 
poor communications equipment and not even a proper speaking English translator 
who can put out a decent press release' (cited in Philo & Berry, 2004: 246). However 
most commentators suggest that that the Israelis are far more skilled in this 
department than the Palestinians. A number of j ournalists have commented that the 
Palestinian public relations apparatus is amateurish and confused in comparison to the 
Israeli operation. A US journalist who ran a Jerusalem based news agency commented 
that: 
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Palestinian spokesmen are their own worst enemy. They often come across as 
boorish, the message is often incoherent. Official Palestine does have a 
method problem. They miss the essential points. Arafat is a one man show,, 
he is almost always incoherent. (cited in Philo & Berry, 2004: 246) 
Palestinian public relations also suffers from the disadvantage that the Israeli 
perspective is far more easily accessible through the English language versions of the 
Israeli press, whilst little of the Arab press is available in English. As Dr Toine Van 
Teeffelen, a Dutch human rights worker who lives in Bethlehem notes: 
Arab newspapers appear only in Arabic while some major Israeli newspapers 
(Jerusalem Post, Raaretz) appear in English, thus allowing for a daily stream 
of Israeli-oriented reports and analyses easily accessible through the internet. 
In fact, most westernjoumalists are more familiar with the realities of 
occupation through the critical accounts of the Israeli Haaretz journalists 
Amira Hass and Gideon Levi than through accounts from the Palestinian or 
Arab press. (Van Teeffelen, 2003) 
Other J oumalists have argued that the lack of a Palestinian perspective is not 
just a function of poor Palestinian public relations, but is also related to an 
unwillingness on the part of some broadcasters to prominently feature some of the 
more articulate Arab spokespersons: 
The BBC has been plied with list of suitable people by organisations such as 
the Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding, the Arab 
League, individual embassies and private people, only for these lists to be 
ignored. Whether this is through inefficiency or deliberation, it is hard to say. I 
do know for example that the Ambassador for the Arab League 
had, between 
January 2003 and the end of the Iraq war in early April, appeared once on 
BBC TV; a colleague of mine who is one of Britain's most articulate and 
intelligent Palestinian spokespersons is missing almost completely 
from 
mainstream BBC television and rarely heard on 
domestic radio. (Llewelyn, 
2004: 224-5) 
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There does seem to be some evidence that Israeli public relations did set the 
media agenda, in the manner described by Fisk above, during the coverage of the Wye 
Accords. As already noted, there were essentially two explanations about why the 
peace process was stalled. The Netanyahu administration argued that the central 
problem was that the Palestinians wouldn't control the 'terrorists' and disarm 
Palestinians. The Palestinian position was that the peace process was being 
manipulated so as to allow the Israelis to take more land, build more settlements, and 
effectively re-package rather than end the military occupation. Whilst the official 
Israeli perspective was featured extensively in reported statements, the Palestinian 
view was largely absent. 
Pressure, Intimidation and Accusations of Anti-Semitism 
In chapter one I discussed work by Mayhew and Adams which suggested that 
the BBC was under intense pressure from Israeli officials and lobby groups during the 
1970s. Journalists have suggested that thirty years later little has changed. The BBC 
bureau chief in Jerusalem, Andrew Steele, has spoken of the extensive monitoring 
capabilities of the official Israeli public relations operation and the pressure this can 
create: 
We fairly regularly get an official summons from one side or the other to 
explain our actions. I would say the frequency is higher on the Israeli side, but 
that possibly is a reflection on the size and sophistication of their publicity 
machine. They are able to monitor every single word that we say- someone 
sits at the Israeli Foreign ministry watching BBC World 24 hours a day. If 
they ever have an issue about a story, they have a taped transcript of what we 
said and they can quote it back verbatim. They are completely open about this 
and even give tours of their monitoring facility. One person watches Sky 
News, another CNN and another the BBC [the three international 24-hour 
news channels broadcast in Israel]. We are very aware of the pressure. 
(Palestine-Israel Journal ofPolitics, Economics and Culture, 2003, vol. 10,2) 
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Sometimes the pressure can involve attempts to have journalists removed if 
they produce critical coverage or fail to report stories which the Israeli press office 
wants covered. In April 2004 Chris McGreal reported on a letter sent by Natan 
Sharansky, Israel's minister for Diaspora affairs to the BBC accusing Orla Guerlin of 
anti-Semitism and 'total identification with the goals and methods of the Palestinian 
terror groups' for questioning Israeli motives in their handling of a 16 year old would 
be suicide bomber. He noted that this came at a time when a number of foreign news 
bureaus had complained about pressure from the Israeli press office: 
The letter comes as several foreign news organisations complain of increasing 
government pressure to curtail critical coverage or to report stories Israel 
believes help identify the Palestinian conflict with global Islamist terrorism. 
Officials have presented editors with dossiers on individual reporters and 
singled out organisations such as Sky News for allegedly having an anti-Israel 
agenda. The Tel Aviv press has called for the expulsion of correspondents 
from Sky, the Times and several French papers for failing to cover a story the 
government mobilised embassies worldwide to get into the media last month. 
(Guardian, I April 2004) 
McGreal also reported that 'CNN sources say the network has bowed to 
considerable pressure on its editors' and that 'Israeli officials boast that they now 
have only to call a number at the network's headquarters in Atlanta to pull any story 
they do not like'. This accusation was later denied by CNN. The BBC bureau chief in 
Jerusalem, Andrew Steele has also spoken of the pressure that the corporation is under 
from organised lobby groups: 
The pressure is enormous. And not just from our audiences in the UK. 
Because the BBC is broadcast in Israel, the West Bank, Gaza and everywhere 
else, every pressure group in the world is on our case. I have never had as 
many emails as I get here. People don't just phone up to complain, they know 
how to get their complaint noticed in a way that means we actually have to 
address it, which is incredibly time-consuming. (Palestine-Israel Journal of 
Politics, Economics and Culture, 2003, vol. 10,2) 
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In the United Kingdom there also exist a number of well resourced lobby 
groups who attempt to influence the media agenda. The Britain Israel 
Communications and Research Centre (BICOM) is one of the most prominent lobby 
groups working in the United Kingdom. In its mission statement the organisation says 
that its objective is 'to bring about a significant shift in opinion in favour of Israel 
amongst the general public, opinion-formers and the Jewish community'. To achieve 
this the organisation engages in numerous activities including 'operating a fully 
functioning media centre, providing real-time briefings and high quality in-depth 
research, publishing daily and weekly briefing of media coverage on Israel with 
analysis, and organising and delivering visitor programs for key politicians, 
academics and journalists' (BICOM website). In October 2002 Stephen Bates 
reported that BICOM had hired both Stanley Greenberg, former pollster and advisor 
to Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and Ehud Barak, and Frank Lunz, former advisor to 
George Bush, Silvio Berlusconi, and Rudy Giuliani (The Guardian, 12 October 
2002). The report cited comments from Lee Petar, the acting director of BICOM, that 
4we are looking at ways to sharpen the message and to choose the right people to do 
it. To get the world's best professionals - and these are the world's best professionals - 
you have to pay the top price. ' 
All of Britain's three major political parties also have internal pro-Israel lobby 
groups. The Labour Friends of Israel (LFI) claims to be 'one of the largest interest 
groups within the Labour party' that can call on 'wide support from MPs, MEN and 
Peers' (LFI website). There is also the affiliated Trade Union Friends of Israel (TUFI) 
which arranges trips to Israel for trade union delegates. The organisation claims that 
its 'packed annual lunches at the TUC congress' were able to attract 'over 200 people 
and leaders of the largest trade unions and in particular TUC General Secretary John 
Monks' in 1997 (TUFI website). The Conservative Friends of Israel (CFI) claim to 
have the support of many MPs including senior cabinet members, and argues that 
'much of the reason for this is due to the diplomatic and behind the scenes operation 
of CFI. ' The CFI organises many events at each year at the Houses of Parliament 
involving j ournalists, Peers, MPs and visiting dignitaries from Israel. The Observer 
reported that 'for those working for organisations perceived as being biased against 
Israel these can be uncomfortable affairs'. Members of these lobby groups frequently 
claim that the media is biased against Israel. For instance the Conservative MP Gillian 
Shephard has argued that: 
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Let's not suggest that Israel feels under siege. And it literally is. That is what 
drives the feeling of ultra-sensitivity. They feel that there is a bias and there is 
a conspiracy against them. There is a perception that Israelis are portrayed as 
instigating the problems and that the historical context of the threat against 
them is forgotten. There is a feeling too that Israel- which is a tiny island of 
democracy amid much less democratic neighbours- never gets enough credit 
for what it has achieved. (Observer, 17 June 200 1, cited in Philo & Berry, 
2004: 250) 
Others go further and claim that the media itself is anti-Semetic. The Daily 
Mail columnist Melanie Phillips has repeatedly levelled this charge against the British 
media: 
Coverage of Israel is obsessive and disproportionate, and marked by a hysteria 
and malice not applied to any other conflict. And it cannot be divorced from 
the overt Jew-hatred that has now surfaced in Britain and Europe, particularly 
the give-away calumny of world Jewish power. The claim that Jews conspire 
to dominate the world is one of the oldest tropes of classic Jew-hatred. 
Astonishingly, claims made by the European Left are not far removed. It 
repeats claims that the 'powerful Jewish lobby' is now running American 
foreign policy. (The Observer 22 February 2004) 
Tim Llewelyn. has suggested that the BBC is particularly sensitive to 
accusations of anti-Semitism, and would rather avoid having to answer the charge. 
The pressure from lobby groups, he maintains has led the corporation to tone down 
any criticism and avoid using terms like 'ethnic cleansing' which could generate 
pressure: 
They [the BBC] know that in the case of Israel the use of the term ethnic 
cleansing would bring down hell on their heads and the BBC are extremely 
nervous about Israel. They have a big bureau there, they've been threatened 
already by the Israelis with being turfed out. They're under constant pressure, 
the phones ring all the time, the Israeli lobby here know exactly who to ring 
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and how to pester, how to persist and who to get at and of course people in 
positions like that, executives in public service corporations like the BBC are 
extremely nervous they don't like this and they don't want to be accused of 
anti-semitism however false the charge may be ... and so they play it safe they 
play it carefully. They are public servants and that's the way they respond. 
(Interview, 16 April 2004) 
Journalists have also been personally targeted for abuse by lobby groups. 
Some have spoken of the hate mail they receive, after they have written stories, 
questioning Israeli policy. It has also been suggested that the quantity of hate mail 
received by j oumalists has increased greatly with the advent of electronic mail. The 
Guardian's reader's editor Ian Mayes has commented on the rise of the 'electronic 
lobby' and noted how organised email campaigns 'can mean two or three hundred 
organised emails piling into a queue in the paper in the space of a few hours and 
threatening to clog up the works. ' (Guardian, 31 March 2001). He suggests these 
organised campaigns 'are perceived by most of those on the receiving end, not as the 
bearers of reasonable argument but as bullying and inhibiting to real debate. ' Mayes 
points out that although there is an organised pro-Arab or pro-Palestinian lobby it 'is 
not on anything like such a large scale' as the pro-Israel operation. The Independent 
journalist Robert Fisk has also spoken of the hate mail addressed to both himself and 
the newspaper: 
The Independent's web-site received an e-mail suggesting that I was a 
paedophile. Among several vicious Christmas cards was one bearing the 
legend of the 12 Days of Christmas and the following note inside: 'Robert 
Fiske (sic) - aka Lord Haw Haw of the Middle East and a leading anti-semite 
& proto-fascist Islamophile propagandist. Here's hoping 2002 finds you deep 
in Gehenna (Hell), Osama bin Laden on your right, Mullah Omar on your left. 
Yours, Ishmael Zetin. '... Almost anyone who criticises US or Israeli policy in 
the Middle East is now in this free-fire zone. My own colleague in Jerusalem, 
Phil Reeves, is one of them. So are two of the BBCs'reporters in Israel, along 
with Suzanne Goldenberg of the Guardian. (Independent 14 May 2002) 
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In these campaigns Jews who criticise Israel appear to have been subjected to 
particular abuse. In early 2004 Brian Whitaker reported on the case of Deborah Fink, 
a singer and music teacher living in London. Fink, who was a member of Just Peace 
UK, a predominately Jewish group which campaigns for an end to the Israeli 
occupation and the creation of an independent Palestinian state, had organised an 
alternative Christmas carol concert in which traditional carols were sung with new 
words, some questioning the occupation. There followed a 'deluge of hateful emails': 
One came from a rabbi in New York, informing her: 'Your soul, my dear, is 
petrified and lost. ' Another said, menacingly: 'Hitler killed the wrong Jews. ' 
Yet another - ostensibly from a Jewish doctor of medicine in the US - 
elaborated on the Holocaust theme. 'Too bad Hitler didn't get your farnily, ' it 
said. 'With six million Jews dieing [sic] 60 year [sic] ago it's a shame scum 
like you somehow managed to survive. ' (Guardian, 19 January 2004) 
Many of the letter writing campaigns are organised via the internet by activists. One 
organisation honestreporting. com, which claims to have 12,000 subscribers, has 
claimed that its letter writing campaigns have directly influenced newspaper 
coverage. After the Evening Standard art critic Brian Sewell had written an article 
calling on Israel to 'become a multicultural society' and stop using the Holocaust to 
justify unacceptable behaviour, honestreporting. com mounted a campaign. 'The next 
day, [we] sent out a letter to subscribers. ' Standard articles recorded 'a wave of 
complaints... hundreds of Jewish readers have written in'. Then 'after more pressure' 
there followed a pro-Israel article by Simon Sebag-Montefiore. 'This is an example of 
what we can do. ' (cited by David Leigh in the Guardian, 22 February 200 1). Other 
attempts to influence the media agenda have been carried out in a more subtle 
manner. David Hirst has written of the Middle East Media Research Institute (Memri) 
which distributes its Arab and Jewish translations from the Middle East to thousands 
ofjournalists, diplomats, politicians and activists. The organisation which presents 
itself as an impartial translation service is run by Colonel Yigal Carmon, a former 
advisor on terrorism to two former Israeli prime ministers, and half Memri's staff are 
former Israeli intelligence agents. Hirst notes that Memri is highly selective in its 
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choice of translations choosing the most 'rabid and outrageous' anti-western and anti- 
semetic, statements from Arab speakers. Hirst claims that that Memri never produces 
translations of extreme statements from fundamentalist Jewish groups and that 'its 
tendentious choice of material casts the Arab world in a much worse light than that 
discourse taken as a whole could reasonably justify' (2003: 77). 
Press Coverage 
Many studies examining the operation of broadcast news organisations have 
noted that much news gathering is not proactive but structured around various pre- 
determined routines. For instance all news organisations utilise what is know as a 
cnews diary' where significant future events such as state visits, elections, legislation, 
and the release of official reports are pre-logged and anticipated. Similarly what 
appears in the broadsheet press is also important in determining the content of 
television news. If a story or perspective is reported in the broadsheets it acts as a 
marker highlighting it as a potential area of coverage for television news. It also 
imparts the story or perspective with a sense of legitimacy and credibility. If it has 
been reported in the broadsheets it becomes a story 'worth covering'. Conversely if a 
story or perspective has not been covered by the broadsheet press, it may be more 
difficult for aj ournalist to convince his editor that it is a legitimate piece of news. As 
the Glasgow Media Group have noted: 
Two other key factors in routine journalistic practice are the general reliance 
on the press to define the parameters of an 'acceptable' story plus the reliance 
on news services such the Press Association to supply a large amount of basic 
news material. Journalists in television news to whom we spoke complained of 
the difficulties of initiating news stories unless something like them had 
already appeared in the press. Attempts by j ourrialists to initiate new themes 
were met by the question, 'where are the press cuttings on this? ' (Glasgow 
Media Group, 1985: 2) 
There have been claims in the media that the two highest circulation British 
broadsheets employ editorial policies which are strongly supportive of Israel, and that 
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journalists have been discouraged from airing the Palestinian perspective. In 
September 2001 Sam Kiley aj ournalist at The Times resigned from the publication, 
claiming that his reports had been subject to pro-Israeli censorship. In an interview in 
the Evening Standard he pointed to the friendship between Rupert Murdoch and Ariel 
Sharon and the press baron's extensive investments in Israel. He maintained that this 
led executives to rewrite copy so as to be favourable to Israel: 
The Times foreign editor and other middle managers flew into hysterical terror 
every time a pro-Israel lobbying group wrote in with a quibble or complaint 
and then usually took their side against their own correspondent (cited in The 
Guardian, 5 September 2001) 
He also claimed that he was told 'not to refer to 'assassinations' of Israel's 
opponents, nor to 'extra-j udicial killings or executions'. On one occasion when he 
interviewed an Israeli army unit responsible for killing a 12 year old Palestinian boy, 
he claimed that he was told to file the report without mentioning the dead boy. He 
concluded that 'no pro-Israel lobbyist ever dreamed of having such power over a great 
national newspaper'. 
Similar claims have been made in relation to Britain's highest circulation 
broadsheet, The Daily Telegraph. In a letter to the Spectator, three writers from 
Conrad Black's Telegraph group argued that Mr Black's strong pro-Israeli views 
made it impossible for any journalist to cover the Palestinian perspective (cited in the 
Guardian, 16/3/2001). They pointed to a strongly worded attack by Black on a 
Spectator j ournalist who had criticised Israel, as well as a blanket condemnation of 
the Independent, Guardian and BBC, who according to Black were guilty of 
propagating pro-Palestinian propaganda. The writers argued that such attacks made it 
difficult for editors or j ournalists on his publications to air opposing views. 
Lack of Specialist Knowledge 
To produce critical informed journalism requires journalists with a deep 
knowledge of the issues they are writing about. However in an area such as the 
Israeli-Palestine conflict, which is complicated and contested, it has been suggested 
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by a senior BBC executive that many of the Corporation's London based j oumalists 
may lack a firm grounding in the history of the conflict, and that this can adversely 
affect coverage: 
My hunch is that you would find that many of the words, phrases, etc that 
reflect either ignorance or lack of balance were written in London, rather than 
by correspondents in the field. It might be an interesting exercise one day to 
seek to analyse the historical knowledge and understanding of TV newsroom 
writers and sub-editors, which I fear may not always be much greater than that 
of the viewers in your focus groups. On a matter of weeks ago, a senior BBC 
programme editor asked me if I could recommend a good Middle East history 
book, as how felt he had an inadequate grasp of the issues and background. 
(Letter, 9 July 2004) 
This certainly seems to back up the comments made by Kevin Williams in 
chapter one concerning the need for j ournalist training to incorporate in its remit some 
knowledge of world politics and history. If senior editors are worried about their grasp 
of one of the most covered stories in international news, this is likely to present 
problems. 
Britain's 'SDecial RelationshiD' with the United States 
Though it is sometimes argued that the Foreign Office is more pro-Arab than Israeli, 
the close political, economic and diplomatic links between the US and Britain, often 
referred to as 'the special relationship', are likely to have an effect on how j ournalists 
report the conflict. There was little in the coverage of the Wye Accords about the 
more controversial aspects of America's role in the conflict, such as its financing and 
diplomatic support for settlement building in the occupied territories. There was also 
no information about its supply of weaponry to Israel, much of which is provided free 
of charge. More recent research examining news coverage of the Al-Aqsa intifada 
also found that journalists tended to avoid discussing the more controversial aspects 
of America's role in the conflict (Philo & Berry, 2004). This appeared to leave 
viewers confused about motives. For instance, few understood that Palestinians might 
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be hostile to American involvement, because the US supplies Israel with weapons. 
Philo and Berry also found that 'even those people who were concerned about how 
much explanation could be included in news programmes said that this was 'the least' 
they should be told (2004: 211). 
So why do journalists avoid discussing the 'American connection'9 Previous 
research suggests that the tone of BBC journalism is partly shaped by pressures 
filtering in from senior politicians. In his ethnography of BBC news gathering in the 
1970s Philip Schlesinger (1978) examined how the Corporation's news output was 
ideologically tuned to conform to British foreign policy, through the editorial system 
and the vetting of personnel. The corporation, which had always had close links with 
M15, employed an ex-army officer Ronnie Stonham, whose task was to weed out 
journalists with 'subversive' views who were then blacklisted. The vetting process 
was conducted in strict secrecy with no right of appeal (see also 'Revealed how M15 
vets BBC staff, The Observer 18 August 1985). Schlesinger also revealed how the 
minutes of meetings involving senior editors and the Director General demonstrated 
the pressures feeding into the top BBC hierarchy from politicians and organised lobby 
groups. Decisions taken in response to these pressures were then diffused downwards 
through the editorial system. Schlesinger notes that this top-down system of control is 
rarely perceived in this way by j ournalists because of a desire to maintain an image of 
autonomy and because decisions taken by upper management become taken up as 
personal decisions by those lower down the hierarchy. Coverage of certain 'sensitive' 
areas such Northern Ireland or official secrets were delegated to senior sub-editors 
who had shown conformity and could be trusted as a 'safe pair of hands'. In contrast 
those who took controversial positions such as a sub-editor 'who had insisted on 
damning the American presence in Vietnam' were subject to a range of official or 
unofficial sanctions (1978: 15 1). 
Tim Llewelyn suggests that the BBC will have picked up on New Labour's 
attitude towards the conflict, and shaped the 'tone of its correspondents' and 
reporters' coverage, and its presenters' and producers' attitudes accordingly: very 
cautiously, in lockstep as close as can be with the government and the policymakers at 
No. 10 Downing Street' (2004: 228) 
It is no secret that Blair is very close to Israel. His old crony and party 
financier, Lord Levy, has been rewarded with the post of special adviser on 
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Middle East matters. Lord Levy is a peer who has close contacts with Israel 
and a multi-million pound villa near Tel Aviv- his son David Levy worked in 
the office of Israel's former Justice Minister Yossi Beilin... The Blair vision 
of the Middle East- that the Americans have all the answers, but need a little 
gentle coaxing from Whitehall, that the Israelis are victims of terror, and 
'terror' is our main universal enemy, that the Palestinians are their own worst 
enemies and must do what they are told- will have been sensed at the BBC and 
passed on down the line ... The process of getting the boys in the front-line into 
line does not work by diktat from above but by hint and nudge and whispered 
word, almost, in such a very English way by extra-sensory perception (2004: 
225-226) 
The pressures that I have highlighted in this chapter have not created a situation where 
no criticism of Israel is possible in the media. Critical documentaries such as Channel 
Four's The Killing Zone (19 May 2004) and BBC's reports on Israel's nuclear 
weapons (Correspondent, 17 March 2003) and the Sabra and Shatilla killings 
(Panorama June 17,2001) continue to be made and broadcast. However the complex 
mixture of economic, political and cultural factors indicated above do help to explain 
why journalists tend to find it easier to present the Israeli perspective. 
194 
Chapter 5 Conclusions 
Six months after the start of the September 2000 al-Aqsa intifada Harpers magazine 
featured an article examining the public relations strategy employed by the Israelis. 
The piece featured comments from the Israeli government spokesperson Nachman 
Shai and Danny Yatom, the national security advisor under Ehud Barak. The title of 
the article was 'Fighting the Media War' and in it Shai commented that: 
Prior to the Shann el-Sheikh summit I put together a committee of ten to 
twenty Israelis to Plot our media strategy in the United States. And I told 
them: we are losing the media battle and it is our job to put each of you on 
television to call the Palestinians liars. We have to win the media war to win 
the larger war. We designated one week for planning, rebutting the Palestinian 
position, and giving assignments to people. These were the top people - Itamar 
Rabinovich, Peres's top aides, former Rabin people, you name it - and we 
gave out assignments. Our purpose was to turn around American public 
opinion. We were very fortunate, because we aimed at putting our strategy 
into effect at Sharm el-Sheikh. And we succeeded, but like I said we were 
lucky. There were no Palestinian media people at Sharm el-Sheikh, and so we 
had the American media to ourselves. We gave interview after interview and 
they [the Palestinians] were very under-staffed. We should not underestimate 
our victory, in many ways, the media war will decide who is wrong and who is 
right in this struggle, and we must convince people that we are right. We have 
some major problems with the American media. There are many media outlets 
that understand our position, but there are others that are completely against 
us. We are especially upset at CNN. They have two Palestinian reporters, and 
they are very anti-Israeli. And we are putting real pressure on the heads of 
CNN to have them replaced with more objective pro-Israeli reporters who are 
willing to tell our side of the story. You know the importance of the media 
in 
molding public opinion, so we need you cooperation. 
We need our friends in 
the United States to counter the Palestinian allegations. We need to get our 
story out. (Harpers Magazine, May 2001) 
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Shai's comments reiterate some of the important themes and issues long highlighted 
by media researchers in discussions over the power and influence of the mass media. 
These include the importance of systematic propaganda and public relations as well as 
the significance of attempts to intimidate and pressure media outlets to toe a particular 
line. Shai certainly sees the public relations campaign as vital as evidenced by his 
comment that 'we have to win the media war to win the larger war'. The media thus 
serve as a site of ideological struggle where parties seek to win public consent for 
their own policies and perspectives, as well as to degrade the arguments of their 
opponents. In the midst of these propaganda wars stand j ournalists and news 
organisations whose job is it to somehow pick their way amongst the minefield of 
competing explanations and simplify a fractious and complicated reality for the 
viewers at home. The purpose of this research was to address how i ournalists 
approached this task when reporting on the Wye River Peace Accords signed in 
October 1998. Although the Oslo peace process was widely seen to be in crisis there 
were a whole series of competing explanations for the breakdown. The Israeli 
government stressed that the problems were related to 'terrorism' and the failure of 
the Palestinian Authority to prevent incitement and attacks against Israelis. The 
Palestinian delegation, on the other hand, were keen to stress that they had grave 
doubts about Israeli intentions. As one delegate interviewed on BBC I had put it 'it is 
very clear there is no commitment to a genuine peace and that the process is being 
manipulated to continue Israeli control and to undermine Palestinian rights' (BBC 1, 
Evening News, 19 October 1998). There was also the position of the various groups 
both Israeli and Palestinian who opposed the Oslo process for a variety of reasons, 
and the somewhat ambiguous position of the United who was ostensively acting as a 
peacemaker. 
The results of the content analysis reported in chapter three indicated that there 
was a strong emphasis, especially on BBC I, on the security concerns of the Israelis at 
the expense of reporting on issues which were important to Palestinians. The 
Palestinian view that the security issue was being used to avoid returning occupied 
land, although expressed by Palestinian sources when given an opportunity to speak, 
was not picked up and elaborated on by journalists. In contrast the Israeli argument 
that the central problem was the Palestinian failure to curb 'terrorism' was frequently 
picked up on and explained to viewers. Palestinian 'terrorism' was presented by 
journalists on a number of occasions as the 'key issue' or 'stumbling blocking' to the 
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attainment of a peace agreement. Furthermore the highly controversial aspects of the 
6 security clampdown' which were heavily criticised by human rights groups at the 
time were not highlighted by j ournalists. The central issues for Palestinians including 
ending the occupation, curbing human rights abuses and resolving the status of 
Jerusalem and the future of the refugees were barely mentioned in coverage. This also 
ties in closely with previous research (Philo & Berry, 2004; Ackerman, 2002; 
Lowestedt & Madhoun 2002; Chomsky, 2000,1999,1996a, 1996b, 1993,1992, 
19919 1988; Mayhew and Adams, 1975). Compounding this problem was the absence 
of historical context or information about the origins of the conflict in news bulletins. 
All of the major issues: Jerusalem, the military occupation, the settlements, refugees 
etc. are tied in to the events of 1948 and 1967. Without any knowledge of what 
occurred in these years it is very difficult to understand the motivations of Israelis and 
Palestinians. As Lindsey Hilsum noted in chapter four this is made especially difficult 
when the historical record is so fiercely contested and j ournalists are working under 
time constraints. 
Another finding from the research was that j ournalists presented only one 
view of the peace process. This was that Israelis and Palestinians, helped along by Bill 
Clinton, were striving to reach a peace agreement but that extremists on both sides 
(the 'enemies of peace' BBC 1, lunchtime news, 24 October 1998) threatened to 
destroy their good work. However this was not how the peace process was regarded 
by many Palestinians, perhaps the bulk of the population. Some time after Wye the 
Israeli j ournalist Danny Rabinowitz reported in the Israeli press on a letter send by 
Palestinian leaders, illustrating the gap between mainstream depictions of the peace 
process and how many Palestinians saw it: 
One view, which is accepted by the majority of Israelis, considers Oslo a 
positive, symmetric process: an elected government in Israel is conducting 
peace negotiations with a Palestinian leadership that reflects the true interests 
of the Palestinian people. Pursuing this joint path will ultimately lead to a 
durable peace between the two peoples. The second view, which is asserted by 
the signatories to the letter, considers Oslo an inherently asymmetric process 
whose forgone conclusion is not only unfair, but also dangerous. The gist here 
is that Israel, which is strong, big, rich and backed by a superpower, is 
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conducting negotiations of a coercive nature with a weak Palestinian 
leadership that has sold out. (Haaretz, 19 March 2000) 
Some Palestinians viewed the peace process as likely to lead not to an equitable 
settlement but to the creation of a series of South African style Bantustans, a 
prediction made at the outset of Oslo in 1993 (see p. 113-4), and the belief gained 
more adherents with Israeli moves to change the demographics of the West Bank over 
the next five years. These included the doubling of the settler population, the seizure 
of more than 40 percent of the West Bank, and the creation a matrix of Israeli only 
roads across the West Bank which effectively cantonised the area and made it difficult 
for Palestinians to move any distance. It also severely damaged the economy. 
Journalists on a number of occasions spoke of the anger and frustration felt by 
Palestinians but did not, apart from on a single occasion, mention these major 
demographic changes that were generating resentment. This pattern of presenting 
Palestinians as motivated by hate or anger without explaining the factors behind their 
resentment was also found by Ackerman (2002) and Philo and Berry (2004) in their 
analyses of the al-Aqsa intifada. 
The letter cited above by Rabinowitz also points to the remarkably ambivalent 
attitude between Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians in the occupied territories. 
Arafat's Palestinian Authority had been accused of corruption and human rights 
abuses and some Palestinians doubted that Arafat could be trusted to negotiate a fair 
settlement. In fact he had been declared a 'collaborator' by a number of prominent 
Palestinians including Edward Said (1996). More than a year before the Wye 
agreements the Israeli journalist Tanya Reinhardt had written in the Israeli press: 
At the eve of the Oslo agreement, the PLO was in a serious crisis, whose 
centre was a growing resentment of Arafat's leadership, There were many 
reports in the press of public gatherings in the West Bank denouncing the lack 
of democracy, the dissociation of the Tunis group from the reality of 
occupation, and, especially, the complete control Arafat had over the budget 
and the finances. Arafat may have felt that the way to regain control is a 
sweeping agreement with Israel. Today it is already a public knowledge that in 
the circles of Rabin, the idea was formed that under these circumstances, it 
may be possible to extort Arafat into a complete surrender. The process in 
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which a brave national leader becomes a pathetic collaborating ruler, like 
Lahad of South Lebanon, is complex, but with a fixed script of pressure and 
bribery. (YediotAharonot, 4 July 1997) 
However in news bulletins the only issue appeared to be whether Arafat could 
4control the terrorists' amongst his people. This is certainly the official Israeli 
perspective. The lack of a more balanced account of how Arafat and the Oslo 
agreements were perceived by Palestinians was partly a result of the restricted range 
of sources used by j oumalists. As already noted Israeli and American sources were 
given more television access than Palestinian sources and their perspectives were 
more likely to highlighted by j oumalists in the form of reported statements. 
Palestinian authority officials were the only Palestinians interviewed, apart from a 
single bulletin in which a young Palestinian mentioned that he couldn't move freely, 
and a reported statement from a Hamas leader who declared that the Palestinians 
'would fight Israel until freedom or martyrdom'. The same was true in relation to 
Israelis interviewed by journalists. Israeli officials were most featured, followed by 
settlers and on one occasion Channel Four featured a representative of a British pro- 
Israel lobby group. The range of Israeli and Palestinian public opinion is much 
broader than this. Israel has a number of well developed peace and human rights 
organisations such as Meretz, Peace Now, Gush Shalom, Rabbis for Human Rights, 
B'Tselem and the Israeli League for Civil and Human Rights. However none of these 
were interviewed or featured in news reports. A brief interview with a member of an 
Israeli peace group might have offered a very different picture of the peace process. 
For instance nine months before Wye, Gush Shalom published a report on the 
progress of the Oslo process which was very different from anything featured in 
British news broadcasts: 
The Netanyahu government has stopped the peace process and threatens to 
bury it altogether, putting all the blame on the Palestinians. It asserts that, 
while Israel has faithfully fulfilled all the provisions of the agreements, the 
Palestinians have systematically violated them. The Israeli media, nearly 
without exception, are aiding and abetting this propaganda. However, the facts 
are quite different: while the Palestinian violations are few and quite marginal, 
as clearly emerges from the pathetic document composed by government 
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secretary Danny Naveh, the contraventions by the Netanyahu government are 
systematic and substantial. (Gush Shalom, 1998) 
This reliance on a narrow selection of powerful institutional sources appears a 
consistent feature of coverage in this area. Research conducted on the al-Aqsa intifada 
also found that official sources were routinely over-accessed in bulletins and this 
effectively meant that there was a wider level of debate featured in the Israeli media 
than on British television (Philo & Berry, 2004). Similarly the image of Israeli settlers 
also replicated the findings of Philo and Berry (2004). These tended to be presented as 
vulnerable to attacks from Palestinians, though j ournalists didn't explain why their 
presence might be resented by Palestinians. There was no mention that settlers had 
been censured by the UN and human rights groups for attacking Palestinians and 
taking their land, or that their presence in the occupied territories is considered by 
most countries as illegal under international law. 
America's role in the peace process was also more contradictory than it appeared in 
coverage. Journalists presented an image of an American president working hard to 
bring two bitter enemies together and forge a peace. One j ournalist even questioned 
whether the pressure from the Americans had been so great that it might lead to a 
fracture in the relationship between Israel and the United States. However such 
coverage tends to overlook the fact that many members of the pro-Israel lobby were in 
senior positions in the Clinton administration including the two men who headed 
Clinton's Middle East negotiating team, Martin Idynk and Dennis Ross, both 
members of AIPAC, the most powerful pro-Israel lobby group in American politics. 
Some might also consider it contradictory to emphasise the American role as 
peacemaker whilst neglecting to mention that the US was arming one side, as well as 
providing economic and diplomatic support for settlement building, which many 
Palestinians thought was undercutting the possibility of a just settlement. Chomsky 
has argued that whilst reporting the conflict American journalists tend to accept at 
face value whatever the US claims to be doing, such as supporting peace, even when 
it may be actually carrying out policies which undermine that goal: 
The most interesting element of the doctrinal framework is the notion of 
'peace process' itself. That the U. S. and its Israeli partner have always sought 
peace is not in question: everyone seeks peace, even Hitler, Stalin, and Attila 
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the Hun. The question is: what kind of peace? In U. S. discourse, the term 
6peace process' is conventionally used to refer to whatever the U. S. 
government happens to be doing, often undermining diplomatic efforts. That is 
dramatically true in the present case. For 25 years, the U. S. has stood virtually 
alone in rejecting two basic principles of the international consensus on a 
peace settlement: that Israel withdraw from the occupied territories in 
exchange for peace, and (from the mid 1970s) that Palestinian national rights 
be recognized in the West Bank and Gaza. (I 996b) 
However the close political, economic and military ties between Britain and the 
United States, meant that it was always unlikely that j ournalists themselves would 
question the dominant American perspective on what was occurring. As Philo and 
Berry have noted to 'explain in detail the rationale of those who oppose US policy is 
to court controversy. It is simpler to avoid explanations or to leave them to the 
margins of television and radio' (2004: 107). The problem with this approach is that 
viewers are likely to receive a partial and sometimes misleading account of events. 
A final point to make about coverage was the tendency for journalists on all channels 
except Channel Four to go beyond merely reporting the Israeli perspective on 
'Palestinian terrorism'. but to actually endorse it. Groups such as Amnesty 
International have suggested, that the use of the expressions 'terrorism' or 'terrorist' 
can create problems. The organisation's view is that the terms are imprecise, emotive, 
politically loaded and employed selectively. For instance some Palestinians regard a 
number of Israeli actions such as extra-judicial killings and torture as 'state terrorism' 
but j ourrialists, do not endorse or even report on this perspective. An alternative course 
of action would be for j ournalists to report but not to endorse the use of such terms, 
and indicate when international law has been violated. This approach is more 
impartial and allows for a clearer legal and moral accounting. 
News Coverage and Public Belief 
The results from the content analysis indicated that television news was largely 
devoid of history and context, featured a preponderance of official Israeli perspectives 
at the expense of providing the Palestinian point of view, and tended to avoid 
explaining the ambivalent and contradictory position of the United States. How might 
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such coverage influence public knowledge in this area and can direct parallels be 
drawn between how the conflict is presented by journalists and how it is understood 
by viewers? Focus group and questionnaire research reported by Philo and Berry 
(2004) suggests there is evidence that it can. The authors found that television news 
was the key site on information about the conflict for over 80 per cent of those 
questioned and that those who were comparatively well informed (and tended to come 
from middle-class and professional backgrounds) augmented their knowledge of the 
conflict by reading books and broadsheet newspapers. Some viewers interviewed 
were openly disparaging about the lack of context in television news. One commented 
that: 
There is no depth to it - television news more or less covers everything 
superficially. I think we are dumbing down. Someone has told the BBC that 
the average person has an attention span of less than two minutes and that is 
rubbish but they are buying into it. More and more it's all about 'How can we 
keep them watching - whether we are giving information or not? ' I certainly 
wouldn't rely on BBC television news for anything that I though was really 
important. (Middle class male focus group, cited in Philo & Berry, 2004: 210) 
Some news editors have reacted defensively to accusations that television news fails 
to provide enough context when reporting on the conflict. For instance Roger Mosey, 
the head of BBC television news has argued that too much is expected of the medium: 
Television is still the dominant medium of our age, and 36 million people a 
week watch BBC news. But if you printed a transcript of the Ten O'Clock 
News it would not fill one page of a newspaper like this: it is, inevitably, a 
brief digest of the day's events with as much analysis as we can manage. For 
the complete background you may need to go to a website or a newspaper or a 
book ... news is an account of the world as 
it is and not as we want it to be, and 
television news is a starting point for our exploration of it and not the last 
word. (Guardian, 27 July 2004) 
In an ideal world people most people might seek out information from alternative 
information sources but for the great bulk of the population television news remains 
their primary window on the world. This can be seen very clearly by comparing the 
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lack of context in news bulletins to audience understandings of the key events and 
issues in the conflict. The absence of historical background found in television news 
reports was strongly mirrored in the audience research studies. Philo and Berry (2004) 
found that few viewers were aware of the historical origins of the conflict or could 
name any of the region's wars. In the focus groups only 19 per cent were aware that 
the Palestinian refugees were related to the establishment of the state of Israel in 
1948. The lack of historical knowledge made it very difficult for viewers to 
understand the key issues in the conflict. So for instance, whilst a number of viewers 
expressed the opinion that 'land' was an issue, in practice there was a great deal of 
confusion about what this actually signified. One viewer expressed his surprise that 
the Palestinians had actually had land taken from them in the conflict: 
The impression that I got was that the Palestinians had lived around that area 
and now they were trying to come back and get some more land for 
themselves -I didn't realize that they had actually been driven out, I just 
thought that they didn't want to live as part of Israel, and that the places they 
were living in they decided they wanted to make self-govemed -I didn't 
realize that they had been driven out in wars previously. (Student group, 
Glasgow, cited in Philo and Berry, 2004: 216) 
What this illustrates is that without some kind of understanding of a narrative 
structure viewers lack the ability to fit the major issues into an interpretive framework 
to help them understand what is occurring in the conflict. When for instance during 
the Wye Accords a BBC journalist stated that 'they haven't even started to tackle the 
most serious issues yet those include the future of Jewish settlements like this one, the 
future of Jerusalem, of Palestinian refugees and the shape of Israel's final borders', 
most viewers would not understand such a statement because they lack the historical 
knowledge to appreciate the salience of each issue in the overall context of the 
conflict. Philo and Berry (2004) found the absence of historical background left many 
viewers bewildered by the conflict and how it might be resolved. The lack of 
historical context also had another important and deleterious effect in that it led 
people to avoid news bulletins dealing with the conflict. Ironically broadcasters' 
desire to maximise audiences by prioritising dramatic scenes of violence and conflict 
over analysis, actually had the opposite effect in that it led many viewers to turn away 
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from what was perceived as an endless and incomprehensible procession of death and 
suffering. 
There were also other areas where audience understandings closely mirrored 
the presence or absence of issues within news coverage. For instance, during coverage 
of the Wye Accords journalists did not explain the nature of the military occupation 
that the Israelis were imposing on the Palestinians or its consequences such as 
restrictions on movement and lack of access to clean water. There was also no 
mention of human rights abuses such as torture and extra-judicial killings that have 
been committed by the Israelis or the large number of United Nations resolutions 
condemning these and the illegality of the occupation. Since so many viewers rely on 
television news as their main source of information on the conflict it is perhaps 
unsurprising that so few were aware of such issues: 
Given that so many did not know there was a military occupation, it is not 
surprising that the consequences of it for Palestinians were little understood. 
Even in groups that were comparatively well informed, such as middle class 
males in Glasgow, there was little knowledge of economic consequences such 
as those caused by the Israeli control of water. In the focus groups as a whole 
only 9 per cent were aware of this issue. There was little understanding of 
areas such as human rights - only two people in all the focus groups raised 
these as an issue. Even in groups that tended to be sympathetic to the 
Palestinians (such as low income males in London) there was some surprise 
when they heard that there were pass laws and identity cards which restricted 
movement. There was also no knowledge of the large number of UN 
resolutions, which have been passed, either those relating to the legality of the 
occupation or to human rights abuses in the territories (Philo & Berry, 2004: 
218) 
Strong parallels could also be drawn between media coverage and audience 
understanding of issues such as Israeli settlements and American mediation. Philo and 
Berry (2004) report that there was a strong tendency for viewers to see Israeli 
settlements in the manner in which they were presented in news bulletins, as small 
embattled communities subject to attack from Palestinians for no clearly identifiable 
reason. Few viewers interviewed in the focus groups saw the settlements as serving a 
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critical strategic role as part of the military occupation or were aware that they are 
widely seen as illegal under international law. Similarly only a minority of viewers 
were aware that the United States supplies Israel with economic and military support. 
Whilst many saw the United States as fulfilling a peace-brokering role, far fewer 
understood why Palestinians might distrust this mediation. 
Overall audience research tends to suggest that many gaps in audience 
understandings are related to specific absences in television news coverage. The 
consequence of this appears to be that most viewers are badly informed, lack a basic 
understanding of the Palestinian perspective and are confused about the ways in 
which the conflict might be resolved. 
Media, Power and Ideological Closure 
In chapter one I outlined a number of factors which affected the production of 
news. These included commercial imperatives, sourcing, public relations, intimidation 
by government or private bodies, cultural assumptions and j ournalism training. A 
number of theorists have formulated models which incorporate some of these factors 
in order to address the question of the relationship between j ournalism and 
economic/political power (Milliband, 1973; Althusser, 1971; Murdock and Golding, 
1979; Glasgow Media Group, 1975; Herman & Chomsky, 1988). In The State in 
Capitalist Society Ralph Milliband argues that the mass media play an instrumental 
role in providing the ideological justification for a particular pattern of class 
domination. He identifies three key factors that produce this outcome: the ownership 
and control of media, the economic and cultural effects of the mass media's reliance 
on advertising and pressure from Government and other parts of the state. Milliband 
argues from a strong structuralist position, rooted in political economy, which leaves 
little space for journalists to challenge (even if they had the inclination, which he 
suggest they mostly do not) the assumptions of the status quo: 
Given the political and economic contexts in which they function [the mass 
media cannot fail to be, predominately, agencies for the dissemination of ideas 
and values which affirm rather than challenge existing structures of power and 
privilege .... The notion that they can, 
for the most part, be anything else is 
either a delusion or a mystification (1973: 211) 
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Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model takes the three factors in Milliband's 
model and adds an organizational dimension by pointing to way in which 
relationships between institutional sources and j ournalists tend to filter out 
oppositional voices. Like Milliband, Herman and Chomsky see the media as Primarily 
fulfilling the role of reflecting and legitimizing the present social order and the 
activities of the state. Also like Milliband, Herman and Chomsky see this outcome not 
as the result of deliberate intent or a conspiracy but rather as a consequence of the 
interplay of various structural factors, primarily rooted in political economy. 
A rather different model of media filters was suggested by Richard Hoggart in 
the foreword to Bad News. Hoggart's model is more concerned with the constraints of 
the medium and the practices of journalism than with political economy. It is a 
formulation which is far less overtly ideological and functional than those offered by 
Milliband or Herman and Chomsky. Hoggart suggests that the 'news selects itself by 
four main filtering processes' (Glasgow Media Group, 1976: x). These are time and 
resource constraints inherent to the medium, 'news values', 'television values' and 
what Hoggart describes as the 'cultural air we breathe, the whole ideological 
atmosphere of our society, which tells us that some things can be said and that others 
had best not be said' (Glasgow Media Group, 1976: x). Hoggart was also critical of 
what he describes as 'high conspiracy theories' of the mass media which he suggests 
assume too great a degree of ideological closure: 
But the basic inadequacy, even of the most subtle forms of 'high conspiracy 
theory ' is that, useful and revealing though they can be, they miss the 
complexity of the matter if you hang onto them for too long. For in 
commercial democracies such as Britain the agenda is not wholly structured 
and the deviant items are not simply 'permitted variations', the repressive 
tolerances of an authority which is wholly in control in the background. 
Something sometimes escapes, precisely because the controls, explicit or 
implicit, are not complete, because the claims for ob ectivity and neutrality by 
the broadcasters- though often made too smugly and blandly- do also have 
behind them, in some people, a belief that the effort at objectivity and 
neutrality is important beyond all outside pressure (Glasgow Media Group, 
1976: xii) 
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Hoggart here is alerting the reader to the potential slippage between how the powerful 
would wish to see issues reported and how they are actually reported in practice. We 
are, he suggests, not dealing with a completely rigid and closed ideological system, 
but a more complicated situation in which political and economic power confers 
significant advantages in ideological struggles but does completely determine them. 
Commercial imperatives, organizational priorities and the journalistic ethos of 
'impartiality' can all mediate this relationship and we should be aware of the potential 
complexities that are involved. In many ways Hoggart's criticisms of 'high conspiracy 
theories' are analogous to Schlesinger's (1990) criticisms of Stuart Hall's concept of 
6primary definers'. In Policing the Crisis Hall et. al. (1978) had argued that powerful 
institutional sources are consigned the role of 'primary definers' who because of their 
privileged access to the media are able to set the terms of debate for issues. Those 
who then engage in the media debate must work within the framework that has been 
set down by the primary definers. Hall illustrated this by pointing to a debate about 
social disorder and immigration where he suggested the primary definition was that it 
was a 'problem of numbers'. He then showed how the debates around immigration 
were structured around the issue of numbers rather than drawing in alternative 
explanations such as white, working class racism. However as Schlesinger (1990) has 
argued this leaves open the question of how and why the framework of debate 
established by the primary definers might break down. Again we are back to the 
argument that media are not a completely closed ideological system where the views 
of the powerful are handed down like tablets from Mount Sinai. Hall's model can also 
overstate the degree of ideological conformity amongst institutional sources, and 
underestimate the potential for non-institutional sources such as pressure groups to 
alter the terms of the debate. We can see this very clearly if we look at two others 
studies. In their research on the struggle over the definition of the AIDS crisis Miller 
et. al., suggest that although the institutions of the state were able to access 
promotional resources and influence media agendas, they did not completely control 
the debate: 
Definitions of social issues do not simply emerge from the centres of political 
power. Campaigners did manage to influence the production and circulation of 
definitions around AIDS. In addition, the media can themselves contribute to 
207 
modifying the definitions of the powerful. Most importantly, we have 
suggested that the construction of 'primary' definitions in the media may not 
necessarily set the terms for policy decisions. As we saw in the discussion of 
the health education campaign, the ability of ministers or others to intervene in 
the production process was sometimes quite independent of the dominant 
definitions carried in the media (Kitzinger & Miller, 1998: 223-224) 
Similarly in their study of how the Toronto media interacted with the state's 
law enforcement agencies, Ericson, Baranek and Chen (1989) point to a complex 
series of negotiations between j ournalists and source bureaucracies over how issues 
were to be framed in news reports. The public relations staff employed by the state's 
criminal justice certainly worked hard to try and get their perspective across but were 
not always successful, and their efforts were mediated by the commercial and 
organizational priorities of the media organizations they interacted with. 
There is however one way in which at least a partial rapprochement can be 
achieved between the stronger structuralist theories such as the Herman and Chomsky 
propaganda model and those who advocate the existence of a more fluid, contested 
space. This requires an acceptance that the space for ideological openness and closure 
on issues is related to both the nature of the issue and the particular moment at which 
the issue is debated. Certain issues will have more latitude for contestation because 
their definition is not considered important or 'sensitive' by governments. The issue 
of AIDS information strategies discussed by Miller et. al. above, would appear to fall 
into this category. How the issue was defined and debated was not likely to 
significantly affect the fortunes of the Conservative party. Conversely on issues such 
as the reporting of unemployment or the Northern Ireland conflict, both subjects 
which were important for the image of the Tories in the 1980s, it was clear that 
significant pressure was brought to bear on broadcasters to limit dissent, though this 
was not always successful (see chapter one). The contours of openness and closure on 
controversial issues is also strongly determined by political and economic 
circumstances. At certain moments governments may face a potential crisis of 
legitimacy and the space for dissent may become constrained. This of course is 
particularly noticeable during wartime when the need to win public consent is 
probably at its peak. Those who express alternative opinions at such moments may be 
208 
particularly vulnerable to orchestrated attacks from politicians. The fate of the former 
BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan is perhaps the most obvious recent example. 
So how does the research in this thesis relate to these arguments about 
political/economic power and ideological openness and closure? In many ways the 
research provides evidence that many of the factors identified by theorists have a 
crucial impact on reporting on the Israel-Palestine conflict, but it also suggests that 
coverage is not completely monolithic or rigid. Of particular importance appears to be 
three of the factors identified in Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model: 'flak', 
sourcing and the need to maximize profits (or audiences). The pro-Israel lobby 
appears able to intimidate both news organisations and journalists. The application of 
pressure through organised campaigns of letter and email writing, as well as 
complaints from Israeli officials and embassies, together with interventions from well 
connected Israel supporters in the media and political life appears to have created a 
climate where journalists and editors are sometimes reluctant to air the Palestinian 
perspective. There is also the charge of anti-Semitism which is sometimes levelled 
against j ournalists and broadcasters, which it has been suggested has a particularly 
chilling impact on dissent, especially at the BBC. According to Mayhew and Adams 
(1975) this is not new. Nearly thirty years ago they alleged that attempts were made to 
silence and discredit those who criticised Israeli behaviour. This they alleged was 
carried out using the same techniques, organised campaigns of letter writing and 
telephone complaints directed at media outlets and the interventions of influential 
Israel supporters in the media and political spheres. This points to the enduring impact 
of networks of power and influence, able over decades to fundamentally influence the 
climate in which j ournalists operate. 
The obverse of 'flak', public relations, also seems to be of crucial importance. 
Whilst the Israelis run a slick and highly professional operation, the Palestinian effort 
has been rather amateurish in comparison. The proactive approach employed by 
Israeli PR professionals involving 'schmoozing'journalists and flooding them with 
the official Israeli perspective appeared effective in setting the media agenda during 
the Wye negotiations, as evidenced by the prominence given to the Israeli perspective 
on security at the expense of reporting what was of concern to Palestinians. Israeli 
sources with their good English, excellent presentational skills and use of soundbites 
are likely to come across as more credible to viewers than Palestinians representatives 
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many of whom are poor English speakers. It has been suggested that this is in part a 
consequence of the cronyism of Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority where the 
responsibilities for putting the Palestinian perspective has been delegated to Arafat 
supporters many of whom lack the necessary public relations skills. 
The issue of sourcing also appears highly significant. Israeli sources were featured 
more often than Palestinian sources but neither were as accessed as much as 
American sources. Since American sources tended to support Israeli positions this 
magnified the imbalance. Taken together Israeli and American sources were given 
more than three times as much space as Palestinian sources. A similar pattern was 
also found in relation to the amount of space given to reported statements, where 
those from Israelis outnumbered those from Palestinians by a factor of nearly two to 
one. As previously noted there was also a pronounced emphasis on official sources. 
This meant that the wide variety of debate about the conflict within the Israeli and 
Palestinian publics was largely absent. This was particularly significant in regard to 
Palestinian public opinion because it meant that the highly ambivalent relationship 
between Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian population was 
missing from news reports. The theory that the media tends to 'over-access' the views 
of officials and other powerful institutional sources was supported in this research. 
The arguments rooted in political economy, the need for media organizations to profit 
and hence audience maximise, also appear to have had an important effect on 
coverage. The need to grab audiences by injecting drama partly explain the absence of 
historical background and the pronounced emphasis in coverage of the latest 
developments of a peace process 'in crisis'. Whilst it might be assumed that the BBC 
as a public corporation, not dependent on advertising, would be insulated from the 
need to audience maximize, in reality it is obliged to seek high rating in order to 
justify the license fee. It could of course be argued that Hoggart's stress on the 
importance on 'news' and 'television' values is itself aj ournalistic justification for 
what are in effect choices structured by the need to maximize audiences and profits. 
In this sense two of his filters are perhaps closer to the political economy perspective 
than he overtly concedes. 
Finally the research in this thesis points to the importance of Britain's foreign policy 
orientation in setting the tone for how journalists' report on the conflict. How this is 
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actually achieved in practice is relatively under-theorised in journalism studies. 
Outright censorship by government is relatively uncommon and attempts by 
government to gag and intimidate the media are a sign that more informal controls 
have broken down. But how do these informal controls operate in practice? The 
former BBC journalist Tim Llewelyn expressed to me the view that the BBC in effect 
4 sniffed the wind' to gauge what the British government's position on the conflict was 
and then adjusted its coverage accordingly. As discussed in chapter four, 
Schlesinger's ethnography of a BBC newsroom in the 1970s provided evidence that 
journalists whose perspectives differed widely from those of the governments on 
sensitive foreign policy issues such as the Vietnam War or the conflict in Northern 
Ireland were subject to a range of official and unofficial sanctions. In this way editors 
who were trusted as a 'safe pair of hands' could be relied upon to limit dissent on 
certain issues. Conversely the activities of senior members of the Government can 
(sometimes unintentionally) open up opportunities for discussion of perspectives that 
wouldn't generally be aired. For instance at the end of October 2001 Tony Blair 
visited Syria and met with President Assad before continuing on to Israel. A BBC 
journalist reported that: 
Tomorrow's hosts are the very same people that today's hosts regard as bloody 
state terrorists, and of course the Israelis think much the same thing of the 
Syrians, the Palestinians and others. 
The j ourrialist also remarked that: 
Syria's President Assad ... regards Palestinian suicide 
bombers and assassins as 
fteedom fighters. (BBCl late news, 30 October 2001, cited in Philo & Berry, 
2004: 172-3) 
Philo and Berry (2004) note that this was the only time that the Palestinian 
perspective that they were victims of Israeli 'state terrorism', and were themselves 
'freedom fighters' was reported on by j oumalists. This suggests that Blair's visit to 
Syria in effect served to temporarily legitimize the reporting of the Palestinian/Arab 
view of the conflict 47 . In this way, the activities and orientations of 
major political 
figures are picked up on by j oumalists and can affect the range of debate on issues. 
This is similar to the theory of primary definition, though it lacks the rigidity inherent 
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in Hall's model. Politicians can set agendas and legitimate and de-legitimate 
viewpoints, but it does not necessarily follow on that all those who later engage in the 
debate must work within those parameters. Furthermore the viewpoint of the primary 
definers may be challenged and sometimes de-legitimised especially if the arguments 
are contested by other high ranking politicians. 
The research reported in this thesis indicated that during the Oslo peace process 
journalists found it much easier to present the official Israeli perspective than the 
views of Palestinians and the wider international community. This was the result of a 
host of factors creating constraints on how journalists could report on the conflict. 
However the research did not support the stronger structuralist models such as Hall's 
theory of primary definition. Some aspects of the official Israeli perspective on the 
conflict were challenged by Palestinian spokespersons, though these perspectives 
were much less likely to be highlighted and elaborated on by j oumalists. Furthermore 
the relative prominence of Israeli perspectives cannot simply be taken for granted on 
the basis of structural factors. The comments of Nachman Shai, which opened this 
chapter illustrated that winning public acceptance for the Israeli government's 
perspective is a constant and continuous process that requires a great deal of work. It 
is not as automatic and pre-ordained as some of the structuralist theories imply and it 
can break down. Whilst the Israelis have been much more successful than the 
Palestinians in getting their point of view across to viewers, this may not always be 
the case. For instance the death of Yasser Arafat may allow for the emergence of a 
new generation of Palestinian spokespersons, better equipped to contest the public 
relations struggle. The election of American administration inclined to adopt a more 
even-handed attitude to the conflict will also likely affect reporting. All of these 
factors should alert researchers to the contingencies and complexities inherent in the 
production of news. 
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Endnotes 
' Chomsky maintains that it 'has been virtually an axiom of US foreign policy that these 
energy reserves should remain under US control; ' and that 'the flow of petrodollars should be 
largely funnelled to the US through military purchases, construction projects, bank deposits, 
investments in treasury deposits, etc. ' ( 1999: 17). He argues that to protect against the threat 
that indigenous nationalist movements might want to gain control of their own resources, the 
United States supports Israel and the region's Arab monarchies who are encouraged to act as 
cregional gendarmes' in support of American interests 
2 These have included Idi Amin in Uganda, Mobutu in Zaire, the Contras in Nicaragua, 
Rhodesia, South Africa, Honduras, El Salvador and Turkey. 
3 In a letter dated 24 October 1915 McMahon laid out the areas that Britain planned to grant 
independence: 'The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying 
west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, 
and should be excluded from the limits demanded. With the above modification, and without 
prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs we accept those limits. As for the regions 
lying within those frontiers wherein Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of 
her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the 
following assurances and make the following reply to your letter: (1) Subject to the above 
modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the 
Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif of Mecca' (letter cited in 
Ingrams, 1972: 2) 
4 According to the British census of 1922 the total population of Palestine was 752,048, 
comprised of 83,790 Jews, 589,177 Muslims and 71,464 Christians (United Nations, 1945). 
5 In a memorandum to Lord Curzon on II August 1919, Balfour wrote: 'the contradiction 
between the letters of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the 
case of the 'independent nation' of Palestine than in that of the 'independent nation' of Syria. 
For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of 
the present inhabitants of the country, though the American [King Crane] Commission has 
been going through the form of asking what they are' (British Government, Foreign Office, 
1919b, cited in Ingrams, 1972: 73) 
6 The Revisionist Movement were a political rival of Ben-Gurion's Labor movement. They 
espoused a more militant attitude towards the Arabs and a more liberal economic policy. 
Much of their support came from Polish immigrants in the 1920s and 1930s. The Revisionists 
laid claim to all of Palestine and Transjordan and argued that conflict with the Arabs was 
inevitable. Their military wing Betar was formed in the 1920s. Some Betar members split 
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away in the 1930s to form the Irgun paramilitary group who fought the British mandatory 
authorities in the 1940s. The Revisionist movement later provided much of the constituency 
for the Herut and Likud parties. 
' The Oxford historian Albert Hourani described the Joan Peter's book as 'ludicrous and 
worthless' in The Observer. Ian and David Gilmour described it as 'preposterous' in the 
London Review ofBooks. Time Out described it as a 'piece of disinformation roughly the size 
and weight of a dried cowpat', whilst the chair of the Philosophy department at the Hebrew 
University, Avishai Margalit condemned Peter's 'web of deceit'. (reviews cited in 
Finkelstein, 2001: 45-6). McCarthy argues that unrecorded Arab immigration into Palestine 
during the Mandate period was 'small' and that for it to 'have had a significant effect on the 
ethnic composition of Palestine it would have had to have been immense'. He concludes that 
the 'argument that Arab immigration somehow made up a large part of the Palestinian Arab 
population is thus statistically untenable' (1990: 34). For a discussion of the effects of 
improvements in sanitation and hygiene on population increase in Palestine see Friedlander & 
Goldscheider (1979). 
8 The U. S. Secretary of State, James Byrnes, wrote to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Halifax, arguing that American Jewry was not interested in the plight of the refugees in 
Europe, their main concern was that Jews 'ought to have a country to call their own'. Harold 
Beeley in the British Foreign Office complained that 'the Zionists have been deplorably 
successful in selling the idea that even after the Allied victory immigration to Palestine 
represented for many Jews 'their only hope of survival" (both cited in Ovendale, 1999: 94). 
9 The pressure to open up Palestine to the Jewish refugees worried the British who feared the 
impact on public order. Ovendale (1999) claims that the U. S. War department had estimated 
that it would have to send 300,000 troops to Palestine to keep the peace if the area was 
opened to Jewish immigration. He also suggests that the U. S. State Department was also 
concerned that an Arab backlash would strengthen Russian influence in a vital geo-strategic 
area and recommended that the British colonial Empire be maintained intact. 
10 For a comprehensive overview of the case put forward by the Arab delegates see the 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Palestine Question, pp. 276-279, cited in UN, 1990). 
A number of delegates including Lebanese representatives claimed during debates at the 
UN, that representatives from the US and USSR had used bribes and threats of economic 
sanctions in order to coerce smaller States to vote for the Partition of Palestine (Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, vol. 11,124th meeting: 
1310) 
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12 For an overview of the concept of transfer in Zionist thinking see Masalha (1992). This 
perspective is challenged by Karsh (2000). 
" In 1959 the Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi went through the official records of Arab 
governments as well as Arab newspapers and the radio monitoring reports of the BBC and 
CIA and could find no evidence of broadcasts urging Palestinians to nee. This research was 
also independently corroborated by the Irish scholar Erskine Childers in 196 1. For an 
overview and discussion of the controversy see Hitchens & Said (1988). Some historians such 
as Gilbert (1999) argue that many Arabs left voluntarily prior to the arrival of the Arab armies 
in May 1948 without mentioning the impact of the alleged broadcasts. 
14 This controversial incident has been the subject of much debate. The Israeli authorities have 
always maintained that it was a 'tragic case of misidentification'. Bregman (2003: 120-122) 
notes that others have suggested that it was deliberately undertaken to prevent the Liberty 
from detecting Israeli troop concentrations massing in Galilee as part of the next days attack 
on the Golan Heights. He argues that recently declassified tapes of conversations between 
airforce personnel support the conclusion that the attack on the American ship was deliberate. 
15 Yitzak Rabin remarked after Israel's victory that 'I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. 
The two divisions that he sent into Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to unleash 
an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it. ' (Le Monde, 29 February 1968 cited in 
Hirst 1977: 211). In a 1982 speech at the National Defense College Menachem Begin stated 
that 'The Egyptian Army concentrations in the Sinai do not prove that Nasser was not really 
about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him. ' (New York 
Times, 21 August 1982). 
16 Menachem Begin claimed that in the penultimate Ministerial Committee on Defense prior to 
the War military leaders 'had no doubt of victory' and 'expressed their belief not only in the 
strength of the anny but also in its ability to rout the enemy' (Begin cited in Finkelstein, 
1999: 135) The former Commander of the Israeli Air Force Ezer Weizmann has claimed in 
relation to the 1967 War that 'there was no threat of destruction to the State of Israel but that 
the war was justified so that Israel could 'exist according to the scale, spirit and quality she 
now embodies' (Haaretz, 29 March 1972, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 100). 
17 Norman Finkelstein (1999) alleges that Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia put forward a peace 
plan involving a full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in exchange for 'full 
demilitarization and other security guarantees in the evacuated territories, as well as an 'end 
to the call for an Arab state of Palestine'. He alleges that this proposal was accepted by both 
Egypt and Jordan but rejected by Israel as 'one-sided'. 
18 The British representative Lord Carodon denied any ambiguity in the interpretation 242 
claiming that 'in our resolution we stated the principle of the 'withdrawal of Israeli armed 
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forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict' and in the preamble emphasized the 
'the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war'. In our view the wording of the 
provisions is clear. '. The French delegate emphasised that 'on the point which the French 
delegation has always stressed as being essential - the question of the withdrawal of the 
occupation forces- the resolution which has been adopted, if we refer to the French text which 
is equally authentic with the English, leaves no room for any ambiguity, since it speaks of 
withdrawal 'des territoires occupes', which indisputably corresponds to the expression 
4occupied territories'. The Indian representative asserted that 'the principle of the 
inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force is absolutely fundamental to our approach' 
and 'it is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by the Council, will commit 
it to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israeli forces ftom all of the 
territories- I repeat, all the territories - occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict which 
began on 5 June 1967. ' (all cited in Finkelstein 2001: 146) 
19Finkelstein points to the memoirs of the American diplomat Dean Rusk who claimed that 
the United States favoured omitting the definite article in the withdrawal clause because 'we 
though the Israeli border along the West Bank could be 'rationalised' certain anomalies could 
easily be straightened out with some exchanges of territory, making a more sensible border 
for all parties'. (Rusk, 1992: 388-9, cited in Finkelstein, 2001: 148). However he stressed 'we 
never contemplated any significant grant of territory to Israel as a result of the June 1967 war. 
On that point we and the Israelis to this day remain sharply divided'. (Rusk, 1992: 388-9, 
cited in Finkelstein, 2001: 148) 
20 See for instance Efrain Karsh, What Occupation, Commentary, July 2002 or Max Singer, 
Right is Might, Jerusalem Post, 29 June 1997. 
21 Chomsky points to an article by Yedidia Segal in the 3 September 1982 issue of Nekudah, 
thejournal of the religious West Bank settlers, which stated that 'those among us who call for 
a humanistic attitude towards our [Arab] neighbours are reading the Halacha [religious law] 
selectively and are avoiding specific commandments'. Segal argues that the Gentiles are 'a 
people like a donkey' and that the scriptures insist that 'conquered' peoples must 'serve' their 
Jewish masters and must be kept 'degraded and low' and 'must not raise their heads in Israel 
but must be conquered beneath their hand ... with complete submission'. 
'There is no relation' 
Segal insists 'between the law of Israel and the and the atheistic modem humanism' citing 
Maimonides that 'in a divinely-commanded war [such as the 1982 Lebanon invasion] one 
must destroy kill and eliminate men, women and children' there being 'no place for any 
humanistic considerations' (cited in Chomsky, 1999: 123-4) 
22 United Nations General Assembly resolution 54/37 adopted I December 1999 
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23 Hirst claims that 'In Israel's Arab schools children have always had to see their own Arab 
culture, history and religion through Israeli eyes: they saw it deliberately mocked and 
falsified. Arab history became little more than a series of revolutions, murders feuds and 
plunderings, whilst everything in the Jewish past was ennobled and glorified. It was always 
the Arabs in decline they learned about, never in their greatness; the heroes of the past, the 
Prophet, the Caliph Harun al-Rashid and Saladin, got perfunctory mention. In four years of 
secondary education Arab children had 384 periods of Jewish history as against only 32 of 
their own. The study of Old Testament was compulsory, while the Muslim and Christian 
religions were not taught at all. (1977: 23 8) 
24 For instance General Assembly Resolution 53/56 passed 3 December 1998 by 151 votes to 
2, Resolution 52/67 passed 10 December 1997 by 151 to 2, Resolution 51/134 passed 13 
December 1996 by 149 votes to 2, Resolution 49/36C passed 9 December 1994 by 145 votes 
to 2, Resolution 47/70D passed 14 December 1992 by 142 votes to 2. 
25 In the late 1970s a Sunday Times report (19 June 1977) found that torture was so 
widespread and systematic that 'it appears to be sanctioned at some level as deliberate policy" 
perhaps 'to persuade Arabs in the occupied territories that it is least painful to behave 
passively'. More recently Amnesty International has issued annual reports cataloguing the use 
of torture by the Israeli authorities (e. g. Amnesty International: 2001 a, 2000,1999b, 1998, 
1997) A report (Amnesty International, 1999a) entitled Flouting UN Obligations in the Name 
ofSecurity concluded that Israeli 'interrogation methods, such as violent shaking, or hooding 
and shackling detainees to low chairs with loud music playing, constituted torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and thus contravened Article I of the 
Convention against Torture' and that torture is 'officially authorized at the highest level and 
indeed effectively legalized. ' In the same report it was noted that the 1600 Palestinians 
detained by Israeli security forces in 1998 were 'routinely tortured or ill-treated during 
interrogation' The Independent journal ist Robert Fisk has produced a number of reports from 
the Israeli controlled Khiam detention centre in Southern Lebanon detailing the use of electric 
shock torture applied to the genitals. (Independent, 20 May 2000). A BBC Correspondent 
documentary (4 November 2000) also reported from Khiam, claiming that torture had also 
been used against children and pregnant women, and that prisoners had been tortured to 
death, in what Amnesty International described as 'war crimes' 
26 The use of 'administrative detention' involved detaining Palestinians for long periods 
without trial or legal recourse. In the 1970s Hirst alleges that many Palestinians suspected of 
involvement with opposition movements were interned in camps in the desert: 'At its worst it 
meant the establishment of veritable concentration camps buried in remote comers of the 
Sinai desert. Nakhl, Abu Zu'aiman, Kusseimah were the names of places where whole 
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families were kept in isolation from the outside world. They were there because relatives of 
theirs were suspected, no more, of working for the resistance. Crowded into tents surrounded 
by barbed wire, they were denied radios, newspapers or the most basic amenities from their 
homes, which were frequently destroyed during their captivity. Women and children would 
be put in one camp, male relatives of 'wanted persons' brother, nephews, cousins- in another' 
(1977: 248). By 1980 the Israeli daily Haaretz estimated the number of security prisoners or 
detainees passing through Israeli jails since 1967 at close to 200,000 people or 20% of the 
population leading to a situation of 'horrendous overcrowding' and 'appalling human 
suffering and corruption' 
(8 August 1980, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 128). For more recent reports on detention without 
trial see Amnesty International (1999a). 
27 Collective punishment could involve curfews where the local population is not allowed out 
for more than a hour or two a day for weeks or months at a time, schools are closed and there 
is no employment. Israel has justified the use of curfews on the basis that confining the 
Palestinian population to their homes for long periods prevents militants from attacking Jews. 
The use of collective punishment is illegal under international law and Israel has drawn 
repeated censure from the United Nations: 'The United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights calls upon Israel to cease immediately its policy of enforcing collective punishments, 
such as demolition of houses and closure of the Palestinian territory, measures which 
constitute flagrant violations of international law and international humanitarian law, 
endanger the lives of Palestinians and also constitute a major obstacle in the way of peace' 
(United Nations, 1999). A report by the Israeli journalist Aharon Bachar in the Israeli daily 
Yediot Ahornot described a meeting where Labour Alignment leaders presented Menachem 
Begin with 'detailed accounts of terrorist acts [against Arabs] in the conquered territories' 
They described the collective punishment in the town of Halhul where: 'The men were taken 
from their houses beginning at midnight, in pyjamas, in the cold. The notables and other men 
were concentrated in the square of the mosque and held there until morning. Meanwhile men 
of the border guards broke into house beating people with shouts and curses. During the many 
hours that hundreds of people were kept in the mosque square, they were ordered to urinate 
and excrete on one another and also to sing Hatikva [Jewish National Anthem] and to call out 
'Long Live the State of Israel' Several times people were beaten and ordered to crawl on the 
ground. Some were even ordered to lick the earth. At the same time four trucks were 
commandeered and at daybreak, the inhabitants were loaded onto the trucks, about 100 in 
each truck, and taken like sheep to the Administration headquarters in Hebron. ' (3 December 
1982, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 13 1) The report further alleged that prisoners were beaten, 
tortured and humiliated and that settlers were permitted into prisons to take part in the 
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beatings. For more recent reports on collective punishments see Amnesty International report 
(200 1 b; 2001 c) or Human Rights Watch (1996). 
28 Hirst cites evidence from the Israeli League for Civil and Human Rights, that searches 
4were often carried with great brutality and violence'. During night time raids, Hirst claims 
that it was a 4regular practice to ... carry men off to prison without any good reason, beat them 
up and torture them' (1977: 249) 
29 After 1967 there were numerous diplomatic efforts to break the deadlock, all of which were 
fruitless. King Hussein's issued a six point peace plan in early 1969 at the National press 
club in Washington. Speaking officially in conjunction with Egypt's Nasser, Hussein offered 
a comprehensive peace treaty and recognition of Israel in exchange for 'the withdrawal of its 
armed forces from all territories occupied in the June 1967 war, and the implementation of all 
the other provisions of the Security Council Resolution (242)', adding that Israel may have 
either peace or territory-but she can never have both' (Washington Report on Middle East 
Affairs, 2 April 1984) This proposal was rejected by Israel. In December 1969 the American 
Secretary of State William Rogers put forward another peace agreement based on UN 
Resolution 242, specifying that Israel would return to the pre- 1967 borders (with minor 
border modifications) and a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem would have to be 
found, in exchange for a comprehensive peace treaty. The proposals were rejected by the 
Israeli cabinet who declared that 'if these proposals were carried out, Israel's security and 
peace would be in grave danger. Israel will not be sacrificed to by any power policy, and will 
reject any attempt to impose a forced solution upon it. ' (cited in Shlaim, 2000: 291). In 1971 
the Swedish diplomat Dr. Gunnar Jarring reported that Egypt had offered Israel a full peace 
treaty based on resolution 242, with the stipulation that Israel also had to withdraw from the 
Sinai and Gaza Strip, settle the refugee problem in line with UN resolutions, and establish a 
UN force to keep the peace. Israel's reply though positive insisted that 'Israel will not return 
to the pre-5 June 1967 lines' (Shlaim, 2000: 300). This, Shlaim (2000) suggests, doomed the 
Jarring Initiative. It also drew repeated criticism from the United Nations. The Jarring 
Initiative was followed by attempts at achieving an interim solution which Shlaim suggests 
floundered on Israel's refusal to accept a timetable for a permanent settlement, and its desire 
for territorial revisionism. There followed in 1972 and 1973 a number of openly annexationist 
pronouncements by Israeli leaders. Moeshe Dayan told Time magazine in July 1973 'there is 
no more Palestine. Finished' and in April 1973 interview he talked of 'a new state of Israel 
with broad frontiers, strong and solid, with the authority of the Israeli government extending 
from the Jordan to the Suez Canal. ' (both cited in Shlaim, 2000: 316). Shlaim suggest that this 
together with the later publication of the Galilee document detailing a 
large expansion of 
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settlement building in the occupied territories, left Sadat little choice but to use force to try 
and regain the Sinai. 
30 Boyle (2002) argues that when the Israeli forces started advancing the Soviets had 
considered inserting their own force into the conflict leading the Americans to raise their 
nuclear alert to Def Con Three, the highest state of preparedness. He claims that in the face of 
this the Soviets backed down but that the World had come perilously close to a nuclear 
confrontation between the superpowers. Three Israeli and American analysts have also 
clamed that Israel threatened to use nuclear weapons against Egypt and in fact prepared to do 
so at the beginning of the 1973 war in order to force America to provide a massive 
consignment of conventional weapons, which was forthcoming (Perlmutter, Handel & Bar- 
Joseph, 1982). 
31 In March 1977 the Palestinian National Council called for an 'independent national state' in 
Palestine and an Arab-Israeli peace conference. Prime minister Rabin's reply was that 'the 
only place the Israelis could meet the Palestinian guerillas was on the field on battle' (New 
York Times, 21 March 1977) In 1977 the PLO leaked a 'peace plan' in Beirut that stated that 
the (explicitly rejectionist) Palestinian National Covenant would not serve as the basis for a 
interstate relations and that any progression beyond a two state solution 'would be achieved 
by peaceful means' (Manchester Guardian Weekly, 7 August 1977). In November 1978 
Tillman claims that Yasser Arafat in requesting a dialogue with American representatives 
issued the following statement: 'The PLO will accept an independent Palestinian state 
consisting of the West Bank and Gaza, with connecting corridor, and in that circumstance will 
renounce any and all violent means to enlarge the territory of the state. I would reserve the 
right, of course, to use non-violent means, that is to say diplomatic and democratic means, to 
bring about the eventual unification of all Palestine... we will give de facto recognition to the 
State of Israel' (Tillman, 1982: 215-8) In April 1981 after PLO acceptance of the Soviet 
peace plan, the PLO representative Issam Sartawi declared that 'from this it follows that the 
PLO has formally conceded to Israel, in the most unequivocal manner, the right to exist on a 
reciprocal basis'. A week later Sartawi issued ajoint statement with the former Israel general 
Mattityahu Peled: 'the PLO has made its willingness to accept and recognize the state of 
Israel on the basis of mutual recognition of each nation's legitimate right of self- 
determination crystal clear in various resolutions since 1977' (all references cited in 
Chomsky, 1999: 68-78) 
32 Testimony of Dr. Chris Giannou before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle 
East, 13/7/1982 (cited in Chomsky, 1999: 229) 
33 Fort other reports on ill treatment of detainees see Der Spiegel, 14 March 1983; Haolam 
Haze, 15 December 1982; or The Times, 18 March 1983 
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34 On the subject of Palestinian weaponry see Ze'ev Schiff, (Haaretz, 18 July 1982) or 
Hirsh Goodman (Jerusalem Post, 9 July 1982) who suggested the Palestinian 'army' and 
weapons posed no significant threat to Israel and that many of the claims regarding the scale 
of weaponry were exaggerated. With regard to cease-fire violations the Christian Science 
Monitor (18 March 1982) reported that the PLO had observed the ceasefire despite many 
Israeli provocations. The Abu Nidal group who attempted to assassinate the Israeli 
ambassador were sworn enemies of the PLO leadership and had previously tried to 
assassinate Yasser Arafat. All above references cited in Chomsky, 1999: 210). 
35 All extracts taken from Do Not Say That You Did Not Know, a report by the Israeli 
Committee for solidarity with Bir Zeit, June 5 1982, cited in Chomsky, 1999: 60) 
36 See for instance Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting 
the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, A/RES/38/79,15 December 
1983 or Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 
Population of the Occupied Territories, A/RES/39/95,14 December 1984 or UN Commission 
on Human Rights: Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, 
including Palestine, E/CN. 4/RES/1985/1,19 February 1985. 
37 A B'Tselern (Israeli human rights group) report on the treatment of children detained by 
Israeli forces found that 'illegal violence against minors, ... many [of whom] are 
innocent of 
any crime, ... occurs on a large scale. ' It 
found that violence directed against minors 
including 'slapping, punching, kicking, hair pulling, beatings with clubs or with iron rods, 
pushing into walls and onto floors, ' was 'very common'. It also detailed more severe forms of 
ill treatment: 'Beating the detainee as he is suspended in a closed sack covering the head and 
tied around the knees; tying the detainee in a twisted position to an outdoor pipe with hands 
behind the back for hours and, sometimes, in the rain, at night, and during the hot daytime 
hours; confining the detainee, sometimes for a few days, in the 'lock-up' -a dark, smelly 
and suffocating cell one and a half by one and a half meters [five by five feet]; placing the 
detainee, sometimes for many hours, in the 'closet' -a narrow cell the height of a person in 
which one can stand but not move; and depositing the tied-up detainee for many hours in the 
c grave' -a kind of box, closed by a door 
from the top, with only enough room to crouch and 
no toilet. ' The Israeli daily Hotam (I April 1988) reported the beating of a ten year old during 
an army interrogation who was left c looking like a steak', noting that soldiers 'weren't 
bothered' when they later found out that the boy was deaf mute and mentally retarded. 
Reporting on the treatment of Palestinians as young as 14 arrested 'on suspicion of stone 
throwing' the Israeli daily Hadashot (24 February 1992) cited the testimony of a insider at the 
Hebron detention centre: 'What happened there ... was plain 
horror: they would break their 
clubs on the prisoners' bodies, hit them in the genitals, tie a prisoner up on the cold 
floor and 
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play soccer with him - literally kick and roll him around. Then they'd give him electric 
shocks, using the generator of a field telephone, and then push him out to stand for hours in 
the cold and rain.... They would crush the prisoners, ... turning them into lumps of meat' All 
above reports cited in Finkelstein (1996: 47-9). 
3'For other references on Hezbollah's influence on Hamas see Haaretz (21 April 1994) or 
Nida'al- Watan (15 November 1996) 
39Amongst others the poet Mahmoud Darwish, the PLO's Lebanon representative Shafiq al- 
Hut (both of whom resigned from the PLO executive committee in protest), the leader of the 
Palestinian negotiating team and Gaza Red Crescent Society, Haidar Abd al-Shafi, the 
Palestinian negotiator as well as other prominent Fatah and PLO officials 
40 Hezbollah which also run a network of social services, claim they are trying to protect the 
local population, many of whom have been expelled from their home by Israel's proxy force 
the South Lebanon. Human rights groups have condemned the expulsions as 'war crimes' and 
demanded that they stop (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The organization has also condemned 
both Israel and Hezbollah for targeting civilians. 
4' European Parliament 1997-8 Session. Extract of the Minutes of the meeting of 13'h March 
1997. Resolution on Israel's policy of new settlement and the peace process in the Middle 
East, B4-0198,0219,0224,0233,0248 and 0264/97. 
42Amnesty notes that this has been achieved by restricting residency since 'the only 
Palestinians allowed to live in East Jerusalem are those holding blue identity cards - i. e. 
people counted in the census following the 1967 occupation, and their descendants' This 
policy has also served to curtail 'the normal migrational flows from rural areas'. Amnesty 
reports that although the blue cards are supposed to grant permanent residency status in East 
Jerusalem 'in practice however at least 6,257 of these blue cards had been confiscated under 
various pretexts up to 1998, rendering the holders' continued presence in their native city 
illegal and aimed at expelling the holder and family from East Jerusalem'. Since 1996 
Palestinians have also had to prove that their 'centre of life' is in Jerusalem using a variety of 
official documents. This had meant that the number of expulsions 'has increased to an 
average of 700 a year' 
43 Israel has consistently argued that a large influx of returning Palestinian refugees would 
present the state with serious security problems. The Israeli historian Benny Morris has 
argued that allowing the return of refugees to Israel would lead to the 'physical destruction' of 
the state: 
'A country divided between Israelis on the one hand and on the other Palestinians 
who had returned and were filled with anger not only at the way they had been treated 
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in the past but also at not finding their villages or homes available-that country 
would quickly become ungovernable. Each individual Jew living in the country 
would be facing a real physical danger' (The Right of Return: An Interview with 
Benny Morris, Tikkun, March/April 2001) 
Morris also argues that the 'state envisioned by the founders of Zionism was a state composed 
of a large majority of Jews' and that 'if you were to allow a right of return for several million 
Palestinians (who have higher birthrates than Israeli Jews) you'd soon have an almost 
balanced Arab/Jewish population-and that would soon mean that you'd no longer have a 
Jewish state. ' Unlike Western democracies, which are considered legally as the state of their 
citizens, Israel is defined as the 'state of the Jewish people'. Israel argues that granting a right 
of return to Palestinians would lead to a dilution in the scale of this Jewish majority and 
therefore destroy the 'Jewish character' of the state. A few Israelis, such as Yehudith Harel, a 
member of the Peace Now movement, however have argued that the positions taken by 
intellectuals such as Benny Morris and the mainstream peace camp are self-serving and 
inflexible: 
The attitudes reflected in [Amos] Oz's (founder of the Peace Now movement) article, 
even more than the political positions expressed, are the epitome of the intellectual 
corruption and the emotional handicap of the Israeli mainstream peace camp 
intelligentsia. This has generated within Israeli circles a deep-rooted patronising, self- 
righteous discourse, a lack of empathy for other people's suffering, a lack of 
understanding of their perspective and needs and, above all, an almost chronic 
conviction that the 'other' has to act in the best of Israeli interests. ' (Yehudith Harel, 
Peace Now and its 'Other'. Al-Ahram Weekly, January II- 17,200 1) 
44 Some elements of Palestinian opinion such as Al-Awda, the Palestinian Right to Return 
Coalition, made up of grassroots activists have declared in public statements that the right of 
return is inalienable and non-negotiable and cannot be bartered away by Yasser Arafat or any 
other Palestinian: 'We, the Palestinians undersigned below, at home and in exile, affirm once 
more that the Right of Return is an Inalienable Right, has no statute of limitation and does not 
permit concessions or delegation by others. It is a basic Human Right as affirmed 
by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, regional Conventions and UN resolutions especially 
the oft-repeated UN resolution 194. It is also derived from the sanctity of private ownership 
which is not extinguished by occupation or sovereignty' (Al-Awda, 
Press Release, 9.2.2002). 
Others have suggested mechanisms whereby the right could 
be accepted in principle, but 
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curtailed in practice, with significant numbers returning to a future Palestinian state, and a 
small number of symbolic refugees returning to Israel. For more information on these debates 
see Shaml: The Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre website. 
http: //www. shaml. org/groundNusseibeh/index. htm 
" See for example the Letter dated 16 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Italy 
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Document A/35/299. This was 
the common position put forward by nine Heads of State and Government and Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs of the European Community in Venice, in June 1980. 
46 For instance UN resolution 3005 passed 15 th September 1972: 'The General Assembly.... 
affirms the Principle of the sovereignty of the population of the occupied territories over their 
national wealth and resource ... Calls upon all States, international organizations and 
specialized agencies not to recognize or cooperate with, or assist in any manner in, any 
measures undertaken by the occupying Power to exploit the resources of the occupied 
territories .... Requests the Secretary-General [to investigate] The exploitation and the 
looting of the resources of the occupied territories' 
47 It is also likely that Blair's visit to Syria provided an opening to discuss the 
Palestinian/Arab perspective without attracting pressure from the pro-Israel lobby. Reporting 
on the perspective of the Syrian president during a visit by a British Prime Minister is 
unlikely to attract the degree of intimidation and pressure that broadcasters could face if they 
were to report that ordinary Palestinians viewed the Israelis as 'state terrorists', and suicide 
bombers as 'freedom fighters'. 
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